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Preface 
This document is an experiment in 
clashing disciplines together and 
seeing if anything useful survives. 
This is not the same as working in an 
inter-disciplinary manner, although 
that is a key recommendation, but 
rather using the tools and 
assumptions of one discipline to offer 
empathetic critique of those in 
another. 
… one could see place-based 
approaches as Copernican-
welfarist (Copernican in their 
inductive nature, based on 
observation; welfarist in their 
implicit assumptions to ‘know’ 
how a better place looks like); 
and the global models as 
Promethean-liberal 
(Promethean in their 
understanding that technology 
can solve the climate change 
problem; and liberal in relying 
on revealed preference 
approach) (Creutzig 2016: 354-
355).1 
This complex provocation from one of the 
leading voices on low-carbon transport 
thinking allows us to clarify the starting 
point of this report and to point to current 
                                                          
1 Creutzig, F. 2015. Evolving Narratives of 
Low-Carbon Futures in Transportation. 
Transport Reviews, 36(3): 341-360. 
short-comings in the literature. This 
document is an outsider’s reaction to 
literature produced by transport specialists. 
Anthropologists traditionally studied the 
exotic, rendering ‘foreign’ knowledge 
comprehensible. The exotic in this 
document is select literature on transport, 
primarily literatures where strategic 
transport thinking and planning 
acknowledges that people are subject to 
and use the end products of such plans. 
The purpose is to point to some, and only 
some, of the assumptions on which this 
literature rests.  
The approach is firmly ‘place-based’ and 
sees opportunity in exploring ‘local 
knowledge’, not to only to understand what 
a better place might look like, but also to 
understand barriers to change. Social 
science literature contains little evidence 
that the technology producers (read car 
manufacturers and enormous complex of 
allied productive agents) who have 
promoted auto-mobility are also likely to be 
key to the reduction of carbon emissions or 
more sustainable patterns of mobility, as 
they themselves now proclaim. 
Searches of the literature revealed no clear 
picture of what current projections of 
increased private vehicle ownership will do 
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to carbon emissions or levels of congestion; 
neither is there a clear picture of the 
consequences of plugging in millions of 
new electric cars into national grids nor for 
what such a new mobility regime will do for 
tax generation or, significantly, for carbon 
emissions. This is a moment of uncertainty 
for global transport – and arguably thus 
opportunity. 
Finally, although Creutizig’s division of the 
literature into these approaches 
conveniently illustrates some of the existing 
chasms across the literature it also seems 
to gloss all disciplines as branches of 
economics. Such bias - whether from 
economics or engineering, the disciplines 
leading the debate – tends to lead to the 
dismissal of the contribution that social 
science can make to complex urban 
transport decision making.
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Policy recommendations and questions 
Premise: In the same period that climate 
change has emerged as a cause for 
concerted global policy action, the intensity 
of mobility and the number of vehicles on 
the world’s roads has increased 
dramatically. It took a century to get the first 
billion vehicles on the road, the second 
billion will take a decade. Low carbon and 
infrastructure policy (often branded as co- 
or mutual-benefit) may serve the needs of 
local carbon and sustainable development 
goals; however, increased mobility, and the 
concomitant claims for economic growth, 
continue to be the taken-for-granted aims 
of such activity. Given the current 
technology available, this approach can 
only lead to ever-greater emissions from 
the transport and allied sectors. These 
sectors are motivated to increase mobility, 
decrease journey time, and ease 
congestion. Such goals without end in a 
finite world. The premises of these 
motivations need to be questioned as 
climate change and the conditions of the 
global transport scenario continue to 
diverge in fundamentally unsustainable 
ways. 
This document makes a small step to 
influence the environment in which future 
transport thinking might take place. Social 
science methodologies, and those from 
social anthropology in particular, are used 
to challenge some of the underlying 
assumptions in the current literature as well 
as to show that there is more to be done to 
understand context, people and the factors 
behind the adoption or abandonment of 
urban transport schemes. In transport 
thinking, some ideas are fetishized and 
unquestioned. Social science can help 
denaturalise the mystification of mobility, 
just as engineers and economists can 
guide social scientists to refine and redirect 
their questions. 
  
Inter-disciplinarity has long been 
recognised as important. In transport 
thinking, however, the potential co-benefits 
of inter-disciplinary research have not 
always been integrated into core aims and 
objectives. Transport needs more and 
better inter-disciplinary work and to 
acknowledge that transport is connected to 
other development and cultural domains. 
 
Recommendations and observations are 
divided into three convergent points of 
intervention: ‘out there in the world’, ‘in 
there among the transport professionals’ 
and ‘knowledge politics’. 
 
‘Out there in the world’ 
Climate and transport policy have 
converged over the last three decades but 
there remains a chasm in popular thought 
and action on the ground between climate 
concern and the actual aspirations people 
have for themselves and their families. 
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Anthropological and other types of social 
science research can be productively 
integrated into transport thinking to 
understand different contexts, aspirations, 
knowledge practices and motivations of 
people ‘out there in the world’. Such ‘soft’ 
factors are perhaps the key to engineering 
a low carbon and mobility future in which 
the premises of ever-increasing mobility 
are questioned as the central component of 
national and international development 
paradigms. 
Social science research consistently shows 
that the presentation of ‘science’ and ‘facts’ 
do not change people’s minds about 
climate change or their transport 
aspirations. Ideas about progress and 
development are not natural facts but 
political and cultural ideas about the world. 
These are also questions of emotion and 
subjectivity – and when understood as 
such become a creative resource for policy 
makers to work with: 
• Understand cultural conditions that 
influence attitudes and capacities 
towards low carbon transport and 
ideas of development are key to 
working across boundaries and to 
building a truly global agenda for 
transport thinking.  
• Engage with the aspirations and 
cultural conditions of people 
through opinion formers and 
networks of influence. 
‘In there among the transport 
professionals’ 
In a professional community, the norms of 
knowledge and practice typically develop in 
silos. It is hard to look outside disciplinary 
comfort zones and ideas from other 
domains can appear awkward. However, 
Recommendations:  
• Social science knowledge can be 
communicated to encourage 
transport professionals to think 
positively about the insights derived 
from qualitative research.  
• Reflexive social science techniques 
can make professionals aware of 
the assumptions that underpin and 
drive their own policy and practice. 
• Build skills and capacity in inter-
disciplinary and cross-disciplinary 
thinking (to erode the unhelpful 
division between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
solutions) 
• Integrate social science 
perspectives within transport 
programmes from inception rather 
than as afterthoughts or ‘add ons’ 
• Promote and advocate frameworks 
for thinking through social science 
questions in infrastructural 
programmes. 
• Develop toolkits and resources for 
mutual learning and support 
between social scientists and the 
transport community. 
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Knowledge politics 
The premise of this project has been to look 
at the politics of big knowledge in transport 
thinking. Where does knowledge about 
automobility, bus corridors or the mass 
displacement of people come from? Who 
produces this knowledge? What 
knowledge sticks and why? How can we 
learn to work against the grain of received 
wisdoms? 
The original brief was to look at the political 
economy barriers to the implementation of 
low carbon transport. Given the chasm 
between climate change urgency and on-
the-ground thinking about transport, the 
single largest barrier appears to be the 
political economy of knowledge production 
itself. 
 
Future questions might include: The 
world has changed since the foundational 
ideas on the relationship between 
infrastructure and economic growth were 
established. Do these old ideas still stand 
in the new world where there are other 
costs that cannot be ignored? 
Is mobility a right? What might ‘global 
mobility justice’ look like? 
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Summary 
Social science knowledge can be 
communicated to encourage transport 
professionals to think positively about the 
insights derived from qualitative research. 
Social science asks different kinds of 
questions and makes different types of 
connections in the field to those 
conventionally asked by engineers. 
Reflexive social science techniques can 
make professionals aware of the 
assumptions that underpin and drive their 
policy and practice. 
Understanding national cultural conditions 
that influence attitudes and capacities 
towards low carbon transport and ideas of 
development are key to working across 
boundaries and to building a truly global 
agenda for transport thinking. Social 
science methodologies are well suited to 
developing such understandings. 
Section 1 
Addresses some of the underlying 
assumptions of the Global Mobility Report 
(2017) to ask why the need for mobility 
itself is not questioned. 
New conditions of infrastructure demand 
call for revisiting old and unsatisfactorily 
answered questions such as: what is the 
relationship between infrastructure 
development and economic growth in 
urban areas? Is there any longer a 
demonstrable causal connection? 
Coalitions of organisations working with a 
global vision should dedicate resources to 
exploring the best methods for making 
agendas more inclusive, especially in the 
countries of Africa and South Asia. Such 
relationships may involve studied 
compromise rather than the universal 
acceptance of a low carbon agenda. 
Much research on low carbon transport 
seeks solutions in institutional reform. 
While important, demand-side aspirations 
and cultural expectations are also key. 
These are linked to broader cultural ideas 
about aspiration, progress and 
development. Once understood as such 
these can be treated as a resource to be 
worked with and influenced rather than as 
a barrier to change. 
Section 2 
Addresses the human factors associated 
with settlement and displacement caused 
by the development of urban transport 
infrastructures.  
Recent literature suggests that 
resettlement is always painful no matter 
how it is handled. Best practice suggests 
that resettlement should be central rather 
than secondary to new urban transport 
infrastructures, the language of 
resettlement should be positive and the 
timeframe and incentives for such projects 
should be projected into the future. 
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Restructuring urban transport typically 
treats resettlement as a secondary rather 
than as a primary activity. Prioritise 
resettlement and treat it as a contribution to 
lowering carbon emissions from transport 
by creating local opportunities and efficient 
transport links for new settlements – rather 
than it adding to commuting times and 
distances. 
Take a long-term approach to resettlement, 
distributing resources accordingly, as a 
way of smoothing disruption, minimising 
shock and trauma, and creating 
possibilities for optimism. 
Section 3 
Addresses the political economy of BRT 
knowledge and assumptions in a range of 
urban settings. The material addresses the 
question of what happens when knowledge 
is so well promoted and organised that it 
too becomes a barrier to sensible and clear 
decision making. 
BRTs are presented as a ‘win-win’ public 
transport interventions, with benefits for the 
economy, the poor and the environment 
(through low carbon transport technology). 
However, the vast majority of existing 
literature is funded by actors with economic 
interests in BRT.  
Independent research suggests – and 
there is need for more – that the 
implementation of BRTs benefits some 
actors and makes others worse off. 
Such actors (who might include pre-
existing transport operators, both bus 
owners and workers or local authorities) do 
not resist BRT due to lack of information (as 
is often suggested). Instead, they resist the 
negative impacts of BRT on their 
livelihoods and immediate environments. 
 
Section 4 
 
Addresses the symbolic and extra-material 
qualities of infrastructure to suggest that 
transport technologies themselves can 
carry behavioural-changing messages. 
 
Infrastructure is an object and 
infrastructure is also a set of social and 
behavioural patterns. Quite a lot is known 
about both qualities but much less is 
understood about the relationship between 
the two. This is perhaps the key 
contribution that anthropologists working 
with engineers and planners could make to 
the field. This is the field in which both the 
success and failure of low carbon transport 
initiatives is to be best understood. 
 
When we say that transport infrastructure 
contains within itself powerful messages, 
we are not saying that adverts can be put 
on the side of buses. We are pointing to the 
invisible and unspoken powers of 
infrastructures to fashion subjectivities and 
to engage with the world in very particular 
ways, ways that are open to change. 
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Section 5 
 
Addresses some of the ways in which 
social scientists have addressed the lack of 
action on climate change and have written 
about the fetish of automobility, i.e. why 
having a car and being auto-mobile has 
taken such a central place in thinking about 
rights and prosperity in most parts of the 
world. 
 
There is a great deal of 
international/science thinking on climate 
change, less social science thinking on the 
subject and much less policy thinking at the 
local/national level. This leads to climate 
change not being centrally incorporated 
into municipal/national transport agendas. 
 
Social science research consistently shows 
that the presentation of ‘science’ and ‘facts’ 
do not change people’s minds about 
climate change. These are ‘beliefs’ tied to 
political and cultural ideas about the world. 
These are questions of emotion and 
subjectivity – and when understood as 
such become a creative resource for policy 
makers to work with. 
 
Cars carry with them all manner of extra 
meanings to do with status, individuality, 
power and so forth. These associations are 
far from ‘natural’ they have been made by 
advertising and related systems of 
production.  
 
The fetish and political leverage of 
automobility are reasons for the absence of 
concern about climate change in the 
everyday world of transport decision-
making. Social science research can help 
denaturalise the mystification of mobility. 
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Glossary of terms and acronyms 
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CERs- Certified emission reductions 
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COP-3- Third Conference of Parties to the UNFCC in Kyoto, 1997 
CTFR- Clean Technology Fund, administered by the World Bank 
DA- Democratic Alliance, South Africa 
DART- Dar Rapid Transit Agency, BRT serving Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
DDPP-T- Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project for Transport 
EEA- European Environmental Agency 
ET- Emission trading 
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IAM- Integrated assessment models 
ICLEI- International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives 
IDDRI- Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations 
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ITF- International Transport Foundation 
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OP11- Operational Programme #11, a programme focussed on transportation within the 
GEF 
PPMC- Paris Process on Mobility and Climate 
PRD- Party of the Democratic Revolution, Mexico 
SBTi- Science-Based Targets Initiative 
SDGs- Sustainable development goals0 
SIDs- Small island developing states 
SLoCaT- Partnership on Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport 
SREP- Scaling up Renewable Energy Program, administered by the World Bank 
TDM- Transport demand management 
TransMilenio- BRT system that serves Bogotá, the capital of Colombia 
UNCED- United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, 
1992 
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Introduction 
There is an extensive and specialist 
literature on why low carbon transport 
projects can be difficult to develop, 
implement and sustain. The three phases 
– development, implementation and 
maintenance – throw up barriers of 
different types, and might be usefully 
separated to refine analytical precision, 
although these distinctions are generally 
not made in the literature. 
Much of the literature is written by 
transport professionals, whose technical 
and institutional knowledge and 
experience leads them to reproduce – 
even in the form of critical engagement – 
the conventions and history of their 
disciplinary and professional practice. 
This report makes extensive reference to 
the existing body of literature, not simply 
to summarise previous findings, but rather 
to identify areas where the conceptual 
tools and analytical methods from social 
science might productively aide thinking 
about future-oriented action relating to 
global transport. 
Urban contexts bring high-population 
density and high rates of mobility together. 
Currently, such a coincidence dramatically 
highlights congestion and pollution as two 
obvious outcomes, i.e. problems. These 
‘problems’ affect the large numbers of 
people in urban spaces. Policy and 
practical innovation, when applied to such 
contexts, therefore has potential to benefit 
many people simultaneously. Less obvious 
in this decision-making landscape, 
however, is climate change (as distinct 
from ‘pollution’ which is broadly recognised 
as a ‘problem’). The scale and invisibility of 
climate change remains, for many people, 
either distant or too large to be 
incorporated into their daily concerns. 
The relationship between transport and 
urban morphology has been a recurrent 
theme in the literature historically. 
Concepts such as density, diversity and 
design (DDD, as in Cervero and 
Kockelman 1997) and the comparative 
typology of cities developed by Thompson 
in the 1970s (full motorisation to traffic 
limitation) are two of the conceptual 
contributions best symbolising these lines 
of enquiry. Both approaches underpin 
subsequent thinking about the relationship 
between transport and urban and suburban 
land use. Cities have also been 
characterised by the dominant mode of 
transport and the different roles cities can 
play in varied national transport contexts 
(foci, hubs, transit metropolises, Cerero 
1998). 
2002 saw the publication of Cities on the 
Move, a World Bank Urban Transport 
Strategy Review and a major intervention 
in the field (Gwilliam 2002). The report 
moved discussion away from earlier 
interests of the World Bank in economic 
and financial viability (1986), the 
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integration of sustainable transport (1996) 
and the ‘liveability’ and competitiveness of 
cities (2000) towards a strong focus on 
poverty and poverty reduction in relation 
to urban transport policy. The report 
outlined a broad understanding of the 
urban transport problems in developing 
and transitional economies and outlines 
possible strategy for local governments to 
work on multiple fronts to improve urban 
transport.  
Importantly, the research developed a 
theoretical overview of the urban scene, 
looking at global trends of urbanisation 
and city growth. The case studies were 
strongly rooted in global data. Overall, 
Cities on the Move drew a picture in which 
increased wealth tended to mean the 
reduction of the quality of travel, 
particularly (but not only) for the poor; that 
urban growth, often oriented towards the 
accommodation of the car, led to greater 
travel costs and travel distances which in 
turn contributed to congestion and 
pollution. Significantly, motorisation 
tended to decrease the quality of public 
transport, while forcing the poor to 
cheaper land, both trends exacerbating 
poverty in a broad sense. This raises the 
interesting question: can this phase be 
skipped/planned away? Or, does the car 
have to take over urban space in order to 
be latter expelled? 
The report’s recommendations focused on 
urban planning, targeting the 
disadvantaged, encouragement for both 
public and private forms of transport, non-
motorized transport and mass transit, and 
institution building. Some of the case 
studies (TransMilenio in Bogotá, for 
example) discussed in the report played a 
key role in developing best practice 
elsewhere; others, notably bicycle 
schemes in Latin America and Africa have 
all but disappeared, while rates of bicycle 
ownership in Asia and Africa continue to 
fall. What was then called ‘Global 
Warming’ did not play a significant role in 
orienting the report, nor in its 
recommendations. Global Warming was 
treated in a similar way to urban air 
pollution. 
Since then, however, the world has grown 
wealthier, more populous, patterns of 
inequality have shifted, rates of car 
ownership (then central to Gwilliam’s 
understanding of morphological and 
density trends in urban areas) have 
expanded dramatically – changing the 
rules of the game in many urban areas. 
The projections of growth and technology 
used in 2002 now seem naïve as rates of 
vehicle growth, road building, mass transit 
schemes, BRT implementation, and the 
role of technology in changing urban 
transport markets and provision (Uber and 
other service sharing apps for example) 
has changed the face of transport thinking 
and what it means to be mobile. In most 
urban areas of South Asia and Africa 
congestion and pollution are now greater 
problems than they were then.  
22 
 
In more recent times, scholars have turned 
to examine social and economic indicators, 
such as transport cost, fuel prices, 
regulatory regimes and income levels. 
Building on this work, Starkey and Hine’s 
(2014) review of the literature on poverty 
and sustainable transport updates and 
condenses many of the key ideas in 
transport thinking in the subsequent 
decades. This wide-ranging survey of the 
literature points to the key problem of 
‘congestion’ for urban transport 
engineering. What can be done about 
congestion? New roads, mass transit 
solutions, the promotion of public and non-
motorised transport, traffic management, 
road pricing, and combining the means and 
aims of transport and land-use planning 
(2014: 36).  
These practical ideas are now well known 
and we do not repeat them in the main body 
of the report; instead, we turn to focus on 
communication and knowledge practices in 
relation to urban transport, on which the 
success or failure of these practical 
solutions may actually hinge. Engineers do 
not doubt that suitable technologies are 
readily available for more efficient and 
cleaner transport – there are however 
numerous barriers which prevent the 
implementation of such technology – and 
even for such technologies appearing as 
plausible options. 
More recently still, there has been new 
focus on behaviour and attitudes. In the 
transport literature, these are often 
described as ‘soft’ and ‘subjective’ 
characteristics as opposed to ‘hard’ or 
‘objective’ measurements. In part, this can 
be explained by the slow spread of the 
‘sustainability agenda’ from science to 
social science. However, there is still work 
to be done in embedding multi-methods 
and ‘softer’ approaches within transport 
research culture. 
The persistent tendency is to see 
qualitative data as fanciful and quantitative 
data as real. Such a self-serving hierarchy 
of knowledge diminishes the potential for 
creative and productive complementarity of 
methodologies and worldviews. Those who 
believe in a quantifiable or even objective 
world might also be persuaded that 
subjective views have objective 
implications - even if they are less willing to 
believe that their view of the world – that it 
can be understood quantifiably - is in fact a 
subjective and enchanted mystification of 
reality. 
In this report, it is taken for granted that 
personal transport preferences and 
decision-making are parts of broader 
cultural systems and do not exist in 
isolation as a straight-forward form of 
rational choice. This is a conventional 
starting point in many branches of social 
science. It is not however the starting point 
in much transport literature. For social 
sciences, and anthropology in particular, 
cultural and social norms and political 
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representation may influence all manner of 
reasoning about travel that are on the 
surface unrelated by ‘rational choice’. 
When these values and norms are 
understood in a broad sense and 
amalgamated only then can we understand 
mobility systems in any given urban context 
(we elaborate this conceptual view in 
Section 1 and elsewhere). So too are these 
observations true of views on climate 
change, mobility rights and relation 
between economic growth and human 
progress: from an anthropological point of 
view, these are not universal or common-
sense values but always have some local 
inflection to a greater or lesser degree. 
‘Holistic’ approaches towards urban 
mobility cultures (Götz and Deffner 2009) 
have attempted to bring together hard and 
soft ways of looking at the world. Recent 
studies, such as that under-taken by the 
BMW-funded think tank IFMO (2013), 
further develop the concept of ‘mobility 
culture’ as something that has to be 
understood if transport planning is to be 
effective. Elsewhere, for the last decade 
the idea of a ‘mobility turn’ has increasingly 
animated the social science discussion 
(see Urry 2007). Urry and other have 
argued that social science was too 
attached to particular places, and as 
people began to increasingly move so too 
should the approach and methods of the 
social scientist. 
This report brings some of the allied 
conceptual tools of social science and the 
mobility turn in particular into conversation 
with issues in transport thinking. 
In the last two decades, climate change 
mitigation efforts have moved from the 
realm of international governance regimes 
to city-level. This is a result of multiple 
factors, but those of particular relevance 
for the governance of low carbon transport 
include: 
 
(a) the slow pace of international climate 
change negotiations;  
 
(b) ineffectual treaties that have 
not generated expected or 
required results; 
 
(c) the general political impetus 
and conscious policy moves 
towards decentralisation and city-centred 
regional development; and  
 
(d) the unmistakable signs of deep 
environmental crises at city level: noise, 
toxic and particulate pollution, waste 
management failings, building safety 
concerns and congestion.  
 
These themes are fleshed out in Appendix 
1, which traces the recent history of 
transport within the context of international 
climate governance. This narrative sets 
the scene for the development of the 
policy landscape and general low carbon 
24 
 
zeitgeist which allowed the collaborators 
behind the Global Mobility Report (2017) 
to come together.  
 
The literature on low carbon 
transport shows the co-evolution of 
scientific knowledge and social 
institutions over the same period. At the 
end of the last century, the literature was 
dominated by models based on the idea 
of ‘integrated transport’, informed by the 
economic analysis of a distinct transport 
sector, artificially separated from planning, 
power, governance and general tax 
regimes. This research 
effort often used global/universal 
data to generate recommendations with 
a narrow focus on alternative fuels, 
innovative vehicle technologies and 
projected efficiency and emission savings. 
This body of work was largely produced 
by international climate change 
institutions (notably, IPCC and IEA) based 
in developed countries – who, at the time, 
were the primary arbiters of concern over 
climate change. 
 
After 2000, the move to decentralise and 
liberalise governance began to gain 
momentum and the World Bank took 
charge of major climate change 
funds. The literature moved from a focus 
on fuel and vehicle technologies to 
‘demand management’ ‘(avoid)’ and 
‘mode shift’. A growing number of papers 
during this period were produced 
by planners and behavioural scholars 
(again details of the high-level narrative 
culled from the literature can be seen in 
Appendix 1). 
 
In other words, however, there was a 
discernible change in the politics and 
language of knowledge production. This 
can, in part, be attributed to the evolution 
and maturation of the climate change 
debate: the content of specialist scientific 
knowledge has gradually been 
understood as a social problem and 
has slowly entered into the domains of 
other disciplines and sectors. This trend 
has been accompanied by the 
realisation – often compounded by on-the-
ground experience - that there are 
significant costs, alongside technical and, 
significantly, ‘human’ and 
‘knowledge’ barriers to the 
implementation of low carbon transport 
solutions in the urban areas of South Asia 
and Africa.  
 
This report draws on our strengths as a 
research team to focus on the ‘human’ and 
the ‘knowledge’ aspects of these 
equations, suggesting that it might be an 
opportune moment in the history of these 
debates to increase the social science 
resolution once more – not only as a way 
of introducing further ‘soft’ variables to our 
analysis, but as a way for governments 
and policy makers to develop a more self-
reflexive understanding of their own 
assumptions as they seek to enter global 
coalitions to influence and shape the 
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transport debate within the umbrella of the 
climate debate.  
 
In reality, the combination of 
these trends poses significant challenges 
for the traditional research 
community: the shift of policy initiative to 
the local level 
poses major methodological and 
epistemological questions for 
conventional transport research 
paradigms. Significantly, many of the 
key factors crucial for decision making 
at the local level are extremely difficult to 
quantify and are often not ‘scalable’, such 
as culture, politics and activities in the 
‘para’ and informal sectors. Therefore, 
what we might think of as ‘context’ 
emerges as the key to problem solving, 
rather than readymade universal solutions, 
such as fuel type, vehicle technology or 
out-of-the-box transport solutions such as 
BRT.  
 
Those typically conducting, analysing and 
implementing transport research and 
practice tend to be from engineering and 
scientific backgrounds. Over the years, 
they have formed strong communities of 
practice that have developed traditions, 
histories and networks of their own. As a 
consequence, knowledge and the ability 
to handle and understand qualitative data 
is lacking. There is a 
scepticism towards qualitative data, 
largely, we hypothesise, because of a lack 
of training and unfamiliarity with qualitative 
techniques – not because qualitative data 
is empirically unsuited for addressing such 
problems. 
 
The distinction and separation of 
qualitative and quantitative research 
methodologies is part of a set of older 
tensions about knowledge and knowing. 
The result is often that one set of research 
practitioners mistrust the methodologies 
of others. Questions of knowledge politics 
are at stake here – but so too are matters 
of education and familiarity. This report is 
written in that spirit – written by social 
scientists, explaining to transport 
engineers and planners what it is that we 
do and why this might be useful in 
understanding barriers to the 
implementation of low carbon transport 
technologies. Real engineers and 
planners exist in our own empirical 
research worlds, but here we have taken 
the literature to be representative of how 
knowledge is constructed in these worlds 
– with some recognition, although not 
perhaps enough, of differences in 
approach between these types of 
practitioners to both problems and 
solutions.  
 
There are of course 
behavioural economists and social 
scientists attempting to incorporate ‘social’ 
factors into climate change modelling and 
future transport planning, notably 
those who take a ‘multi-level 
perspective’ on ‘socio-technical transition’ 
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(see Whitmarsh 2012 for review). 
However, on the whole, they tend to direct 
their research effort to transport-oriented 
problems. Therefore, they may miss other 
important variables that a broader 
approach would allow to remain in focus, 
such as politics, culture and broader webs 
of aspiration and decision making. Some 
literature successfully bridges disciplines 
and approaches, such a Creutzig (2015), 
Hughes (2017) and Naess at al (2015). 
However, when we compare these three 
combined approaches we see that the 
various starting points are so different that 
a further comparison of combined 
approaches runs into conceptual 
difficulties.  
 
In another register, scholars have 
produced a significant body of research 
on BRT; however, due to the relegation of 
‘social science questions’ in favour of 
‘transport questions’ and, often even more 
specifically, ‘industry 
questions’, this literature primarily 
addresses the importance of the 
technology or the role of cities as lead 
players, with little deeper reflection about 
legitimacy, functionality and actual impact 
of such transport regimes on people who 
consume and produce mobility in the cities 
of South Asia and Africa. The literature 
develops a vocabulary and framing of its 
own, becoming increasingly parochial 
while being increasingly universal in its 
application. We address the production of 
knowledge in relation to BRT in Section 3 
and touch on it again in Section 4. 
 
From a social science perspective, 
successful planning for urban transport 
requires both a knowledge of the 
environment in which planning is taking 
place and an understanding of the 
expectations and aspirations of those 
being planned for. Planning too is a form 
of culture and has distinct organisational 
practices, histories and influences in 
different parts of the world. When planning 
is viewed as a technical process rather 
than a social or cultural one opportunities 
are lost to affect behaviour and attitudinal 
change. At other times, arguably as with 
BRT, technology itself becomes the 
‘solution’ and people necessarily become 
the ‘problem’ or the ‘barrier’.  
 
Significantly, there is 
a complete absence from the sustainable 
transport literature of the type of self-
reflexive research that has dominated 
the academic fields of sociology, 
geography and social anthropology for the 
last three 
decades. Through research practice, the 
researcher is able to ask questions about 
the values, methods and aims of 
researchers themselves and 
their own knowledge practices. Self-
reflexive research sheds light on the 
cultural and planning assumptions of 
researchers and institutions that employ 
them, that could be used to great effect in 
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the formation of a global sustainable 
transport planning agenda, when the 
agenda requires working across different 
cultures of government, expectation and 
aspiration.  
 
In this report, some of the techniques and 
possible insights of a reflexive social 
science approach are brought to bear 
on: the Global Mobility Report (2017) 
(Section 1), urban displacement (Section 
2), BRT schemes (Section 3), the hidden 
or ideological messages that can be 
conveyed with transport infrastructure 
(Section 4), and ‘automobility’ (Section 5). 
Given the scale and limited time-frame of 
this project, the findings represented here 
are suggestive rather than exhaustive – 
but hopefully pave the way for asking 
broader questions and contribute to a 
better integration between social science 
and key research on sustainable urban 
transport solutions. As mentioned above, 
Appendix 1 provides the high-level context 
in which current debates and concerns 
can be meaningfully traced to the present. 
 
Conversely, it must also be added that 
although transport planners might ignore 
or dismiss qualitative social science, this 
review has demonstrated to us a 
significant lag between the emergence of 
ideas on the international stage and the 
scholarly treatment of such issues by peer 
reviewed social science of international 
standing. Only now, for example, are 
social scientists beginning to focus 
on whether climate change is 
happening or not, to critically address new 
forms of knowledge politics and claim-
making in relation to climate, and 
the significance of thinking in terms 
of ‘North and South’ at the expense 
of ‘urban v rural’ – these 
debates perhaps seem quite old hat for 
‘the transport guys’ and have been on the 
international policy agenda for two 
decades or more. 
 
For many disciplines, it is the case 
that local matters are considered too 
trivial for scholarly effort. For example, 
research on international law has 
expanded while research on local 
government and decentralisation 
has contracted. Local issues are not 
as visible as national or international 
issues to most theorists, and often 
require time-consuming 
and expensive field research, which is 
itself often under-valued. Also, case 
studies are not easily scalable 
to general theories. Therefore, overall, as 
the power is pushed into the mega and 
secondary cities of South Asia and Africa 
there is little critical research being 
undertaken on how to make this power 
count in relation to SGDs or broader 
humanitarian values which can be instilled 
through thinking about transport in new 
ways. 
  
The lack of data is often presented as the 
primary barrier to the implementation of a 
28 
 
low carbon transport agenda. 
Governments are not resourced to provide 
performance indicators and targets 
against which action can be calibrated. 
This lack takes place in an already-difficult 
field, where calculating the GHG 
emissions from transport, for example, is 
subject to considerable disagreement. 
Recent decades have demonstrated that 
targets are difficult to establish and, 
furthermore, it is harder still to find 
equitable and universally acceptable 
methods to work towards such targets. 
There are similar difficulties in quantifying 
the impact of ‘co-benefits’ that can be 
realised through transport interventions, 
which may considerably enhance the cost 
effectiveness of activities in the sector if 
ways are found to mainstream low carbon 
transport targets in other related spheres 
of urban governance.  
In sum, major political economy barriers to 
the implementation of low carbon 
transport emerging from the literature are 
many and varied: 
Political factors include, low levels of 
government and political commitment to 
implement measures to reduce the 
expansion of private car ownership; the 
unwillingness to scale-up or develop 
replicable sustainable projects; reluctance 
to reduce or regulate informal transport 
services provision because of its flexibility, 
employment creation and use-value to the 
poor (and conversely the demonstrably 
negative effects which typically come with 
trying to regulate these spheres); the 
influence of vested commercial interests 
promoting unsustainable transport 
solutions (for example, vehicle 
manufacturers, cartels of various kinds, 
transport providers, developers and land-
use planning authorities). It is also the 
case that substantial infrastructure 
projects are risky political investments for 
politicians and civil servants because they 
may take longer than an election cycle, 
and in many cases far more than one. The 
long-term planning required is difficult to 
square with the shorter term political 
needs of an enthused electorate. 
Economic and financial barriers include 
the brute fact that in most countries 
subsidies, pricing and planning systems 
generally continue to be oriented towards 
car ownership – even after three decades 
of international concern about the 
relationship between transport and 
climate change. Typically, cost-benefit 
analysis or general project management 
thinking does not address or account for 
associated negative externalities. Budgets 
might be stretched, reliable public funds 
limited, and borrowing rates prohibitive so 
that other more immediate human 
development interests may take priority, to 
the detriment of transport planning and 
environmental conditions. 
Institutional factors include the difficulty of 
integrated action and communication 
across regulatory, planning and fiscal 
bodies: transport use is intimately, 
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although seldom explicitly, connected with 
policies in other sectors where other 
priorities may take precedence; for all 
sectors, and at all levels of governance, 
working across agencies within cities and 
within development contexts is notoriously 
difficult. Local authorities may have limited 
influence within private or informal sectors; 
legal frameworks may be insufficient or 
obsolete; local institutions may have 
experienced different rates of reform and 
have incompatible working procedures 
and aims.  
Two key issues stand out from the World 
Bank’s long experience in low carbon 
transport (Gwilliam 2013): 
• The struggle local governments 
have had to incorporate ‘paratransit’ 
companies within public transport 
services. It is important for cities to 
incorporate the informal sector to 
improve its capacity to provide 
service and reduce resistance; 
however, in the real world, 
municipal governments often lack 
the resources and capacity to 
handle ‘paratransit’ companies. 
• There is a strong perception that 
public transport is for lower 
classes, and the private car is 
valued as a status symbol and a 
development right; individual 
choice is therefore often extremely 
limited in urban transport contexts 
given the absence and costs of 
transport alternatives.  
There is also a lack of skills or capacity to 
develop and implement appropriate 
technologies and methods in a wide 
variety of fields such as integrated 
transport planning; vehicle, fuel and 
infrastructure standards; assessment, 
evaluation and accounting of transport 
impacts.  
In many settings, the market for low-
carbon alternatives is not fully developed. 
For example, although it may be possible 
to import a low-carbon vehicle technology, 
there is no infrastructure or local industry 
that enables its maintenance. Monopolies 
in the supply of specific low-carbon fuels, 
make their use an ineffective cost option 
and serve as a deterrent for a broader 
uptake. In addition, in new markets, the 
business case for a specific low-carbon 
alternative may not have been explored 
yet or discussed openly.  
In some accounts, the lack of awareness 
or education is presented as a major 
obstacle to the implementation of change. 
We do not rule out the possibility that 
limited understanding of local or global 
environmental concerns might play a role; 
however, social science research on 
climate change suggests that the 
provision of information or ‘facts’ does not 
simply change people’s minds nor their 
behaviour; thinking about climate and 
culture are also cultural values tied in with 
global ideas about justice and equity.  
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What is striking about the literature overall 
is the extent to which explanations are 
located in institutional and governmental 
failing. Of course, the institutions in 
question fund research and, 
unsurprisingly, seek justification to 
improve, change and reform themselves 
and others. As institutions, they may best 
recognise other institutions and see 
institutional form as a legitimate form of 
knowledge and set of standards and 
practices to work with. An alternative is 
offered by social science research with a 
focus on qualitative ideas and ‘the people’. 
The people are those who vote for certain 
ideas and use – or not – particular forms 
of transport innovation. A stronger 
understanding of what ‘the people’ think 
about the future, technology and 
development questions – the kind of 
knowledge a good local politician may 
have as well as a field-oriented researcher 
– might make the work of institutions 
thinking about future transport more 
effective. 
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The big numbers 
In some quarters, it is widely acknowledged 
that climate action/ambition in the transport 
sector has been insufficient when 
compared to the requirements of mid-
century Paris compatible transformations. 
Ambitious transport decarbonisation 
requires a global alignment of strategies by 
state and private sectors and people.  
However: 
Each decade or so produces a series of 
ideational statistics that become the 
defining wisdoms of the age. It is beyond 
most of us to know, even specialists, how 
accurate they are - even so, they become 
the basis for projections and the 
imagination of the world as heading in a 
certain direction. 
Global transport thinking currently operates 
on the following frequently cited numbers: 
It took a century to get the first billion 
vehicles on the road, the second billion will 
take a decade. 
If trends observed in the last decade of the 
twentieth century were to prevail, the most 
notable change in urban transport would be 
a shift from walking and cycling to private 
motorised vehicles. Public transport will 
decrease in market share in all regions. 
Global transport emissions grew at an 
average annual rate of 2 percent from 1990 
to 2012 and up to now remains amongst 
the fastest growing sectors of CO2 
emissions. In 2012, transport was the 
largest energy consuming sector in 40 
percent of countries worldwide, and second 
in the others. In one projection, energy 
related to CO2 emissions are expected to 
grow by 40 percent between 2013 and 
2014.  
The transport sector contributes between 
20-25 percent of global energy-related 
greenhouse gas emissions and 18 percent 
of all man-made emissions in the global 
economy. 
In the coming decades, the economies of 
Africa and Asia will expand rapidly. In 2015, 
there were 29 cities of more than 10 million 
people - within a decade it is estimated that 
there will be 12 more. 
About 7.5 billion trips were made every day 
in urban areas worldwide in 2005. The 
share of daily trips made by public transport 
was at 16 percent, walking and cycling 37 
percent, whereas private motorised 
moments had around 47 percent - about 
three times the share of public transport. 
Current logic suggests that improving the 
fuel efficiency of vehicles reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution. 
Vehicles consume less carbon to travel the 
same distance. However, allowing the 
number of cars on the road to double in the 
next decade would mean that energy 
efficiency of the average vehicle (other 
things being equal) would have to improve 
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beyond all current technological 
possibilities just in order to keep emissions 
from transport at current levels. 
The International Transport Forum (ITF) 
calls for a significant reduction of transport-
related emissions. This requires profound 
transformations in the provision of mobility 
and freight services. Identifying these 
transformations and defining concrete 
actions for their implementation requires an 
understanding of technological, social and 
economic challenges, opportunities and 
enabling conditions, at different scales and 
from different perspectives. 
In response, there are numerous exciting 
initiatives, such as the Decarbonising 
Transport initiative of the ITF, working with 
governments towards decarbonisation of 
the transport sector; the Deep 
Decarbonization Pathways Project for 
Transport (DDPP-T), led by the Institute for 
Sustainable Development and 
International Relations (IDDRI), working for 
country-driven decarbonisation of transport; 
the Paris Process on Mobility and 
Climate (PPMC), led by Movin’ On 
(Michelin) and the Partnership on 
Sustainable, Low Carbon Transport 
(SLoCaT), is developing a macro-roadmap 
as a framework for action on transport; and 
the Science-Based Targets Initiative (SBTi) 
is developing target-setting tools and 
guidance for the transport and logistics 
sector. 
What is not particularly evident in 
conversations taking place at these levels 
is that people demand mobility, demand 
can be understood and such understanding 
can be used to generate behavioural and 
aspirational changes. 
It is also the case that outside the initiatives 
mentioned above there remains a very 
wide gap between transport thinking driven 
by concern over climate change and the 
statistics on future mobility projections. 
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Section 1: Aspirations and the Global Mobility Report 
The Global Mobility Report was launched 
by the World Bank in the autumn of 2017. 
It is the first attempt to examine the 
performance of the transport sector 
globally. Most significantly, perhaps, it 
represents a serious and exciting attempt 
at thinking about what sustainable 
transport might look like in an uncertain 
future. The Report was produced by a 
number of institutions in the form of a ‘multi-
stakeholder partnership’ – with significant 
funding from DFID. Various organisations 
fed data of varied provenance and 
research of different types into the Report. 
The spirit is international and 
acknowledges that we have a shared 
responsibility to shape the future transport 
agenda. The ultimate aim of the Report and 
the project it represents are to create 
mechanisms for global decision-making to 
influence the development of ‘universal 
sustainable mobility’ and investment 
patterns.  
The Global Mobility Report acknowledges 
that we are at a critical juncture in global 
thinking about transport. Actions we have 
already taken and decisions we have 
already made mean that mobility will only 
increase in the coming decades. More 
people, goods and ideas will be transported 
here and there than ever before. The 
creation of new markets for vehicles, falling 
costs of production (often at the expense of 
safety in some countries), and the 
continued expansion of existing markets – 
will increase the number of vehicles on the 
world’s roads. In the next decade, it is 
estimated that annual passenger traffic will 
exceed 80 trillion passenger kilometres. 
This represents a doubling of the distance 
travelled in a period of only 15 years. It is 
also estimated that within a decade there 
will be more than twice as many cars in 
operation than there are today. In short, it 
took a century to get the first billion on the 
road and will take a decade to get the 
second billion fuelled and running. 
This is an extraordinary and troubling 
forecast, which comes at a time when 
climate change policy and thinking has just 
about become entrenched in some 
institutions in some parts of the world. This 
is not simply a case of policy being un-
joined. When seen in this light, transport 
policy and planning - at least to the degree 
that these practices corresponds to actual 
vehicle numbers - would seem to have a 
trajectory quite at odds with the broader 
aims of carbon reduction and sustainable 
transport. It is not only the sheer number of 
vehicles that staggers, nor is it the levels of 
congestion and pollution that such an 
enlarged fleet can rightly be imagined to 
produce; rather, it is the knock-on effects of 
such mass automobility that will have 
serious implications for increased 
consumption and therefore sustainability 
agendas in all sectors. 
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Despite these rather cataclysmic forecasts, 
the report makes no suggestion that 
mobility is itself the problem; instead, the 
challenge is presented as being how to 
‘meet’ the ‘growing aspirations for mobility’ 
(2017: 6). Mobility is itself treated as a 
valuable commodity and is described as 
having the potential to improve lives and 
livelihoods. Mobility is presented as a 
signifier of economic growth which will 
somehow (the key question of ‘how’ is not 
clearly spelt out in this Report, although it 
is perhaps assumed that this comes with 
economic growth) improve the ‘quality of 
life’ and ‘help minimise the effects of 
climate change’.  
Looking to the future, cities are quiet, air is 
clean, people ping and zip here and there 
using a variety of existing – but improved – 
transport technologies, border crossings 
are efficient, the world is punctual - and all 
this happens with minimal environmental 
impact and without compromising 
opportunities for future generations. This is 
a utopian vision in which we go on doing 
our business as usual - more of it even - 
saved by clean sources of power and the 
development of integrated and efficient 
thinking which translate clearly into the way 
we achieve consensus, attain political 
power, and plan and construct our built 
environment. It is utopian, but it is also 
wishful thinking, with the technological 
aspect of the projection being perhaps 
more probable than the creation of global, 
efficient and harmonious systems of 
governance for global transport. Part of the 
problem with this picture is whose vision it 
represents – whose ideas are these? We 
return to these questions later. 
Underlying this rather optimistic picture is 
also an acknowledgement that the future of 
mobility has the potential to engender 
inequality, promote the consumption of 
carbon, contribute to the further 
degradation of the environment, and have 
a negative impact on global health. The 
Report suggests this as a possible scenario 
for the future, although it sounds rather like 
the present.  
In order to avoid this less desirable 
pathway, the Sustainable Mobility for All 
initiative aims to make transport equitable, 
efficient, safe and green. Significantly, the 
global multi-stakeholder partnership that 
produced the Report is an attempt to create 
a voice and movement within global 
transport thinking. The transport sector is 
poorly represented in sustainable 
development goals (SDGs), and, although 
transport clearly transects many of these 
goals - given the significance of mobility as 
a source of inequality and emissions - it is 
surprising that little dedicated thought on 
the topic went into the formulation of the 
goals. In addition to forming a lobby, the 
partnership aims to structure the space - 
the vision – for the future of transport 
thinking and to develop measures and 
indices that will facilitate the tracking of 
transport development in different sectors 
and regions. 
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This report is a small contribution to 
structuring that space by bringing social 
science thinking into disruptive 
conversation with discussions around 
transport. 
The central challenge outlined in the 
Report is to ‘meet’ (2017: 6) ‘the growing 
aspirations for mobility’, and ‘the strong 
association between transport and 
economic growth’ (2017: 14). Clearly 
demography and technology are significant 
variables in what the future of mobility 
might hold, but of particular significance is 
the acknowledgement that ‘people aspire 
to live in a mobile society where they can 
move easily from place to place, travel and 
relocate as needed, and have quick and 
easy access to a range of goods and 
services’ (2017: 14).  
This is an incredibly important statement of 
recognition and is supported by much of 
the social science literature on grassroots 
development and class formation (the 
emergence of a middle class) in Africa and 
South Asia. This literature shows the 
elevated place of mobility in the 
imagination of development - and the 
powerful symbolic status or social capital 
that mobility can bring with it. As incomes 
rise, a vehicle and a suburban house (for 
which personal mobility is a requirement) 
are high on many people’s shopping lists. 
There is, so to speak, an incredible 
demand for mobility - but this is generally 
oriented towards two and four-wheeler 
personal transport rather than the shared 
spaces of mass transit.  
The theory used in the Report to 
understand this ‘aspiration’ is from 
economics in the forms of supply and 
demand. By identifying where market 
performance is sub-optimal or fails and by 
investing in these sectors - it is reasoned - 
all can be given sustainable mobility and no 
one will be left behind. Given the multiple 
authorship of the Report, it is not surprising 
that the text has an uneasy and 
inconsistent relationship with market 
mechanisms. It is noted that the market 
does not distribute transport, infrastructure 
and services equitably (for example 2017: 
38). Elsewhere, the Report acknowledges 
that vulnerable groups are not likely to be 
well served by the free market in mobility. 
Those listed as vulnerable include women, 
children, those with disabilities and older 
persons – or, in other words around two 
thirds of the population. Given such 
numbers, might it not be better to see these 
vulnerabilities as produced by the market 
rather than exclusions from it? Those who 
benefit from the operation of such markets 
(presumably adult men) are likely to over-
use their private automobiles to the 
detriment of public transport systems, 
resulting in congestion, excessive fossil 
fuel use and air pollution (2017: 25). 
 
At the heart of this economic model is the 
rational decision-maker who naturally 
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wishes to ‘satisfy private needs, without 
taking into consideration the collective 
present and future needs’ (2017: 25). Such 
action is exemplified by high levels of car 
usage and the continued development of 
an automobile-focused transport system. 
Thus, what constitutes a set of individual 
choices in the short term is not a 
sustainable pathway for the planet in the 
longer term (a point clearly made in a World 
Bank (1996) report written in the mid-
1990s). 
This point is easy to articulate, difficult to 
comprehend, and virtually impossible to put 
into working practice. National and 
international technological path 
dependency, slow rates of policy change, 
and grassroots demand for mobility point to 
a ‘runaway world’ of ever-increasing 
mobility. It is this demand or aspiration for 
mobility and automobility in particular which 
is perhaps the single largest barrier – or set 
of barriers because the aspiration can be 
further refined and thus better understood - 
to the implementation of low carbon 
technologies and the reduction of carbon 
emissions. The aspiration is not only to be 
mobile but to be mobile in particular ways, 
with bikes and cars in particular taking 
centre stage.  
A model in which two thirds of the 
population are rendered vulnerable and the 
remaining third contribute to traffic jams is 
not sustainable; neither, however, is it 
particularly helpful in understanding the 
complexity of the mobility aspirations the 
Report aims to meet. 
 
Anthropology and aspirations 
What are aspirations? Aspirations are 
wants and preferences that influences 
choices and the ways in which ideas, 
promises and plans are received and acted 
upon. Anthropologists have argued – as 
part of the perennial attempt to counter the 
hegemony of economists - that these are 
not simply rational choices but are part of 
cultural value systems. Therefore, 
aspirations can be seen as parts of wider 
ethical and metaphysical ideas, and 
specifically related to other cultural ideas 
such as time, progress and rights. In other 
words, aspirations are not individual 
decisions but part of collective webs of 
endeavour that may find reflection in other 
shared ideas and values. While aspiration 
might have history in a particular place or 
culture, it is more important to understand 
that aspiration influences the actions 
people take as they anticipate what the 
future might hold; or, what they hope to 
gain from the future; or, what a just future 
might look like.  
Aspiration then is connected to other ideas 
and becomes part of a broader system of 
cultural values. This anthropological 
understanding of aspiration allows us then 
to think of aspiration as a resource, 
something that can be understood, worked 
with and ultimately influenced. As 
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Appadurai (2004) has suggested, 
aspirations might be casually thought of as 
a future good life. However, upon closer 
scrutiny, aspirations directed at a good life 
tend to be formed from more specific and 
local ideas about marriage, work, status, 
health, and progress. Increasing the 
resolution further, these kinds of norms are 
often submerged and unarticulated, only 
emerging as singular expressions of wants: 
for this house, that marriage, for a two-
wheeler or a car, or to be mobile, or to be 
somewhere else.  
The visible and readily-comprehendible 
shopping list of wants do not reveal the 
layers of rationale and context-driven 
decision making that have nurtured such 
wants. Therefore, to want a car could 
appear as a rational choice rather than as 
a cultural value – but only if the aspiration 
for an object is decontextualised. When so 
decontextualized, such aspirations 
become individual choices to be 
understood in the terms of calculation and 
market-economics and the cultural import 
and weight of such aspirations is 
disappeared. But, and to repeat, these lists 
are inevitably and significantly tied up with 
more general norms, presumptions, and 
axioms about the good life, and life more 
generally. They emerge from deep-rooted 
ideas about justice, rights, privileges and 
what constitutes human development and 
progress.  
Aspirations, in a general sense, then can 
help us understand why people are mobile 
and why mobility has become such a 
strong value and want – but only if we link 
mobility to a broader set of cultural 
impulses. However, aspiration is not a 
homogenous cultural value or faculty. It is 
unevenly distributed across a given 
population. In Appadurai’s provocative 
view, the rich have a more fully-developed 
capacity to aspire because they are more 
likely to be conscious of the links between 
the more and less immediate objects of 
aspiration. Because the better off, by 
definition, have a more complex 
experience of the relation between a wide 
range of ends and means, because they 
have a bigger stock of available 
experiences of the relationship of 
aspirations and outcomes, because they 
are in a better position to explore and 
harvest diverse experiences of exploration 
and trial, because of their many 
opportunities to link material goods and 
immediate opportunities to more general 
and generic possibilities and options. They 
too may express their aspirations in 
concrete, individual wishes and wants. But 
they are more able to produce justifications, 
narratives, metaphors, and pathways 
through which bundles of goods and 
services are actually tied to wider social 
scenes and contexts, and to still more 
abstract norms and beliefs.  
As Appadurai says, the balance is in favour 
of the wealthy - the rich get richer – 
because acquiring wealth is itself part of 
the experimental process through which 
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one learns about connections, language 
and strategy. In this sense, ‘the capacity to 
aspire’ is a form of navigation or skill. ‘The 
more privileged in any society simply have 
used the map of its norms to explore the 
future more frequently and more 
realistically, and to share this knowledge 
with one another more routinely than their 
poorer and weaker neighbours’ (Appadurai 
2004: 69). This is not to claim that the poor 
cannot develop strategies, wish for things 
or aspire – but it is to say that the landscape 
in which they can do so and the resources 
at their disposal are necessary more limited. 
Other social scientists might make similar 
arguments about the role of agency in 
relation to poverty and opportunity.  
The inverse of this argument is that the 
poor may have fewer resources to imagine 
and create alternative futures. Access to 
the cultural capital, technology and 
accomplices will be more limited. Thus, 
again following Appadurai, the capacity to 
imagine and manufacture possible courses 
of action is also less developed. This 
argument seems to sit well with choices 
about mobility and technology. The 
possible options and technologies for 
mobility among many of the poor of South 
Asia and Africa are quite restricted when 
compared to the choices available to the 
wealthier. The adverts, available brands 
and status claims of their friends and 
neighbours follow quite limited pathways.  
When seen in this light, the capacity to 
aspire is a cultural quality, the fortification 
of which may accelerate the building of 
other capacities. If so, Appadurai suggests, 
it ought to be a priority concern of any 
developmental effort. In concrete terms 
and to this end, he suggests four strategies 
for those working in development contexts; 
his focus is on the poor but the strategies 
arguably have broader application: 
• Rituals of consensus production 
may provide a place to change the 
terms of self-recognition that define 
values and aspirations. 
• Capacity building should focus on 
local education that increases the 
ability to understand the links 
between aspirations, achievement 
and consequences. 
• Outside agents should encourage 
internal efforts to cultivate voice and 
confidence. 
• Any development project or 
initiative must develop a set of tools 
for identifying the cultural map of 
aspirations that surround the 
specific intervention. 
These proposals connect aspirations to 
culture and are guided by the assumption 
that understanding the values, morals, 
habits and material life of people is key. 
Appadurai’s ideas have embedded 
themselves within some strands of the 
international development world. The idea 
that aspiration, which could be nuanced by 
adding a strand of motivation, is a resource 
that can be understood and worked with is 
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an extremely powerful idea. Therefore, in 
order to ‘meet’ a world aspiring to be mobile, 
which is what the Global Mobility Report 
aims to set the conditions for, what does it 
mean if aspirations are cultural rather than 
belonging to the realm of rational choice? 
In order to understand this, we might wish 
to add our own criticism to Appadurai’s 
otherwise intellectually vigorous account. 
He presents to the economist a rather 
quaint notion of what culture is, where it 
comes from and what it does to people. 
Anthropologists have long given up on the 
idea that people live in hermetically sealed 
cultural worlds. Borders and boundaries of 
what we know and how we know it are open 
and in flux. Significantly, cultural values can 
be influenced and manipulated - including 
that of aspiration.  
Whole industries the world over have 
developed to manipulate and engage with 
the varied capacity people have to aspire. 
At one level, advertising encourages and 
promotes demand of particular kinds - this 
car over that, this deep-seated 
restlessness or insecurity to be overcome 
with this or that product – politicians thrive 
in this terrain also; at another level 
altogether, entire systems of production 
and consumption continue to produce their 
own messages which run deeper in popular 
consciousness than any slogan or brand – 
and which develop individual and collective 
aspiration in particular directions, often to 
the point to which aspiration seems little 
more than common sense. One of the key 
questions which is attached to the idea of 
aspiration is: where does the aspiration to 
be mobile come from? Is it natural? Most 
anthropologists would say ‘no’. If it is 
cultural then how are we best to 
understand it? And, what information, ideas 
or alternative values might be introduced or 
cultivated to lessen the aspiration to be 
mobile?  
There is a second and final use to which 
anthropological ideas of aspiration can be 
called upon to help illustrate an important 
point. The Global Mobility Report is itself a 
form of aspiration. The authors are leading 
and world experts in their fields, drawing 
upon the resources of personal experience 
and well-funded institutions. The aim of the 
Report is to develop global thinking in 
relation to transport - this is laudable and 
surely to be encouraged. However, the 
partnerships from which the Report 
emerged were between wealthy institutions 
and those with the cultural capital and 
financial security to think about 
sustainability and transport in particular 
ways. Recall the quiet cities and clean air 
of the future. This is not a mainstream 
vision in much of South Asia or Africa, 
where for many the daily struggle is to 
become mobile, a process that generally 
demands aspiration for technologies of 
mobility which are oil powered. The greater 
challenge for such a global partnerships is 
to decolonise the transport movement and 
to work with those whose national 
ministries are over-seeing the increased 
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consumption of carbon, the further 
degradation of the environment, and 
negatively impacting on global health. This 
is a question of culture as much as it is one 
of technology or ‘facts’. Planners can 
deeply influence ‘culture’ through what they 
do – both directly through what they 
produce and more profoundly by the 
messages that accompany what they do. 
In his rather unpunctual inaugural address 
to the International Road Federation in 
Delhi in November of 2017, the minister 
responsible for India’s highways told the 
audience that his country was now building 
more than 35km of four-lane highway per 
day – an incredible rate but still some 15km 
behind his target. When the Global Mobility 
Report was released at the same 
conference the following day, one of the 
worst periods of air pollution in India’s 
history was coming to an end. Traffic-jam 
bound Delhi-ites blamed farmers in Punjab 
for burning stubble. The panellists 
congratulated Jose Luis Irigoyen from the 
World Bank for his excellent report before 
turning to discuss electric vehicles and 
smart technologies. There were no Indian 
or Chinese faces on the stage as part of the 
global discussion. The rest of the 
conference proceeded in a similarly divided 
fashion, with the men who build roads in 
India attending one set of panels and 
representatives of international sustainable 
transport attending others. The difference 
in the culture, language and aspirations of 
these two interest groups was laid out in 
rather stark contrast. 
The point is not to say that the aims of the 
Global Mobility Report are wrong – far from 
it – but to say that in other parts of the world 
the cultural basis of individual and national 
aspirations emerge out of very different 
developmental and cultural concerns. 
While not easy to work with institutions that 
have such different starting points, ways of 
operating and paymasters, without working 
across such divides the global vision of the 
future is likely to be rather parochial and 
exclude some of the most carbon-
influential countries on the planet. 
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Section 2: Urban transport and displacement: When people are a barrier 
Addis Ababa Light Rail 
The Addis Ababa Light Rail (Ethiopia) is a 
17km electrified double track rail line 
running from the city centre to industrial 
areas in the south of the city. It was 
constructed by the China Railway Group 
Limited, with funding from the Export-Import 
Bank of China. It is part of the Addis Ababa 
Master Plan to modernise the city. The 
scheme has been promoted as a greener 
and safer means of transport for city 
commuters. The first line opened in 
September 2015. 
The construction of the Addis Ababa rail line 
led to the demolition of thousands of homes 
in order to make space for the rail tracks 
and stations. While rich companies were 
able to raise law suits to secure substantial 
amounts of compensation for the relocation, 
most of the displaced were rendered 
voiceless under the government and the 
contractor’s heavy-handed approach to 
dissent and complaints. 
Most displaced were relocated in a rush to 
half-finished, unsafe buildings on the 
outskirts of the city with cramped living 
space. These housing units were without 
doors, windows and paths and there was no 
access to electricity, water and private 
toilets. Some newly built resettlement units 
collapsed, and people who had already 
been re-housed had to be moved yet again. 
Apart from poor living conditions, the 
displacement also disrupted the socio-
economic and cultural lives of those who 
were moved, brought back environmentally 
unfriendly practices and exacerbated the 
vulnerability of the poor. For instance, 
without electricity, women were forced to 
build traditional clay stoves by hand and 
purchase expensive wood from farmers as 
a fire source for cooking. Unable to afford to 
travel long distances to schools, having no 
electricity to watch TV at home, and with no 
recreation facilities in the resettlement area, 
many school children were left resenting 
their displaced conditions, wandering on the 
street and joining street gangs.  
In 2012, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation 
displaced 2,700 land owners in Adama City 
of the Oromia region, an area of the country 
with a long history of ethnic conflicts. A 
strong protest in 2014 against the 
government’s continually evolving Addis 
Ababa Master Plan left dozens of protesters 
dead under the government’s explicitly 
‘merciless’ approach. In 2015, the 
government announced the tenth Addis 
Ababa Master Plan seeking to further 
expand Addis Ababa city (with the rail line 
as a key component) into the Oromia region. 
The fear of forced eviction and 
displacement immediately sparked 
widespread protest. Human rights groups 
reported that at least 150 protesters were 
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killed and another 5,000 were arrested by 
security forces in the initial conflict. Enraged 
Oromos, especially those in the rural areas, 
perceived the Master Plan as a ploy by 
other ethnic groups, especially the Tigray 
and Amhara, to uproot them from their 
fertile lands under the guise of development. 
The government had to make an 
unprecedented policy U-turn and cancel the 
development plan, due to concerns that the 
protestors might otherwise turn to support 
the local armed ethnic rebellion groups 
threatening the already fragile stability of 
the country. Unfortunately, however, the 
policy U-turn was too late to stop the public 
outcry and the resulting tragic violence. The 
Ethiopian government announced that the 
nation was in ‘a state of emergency’ in 
October 2016. Human rights groups 
reported that the incident had turned into a 
major human rights crisis with many 
hundreds dying in the chaos.
 
 
Lyari Expressway Karachi 
Lyari Expressway is a 16-km city district 
expressway currently under construction 
along the Lyari River in Karachi, Sindh, 
Pakistan. It was promoted as a way to 
alleviate the traffic to and from Karachi Port 
and as a solution to flood protection. 
Construction started in 2002 and remains 
incomplete. 
Protests against proposed demolitions and 
the resettlement plans were the main cause 
for these ongoing delays. Local NGOs 
estimated that the government’s original 
plan would lead to 25,400 housing units and 
8,000 commercial and manufacturing units 
being demolished. At the time, this was 
probably the largest urban demolition 
project for the purpose of urban road-
building in the world, with considerable 
social impacts resulting from an estimated 
77,000 families (230,000 persons) being 
moved, 26,000 students’ education being 
disrupted, and 40,000 wage earners losing 
their jobs.  
The project had been shelved by the 
previous government due to the 
contractor’s decision, in the face of effective 
protest, to withdraw from the project. The 
contractor came under pressure when local 
NGO’s networked with international 
journalists to expose the scale of the 
demolition. Sufficient press coverage of the 
plans in Canada, the home country of the 
contractor, compelled them to withdraw 
from the project.  
Nevertheless, the military government 
decided to proceed with the project with a 
halved government budget and, without 
prior consultation nor notification of the 
affected residents, started the demolition. 
When the Hawke’s Bay resettlement site for 
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the Lyari affectees was established 30km 
outside the city in 2002, the displaced found 
little infrastructure was in place, nor were 
regular bus services to Karachi. 
The demolition was met with extraordinarily 
well-organised protests from the affected 
communities, who staged not only physical 
protests but also successful political 
lobbying and campaigns in the international 
media, employing human rights activism 
and prolonged legal challenges in their 
struggle against the government. As a 
result, the project was halted for lacking 
sufficient resources to fund the resettlement 
schemes demanded by the protesters. 
Local planning and development NGOs had 
teamed up with academic experts and 
activists, serving as an incredible 
knowledge resource to the affected 
residents. This coalition armed affected 
residents with a professional level of 
knowledge that helped them organise and 
build broad support networks, both locally 
and internationally.  
The government’s plan was challenged as 
an environmentally unfriendly, 
unsustainable, corrupt and discriminative 
attempt against the poor. The protesters 
had managed to reach a high-level of 
support, including from the opposing 
political parties’ alliance ‘Muttahida Majlis-
e-Amal’, the UN, and over 1,000 
international human and housing rights 
organisations, creating immense political 
pressure. The government was only able to 
continue the construction when an 
unexpected court ruling divided and 
weakened the affected residents’ alliance, 
and sufficient government funding for the 
resettlement project was secured. 
 
When people are a barrier 
Not always, but often, new transport 
infrastructures require corridors be made in 
urban areas. This may cause the 
fragmentation of the urban space and 
cause disruption to those who remain in the 
area. Buildings are demolished and people 
have to be moved and resettled. 
The literature records the complexity of 
resettlement and the changing emphasis of 
guidelines and best practice (Mathur 2006, 
2013). The literature also records the pain 
and hardship generally associated with 
relocation, even when it is managed 
efficiently and with humanitarian sensitivity.  
Anthropologists have pointed out that 
communities may appear to have unifying 
characteristics such as ‘lower income’ or 
‘urban poor’ but, in fact, generally speaking 
communities are comprised of groups of 
people with varying capacities, interests 
and aspirations and, therefore, resettlement 
affects people in different ways (Oliver-
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Smith 2009, 2010). The process is never 
going to be without discomfort and some 
will do better than others.  
There are features in the landscape that 
cannot simply be compensated for, such as 
memories, religious sites and the particular 
dynamics of the community having 
developed in situ (Cernea 2007, 2008). The 
costs and the difficulties of resettling people 
often mean that this element of a project 
receives less care and attention and 
resources than the main headline grabbing 
piece of transport infrastructure. 
Resettlement projects generally are 
unwanted extra costs, rather than at the 
heart of rethinking urban transport 
infrastructures. 
The World Bank implemented a set of 
international standards in 1980 as a 
response to the displacement of people in 
Brazil. The International Finance 
Corporation also has its own standards 
which are commonly used in the private 
sector. Most of the international 
development banks, export credit agencies 
and development cooperation agencies 
have their own standards relating to the 
relocation resettlement projects they fund. 
There are a number of international 
guidelines in place which are aimed at 
assisting displaced people to improve, or at 
least restore, their former living standards 
and earning capacities. Ideally, displaced 
people should be compensated for their 
loss at replacement cost and given 
opportunities to share in the benefits 
brought about by new projects. The 
displaced should be consulted on the 
transfer and provided assistance to both 
move and transition to the relocation site. 
Moving people in groups is recognised as 
making the disruption of dispossession and 
relocation easier to live through. Minimising 
the distance between original and 
relocation sites might mean that former 
patterns of livelihood and sociality can be 
retained. The relocated should be 
encouraged to take part in the design and 
ethos of resettlement sites, and wherever 
possible, existing institutions should be 
used to conduct the transfer, relocation and 
transition processes. New institutions with 
uncertain powers risk being unfamiliar to 
the displaced, exacerbating their potential 
alienation. Those resettled should be 
provided with viable settlements with 
infrastructure and services that ideally are 
also integrated into the broader urban fabric. 
Price (2015) reviews the international 
standards, suggesting there is an 
increasing alignment and that similar 
guidelines exist across the major 
institutions. However, it should also be 
noted that national and urban governments 
do not always follow international standards 
relating to the acquisition of land, many 
often relying on other kinds of expropriation 
procedures and the use of force, rather than 
negotiation. 
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Resettlement requires a great deal of 
planning and careful implementation in 
consultation with those responsible for the 
main incoming infrastructure project. Often, 
contractors and agencies vary, making 
cooperation difficult and ineffective. In 
essence, relocation involves the destruction 
of something that has history, complexity 
and interconnectivity, and the provision of 
some new alternative, often at some 
remove. Sometimes, though perhaps rarely 
now, cash compensation is given; at others 
there may be the provision of compensation 
for lost assets; other schemes may also 
provide mechanisms to encourage 
livelihoods’ restoration and educational 
opportunities. There might also be activities 
to encourage the recreation of social 
institutions, collective rituals and vernacular 
forms of authority and decision-making. 
In most of these scenarios, land has to be 
acquired to make way for a new settlement. 
Even in informal settlements, land prices 
where new infrastructure is critical tend to 
be high and such areas are also typically 
densely populated, adding to the complexity 
of the resettlement challenge. The 
temptation to acquire low-cost land is 
understandable; however, this means that 
those resettled may be asked to surrender 
something of high value with a central 
location in exchange for something of low 
value in a distant and remote location. 
Resettlement sites may become part of 
other planning visions for the future, such 
as new satellite cities on the outskirts of 
mega city. Such locations tend to be cities 
in the making, which in the short term might 
mean that they lack the services and 
excitement of a larger city. 
Obviously, moving people away from where 
they have settled will mean disrupting their 
rhythms, routines and journeys through the 
city, including journeys to school, work or 
other forms of civil society activity. Often, 
livelihood provision is far more complicated 
than having a ‘job’, as people rely on 
multiple strategies and engage in a wide 
variety of activities to support their families. 
Many will also have investment in local 
savings schemes, access to informal credit, 
beneficial rental arrangements, remittances 
from family members elsewhere and so 
forth. Many of these sources of support are 
invisible to the naked eye and difficult to 
tease out even by skilled qualitative 
researcher. 
Given the embeddedness of most people in 
their local environment, the complexity of 
resettling them becomes increasingly 
apparent and there are obvious 
development questions and opportunities in 
the programme of resettlement. Should all 
livelihoods be restored? Should some 
livelihoods be discouraged? 
Owen and Kemp (2016) express doubt as 
to whether planning can address the 
complexity and uncertainty associated with 
project-induced displacement. There are 
simply too many variables, and planning for 
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the restoration of people’s subjectivity is an 
unrealistic goal. Being moved from your 
home to make way for new forms of 
development, which may exclude you, even 
if the most stringent best practice guidelines 
are followed, will create physical, 
psychological and social forms of stress. 
The uncertainty and the adaptation to new 
forms of habitation are documented to 
induce many forms of illness. 
Livelihoods and educational opportunities 
are perhaps key to remaking communities. 
In pioneering resettlement site research by 
Cernea (1997, 2006), it has repeatedly 
been shown that the risks associated with 
resettlement include landlessness, 
unemployment, homelessness, new forms 
of marginalisation, insecurity of food 
provision, reduced access to common 
property resources, increased morbidity 
and mortality, perhaps accompanied by the 
declining health associated with stress, and 
the dis-articulation of community. 
Displacement is a cause of disruption and 
sensitivity. The kinds of protest movement 
and suffering associated with displacement 
are now well known and, as the Karachi 
case study shows, are readily recognisable 
in international media. However, it takes 
many years for resettled groups to reform 
into what we might think of as communities, 
and to become part of local economies. 
Longer-term studies of resettlement 
communities show how normalcy is re-
established over the years and how new 
forms of ritual and sociality can emerge 
(Simpson 2013). The short-term focus on 
resettlement and the short-termism of 
compensation packages, consultation and 
the language of movement arguably 
contribute to this disruption and sensitivity. 
By taking a longer-term perspective, by 
putting incentives in the future and by 
emphasising the possible longer-term 
benefits of moving, displacement might be 
framed, and thus seen, as a more positive 
step rather than a sacrifice. 
Well-known cases in the literature from 
Mumbai (Patel, Cruz, Burra 2002), when 
people were displaced by rail developments, 
have shown that there is perhaps an 
inverse relationship between the ways in 
which people participate in their own 
resettlement and the level and degree of 
stress that resettlement causes. 
Participation is key, but so too is 
communication. Resettlement should not 
be presented as a sacrifice for development, 
but seen as a development and transport 
planning opportunity. The kinds of actions 
authorities took in Ethiopia are short-
sighted and in violation of international 
norms. The protestors in Karachi added 
significantly to the overall cost of the project 
and the timetable. Shifting the focus away 
from transport innovation to resettlement 
innovation would entail investment in 
upgraded facilities, reducing requirements 
for mobility from the new sites, and making 
the sites part of transport and urban master 
plans rather than treated them as 
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afterthoughts. Such a focus on resettlement 
would also involve investment in the soft 
infrastructures that allow for the 
redevelopment of community features. 
Above all, such an approach should 
lengthen the time-frames for thinking about 
the move, so as to lessen the immediate 
traumas created by displacement, and to 
create incentives for affected people to look 
optimistically to the future. 
Other questions to orient future thinking: 
• When do the human costs of resettlement 
become too high for a project to proceed?  
• How can this be calculated?
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Section 3: The political economy of BRT: Knowledge as a barrier 
 
Bus Rapid Transit systems have come to 
play a prominent role in the list of options 
available for urban transport planners and 
engineers. It is clear that strong political 
will – rather than good engineering – is key 
to their sustained success. When such 
projects are treated as solely as 
engineering or planning projects then the 
likelihood of failure is greatest. Successful 
BRT projects tend also to focus on 
behavioural and attitudinal change and 
involve a strong social component. In 
South Asia there has been considerable 
investment in BRT schemes over the last 
decade. Initial successes now seem to be 
failing as new streams of funding, a 
preference for flagship schemes such as 
metros, and a new wave of low-priced 
automobiles have come to dominate the 
scene. 
 
The point made in this section is that the 
production of knowledge about BRT was 
encouraged by the industry itself. This 
knowledge was carefully produced and 
then cemented into the worldviews of city 
planners, so that in many cases BRT 
seemed like the only sensible option to 
ease congestion and to reduce carbon 
emissions, when in fact other options 
might have been empirically preferable. 
                                                          
2 On the current figures see: 
http://brtdata.org 
Despite attempts at developing global 
standards and forms of certification for 
BRT, many industrious city-level 
politicians and engineers developed their 
own ‘counterfeit’ versions. A review of 
these is absent from the literature, and 
thus this review.    
 
BRTs have been increasingly promoted as 
the way forward for public transport in 
developing countries. A consensus in the 
literature portrays them as the ‘win-win’ 
solution to chronic and rapidly escalating 
traffic congestion and to the low quality of 
public transport provision, which are 
widely-shared features of urban life in 
developing countries today. In 2007, forty 
cities across six continents had BRT 
systems. In December 2017, the figure 
had risen to 165. This increase mainly 
results from new BRTs in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa, where many more BRTs 
are currently being planned and 
negotiated. At present, Latin America 
hosts the largest number of operational 
BRTs (54), followed by Europe (44), Asia 
(43), North America (16), Oceania (4) and 
Africa (4).2 
 
It is crucial to note from the outset that 
while low carbon emissions have been an 
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important argument for the adoption of 
BRTs, the conceptual case for BRT relies 
on a broader set of arguments – around 
economic efficiency, environmental 
impact and public interest – that although 
continuously evolving, draws largely from 
foundational reviews and policy manuals 
(Levinson et al. 2003; Wright 2004a, 
2004b; Hook 2005; Danaher et al. 2007; 
Wright and Hook 2007; Engelskirchen 
2011). Such manuals are used by would-
be BRT implementers as planning guides, 
as they include step-by-step guidance on 
how to conduct pre-feasibility studies and 
list potential sources of funding for BRTs. 
 
Furthermore, BRT proponents have 
developed an effective communication 
strategy based on additional material for 
both specialised users and for the general 
public. In addition to training manuals, 
branding tools, such as the BRT ‘gold 
standard’ scoreboard, have been 
developed to aim at securing a uniform 
delivery of BRT-reforms. The success of 
the case for BRT is evident in the 
emergence of a consensus in the media 
and in literature that reproduces the same 
arguments put forward by BRT 
proponents (Badami 2005, 2010; Patel 
2006; Breithaupt 2008; Wright 2010; Filipe 
and Macário 2013), as well as by the rapid 
diffusion of the BRT model in cities of the 
developing world. 
  
Many of the cities that considered the 
adoption of a BRT system were emerging 
from a protracted period in which, private 
unregulated public transport had 
unleashed fierce market competition on 
the streets, creating deeply entrenched 
problems, including congestion, 
oversupply of under-utilised buses, 
exploitative work conditions, predatory 
driving practices, and high-levels of 
pollution by aging fleets (sometimes of 
imported secondhand vehicles that had 
been outlawed by emissions legislation in 
other parts of the world). In light of this 
diagnosis, public mass transport reforms 
were presented as an imperative and the 
BRT model was offered as the most cost-
effective form of reforming public transport, 
and therefore one suited to cities and 
metropolitan areas in the developing world 
(Gilbert 2008). 
 
The economic argument for BRT was 
central in drawing the attention of 
politicians and urban planners. BRTs were 
promoted as cost-effective solutions to 
mass public transport problems, 
transporting as many passengers, and 
leading to similar time savings, as rail-
based solutions, but at a fraction of the 
cost. BRTs were presented as the mass 
transport solution with the lowest cost per 
kilometre and lower overall life-cycle costs. 
It was argued that BRTs could operate on 
the basis of fares alone and would not 
require ongoing subsidy. Furthermore, 
57 
 
due to comparatively lower investment 
demands, BRT systems could operate 
profitably with lower passenger density 
when compared to rail-based alternatives 
(Fouracre et al. 2003; Wright and Hook 
2007; Breithaupt 2008; Hensher and 
Golob 2008; Deng and Nelson 2011; 
Adewumi and Allopi 2013; Cervero and 
Dai 2014). 
Technical and public welfare arguments 
also weighed in: BRT systems could allow 
for an intensification of transport, improve 
mobility, travel times, traffic safety as well 
as the overall reliability of public transport. 
Since BRT systems were said to work for 
both high-density corridors and spread-
out urban forms, they would be the ideal 
transport solution to meet the needs of 
cities that were growing rapidly and 
constantly changing (Matsumoto 2007). 
BRT systems would be easier to 
implement in developing countries since 
they required only minor changes in 
technology and ‘mindsets’ and were 
supposed to incorporate existing transport 
operators (Mejía-Dugand et al. 2013). The 
proposition of BRT systems as capable of 
incorporating, rather that displacing public 
transport systems’ existing workforce has 
been instrumental to the perceived 
favourability of BRT vis-à-vis Metro 
systems. 
In other cases, the BRT system was 
presented to urban planners as an inroad 
to adding value to urban land through 
investment in transport infrastructure and 
services. (Badami 2010; Suzuki and 
Shewmake 2011; Deng and Nelson 2013; 
Mathur 2015; Suzuki et al. 2015; Smith 
and Gihring 2016). Lastly, BRT systems 
were expected to have a positive effect on 
employment in the transport sector by 
creating more jobs and better work 
conditions (Deng and Nelson 2013; 
Wirasinghe et al. 2013; Cervero and Dai 
2014). 
The environmental case for BRTs saw 
their introduction as a way to reduce 
emissions in large mega-cities in which 
unregulated private operators were 
contributing heavily to pollution, as well as 
an engine of modal shift away from private 
cars to public transport: BRTs would lure 
private drivers through lower travel times.  
 
Attempts were made to develop standards 
for BRT schemes through study visits and 
planning guides. The aim was to lower the 
costs and time involved in the planning 
phase of BRT implementation. As 
previously discussed, BRT policy guides 
included detailed description of the 
planning process, sources of finance and 
lists of consultants. In highlighting best 
practice, BRT processes are rendered into 
a ‘flat-pack’ solution for local assemblage 
(Wright 2004a, 2004b; Wright and Hook 
2007; Hidalgo and Carrigan 2010b). In 
examining these instances of ‘policy 
tourism’ and policy transfer through the 
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conceptual frame of policy mobility 
proposed by E. McCann, Wood contends 
that such visits reinforce policy adoption 
within ‘ideologically prescribed 
parameters’ that allow the export of the 
BRT-model to very different polities, while 
protecting its consistent replication (2014, 
2015a, 2015b, 2015c).  
 
By contrast, the (albeit minimal) 
independent research, alongside a 
preliminary study of media coverage on 
TransMilenio, reveals a more ambivalent 
picture, in which the positive impacts of 
BRT co-exist with negative consequences. 
Although travel times, and the quality of 
transport, initially improved with 
TransMilenio, claims that it is ‘providing 
reliable transport accessibility for the poor’ 
(World Bank 2010) sit at odds with 
increases in transport fares, a trend 
observed in other cities following the 
introduction of BRTs (Muñoz and Hidalgo 
2013’ Muñoz et al. 2008, 2013, 2014).3 
There have been claims that it has 
prevented the poor from accessing the 
service and has led to public protests 
demanding lower fares. Such demands 
could not be met, as the bargaining power 
of the public regulatory body vis-à-vis 
private operators was low. Furthermore, 
                                                          
3 The inflationary impact of BRTs on 
transport fares has been observed in 
many other cities, with costs as high as 
1.05 US$ per trip (São Paolo, Brazil). Most 
the inclusion of previous public transport 
operators has often proved problematic. In 
Bogotá, ownership of BRT buses 
increasingly became concentrated in the 
hands of a few private operators, while 
other contexts presented their own 
distinctive, and at times violent, tensions 
over participatory inclusion (Paget-
Seekins 2015; Walters and Cloete 2007). 
 
Another major problem with TransMilenio 
was the contraction in employment 
opportunities that accompanied the higher 
productivity of labour. The proclaimed goal 
of replacing the exploitative informal 
employment relations of the pre-existing 
transport system with better, formal jobs 
was not straightforward. Only one in seven 
of the bus drivers in the old system were 
able to find employment opportunities that 
accompanied the higher productivity of 
labour. International loans were used to 
pay for the infrastructural work, thus acting 
as a hidden subsidy to the private 
companies operating BRT (Gilbert 2008: 
439-467). In sum, BRTs are mass transit 
systems which often display an 
unimpressive record in providing cheap, 
quality public transport to the poor and 
systems with a fare below 0.40 US$ are 
reported to be under financial stress. 
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mixed results in including previous 
providers of public transport. 
 
Beyond a ‘win-win’: A political 
economy analysis 
BRT systems require a more complex 
organisation than that of unregulated 
transport due to the introduction of new 
functions and actors. It has been observed 
that the adoption of a BRT system raises 
considerably the coordination demands 
on public authorities, who are ultimately 
responsible for setting in motion the 
planning and design of the project, for 
seeking finance to fund it and for securing 
political backing at different levels (Finn 
2013; Finn and Muñoz 2014). In effect, the 
World Bank explicitly saw the BRT model 
not purely as a transport technology but 
also as a vehicle for institutional reform of 
urban public transport at large (Hook 2005; 
Mitric 2006, 2013). More broadly, such 
reform is part and parcel of an agenda to 
reform urban governance and to develop 
new mechanisms for the private sector to 
play a role in the provision of public 
services.  
 
Precisely because BRT cannot be 
understood as a ‘win-win’ intervention to 
                                                          
4 In Ahmedabad the BRT system is failing, 
support for it has fallen away and a metro 
is being constructed. 
transform the provision of public transport, 
strong political will is required to introduce 
such schemes successfully. Political 
coalitions with the capacity to drive the 
project to maturity by ring-fencing it 
politically and bureaucratically are 
required. Such coalitions would in 
principle be eager to reap the political 
premium of being associated with a 
successful project, but in many cases 
have also paid the reputational price of 
botched interventions or the loss of 
legitimacy among those negatively 
affected by the introduction of BRT.  
 
Part of Narendra Modi’s political capital 
was gained through his association with 
the development of the Ahmedabad BRT, 
as Chief Minister of Gujarat. When more 
problematic aspects of this BRT came to 
the fore, Modi had already been voted in 
as prime minister. 4  Similarly, Jakarta’s 
Governor Sutiyoso was re-elected on the 
promise of introducing BRT in 2003 and 
gained some political capital from 
TransJakarta, until its problems became 
more evident. In 2009 and 2014 Sutiyoso 
failed to gain support for a presidential 
nomination (Matsumoto 2007). The early 
and evident failure of Transantiago in the 
first year of operation led to public 
backlash and the most intense popular 
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protests since the beginning of the 
democratic period (Libertad y Desarrollo 
2011; Gómez-Lobo 2012; Paget-Seekins 
and Tironi 2016). This leads several 
authors to claimSho that success in BRT 
implementation is correlated with the 
existence of political vision and leadership 
on the part of a determined individual or 
group, a ‘determined political champion’, 
an ‘enlightened Mayor’ or a ‘highly 
talented public administrators’ such as the 
Lagos State Governor, the Major of 
Bogotá and the Ahmedabad district 
collector (Wright 2004; Wright and Hook 
2007; Kumar et al. 2012; Basset and 
Marpillero-Colomina 2013; Deng et al. 
2013; Mitric 2013; UN-Habitat 2015). 5 
Mizuoka and Shimono (2013) argue that 
since BRT can be implemented in a typical 
mayoral term, it is well suited for political 
systems with high turn-over. The 
incentives are in place for ruling coalitions 
to finish and launch the system before 
their term is up. 
 
The transport formalization 
agenda 
The formalisation of public transport that 
BRT entails is linked to a shift in the 
conceptualisation of the role of the state in 
                                                          
5 Conversely, ‘lack of political leadership’ 
is blamed for the failures in the 
implementation of BRT projects and public 
transport coordination in general with 
public transport. Indeed, the development 
of BRT systems contributes to enhancing 
the state’s control of mass transport 
(Paget-Seekins and Tironi 2016) but 
added to this there is a more practical level 
at which trends towards the formalisation 
of mass public transport have political 
economy implications. BRT-proponents 
are right in claiming that BRT projects 
cannot be understood as discrete units of 
public intervention. The cases of BRT 
adoption that have failed to harmonise and 
integrate into broader transport system 
reforms seem to have been less 
successful. This is coupled with the fact 
that recommendations emerging from 
early BRT experiences emphasised the 
need to embed the BRT within integrated 
transport systems that ultimately aim for 
centralised fare collection and the overall 
formalisation of all transit operators, 
whether feeding into BRT trunk lines or not 
(Filipe and Macário 2013, 2014).  
 
In the case of Bogota, the lack of a 
coherent strategy for the integration of the 
system was blamed for the very low rates 
of modal shift and bus reconversion in the 
first phase of BRT (Ardila 2005; Echeverry 
et al. 2005; Willoughby 2013). Later 
phases were more effective in forcing the 
Santiago, Dhaka and Accra as cases in 
point (Mitric 2013; Muñoz et al. 2014; 
Agyemang 2015). 
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ousting of considerable numbers of 
paratransit operators and finding 
synergies between the system’s 
expansion and that of the network of 
cycle-paths, the regulations on public 
parking and restrictions on the use of 
private cars (Filipe and Macário 2014).  
 
The type of system integration promoted 
by BRT reforms results in a struggle 
between the integrated system and so-
called paratransit operators, not merely for 
the monopoly of operation along the 
transport routes, but also for the right to 
use stops, pavement and other urban 
assets in mass public transport. 
Furthermore, other aspects of the 
functioning of BRT reinforce formalisation. 
For example, the financial sustainability of 
BRT corridors is highly dependent on their 
ability to monopolise transport and attract 
as many riders as possible. BRT systems 
work best when the rest of the transport 
system, including paratransit operators, 
accommodate BRT and give it priority for 
operation in dense corridors.6 
                                                          
6 Metrobus in Istanbul provides a good 
example of a BRT system that takes over 
the densest corridor only, allowing fares to 
recoup operative costs and displacing 
non-BRT operators to the less coveted 
areas (Alokokin and Ergun 2012). 
7 The Quito BRT is publicly owned and 
operated. Key routes in the BRT of Mexico 
 
The displacement of traditional operators 
and restrictions on the unregulated use of 
public spaces have been characterised as 
form of ‘privatisation of the commons’ that 
is reinforced by the subsequent spike in 
fares - except in cases where subsidy 
mechanisms have been put into place 
(Paget Seekins and Tironi 2016). For neo-
classical economic approaches, the 
privatisation of the commons is instead 
seen as the necessary process of 
specifying use and property rights over 
roads and pavements (Echeverry et al. 
2005). In turn, this ‘privatisation of the 
commons’ contributes to municipal state-
led attempts at formalising the transport 
system, either by displacing informal, 
unregulated operators or by forcing them 
to operate by contract with municipal 
authorities. This trend, observed 
throughout Latin American cities has 
different effects depending on local 
balances of power. 7  The ultimate 
expression of the formalisation drive is 
system integration: a set of measures 
aiming to standardise and nest together 
City were contracted out to a company in 
which the old operators of the route are 
the main shareholders, while in Bogotá the 
routes were allocated based on 
competitive, open tendering, but 
companies that could demonstrate share-
holders among old paratransit operator 
received incentives. 
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routes, transfers and fare collection for all 
BRT and non-BRT operators. 
 
Political economy analyses of BRT-led 
formalisation or transport integration can 
lead to various interpretations. Paget-
Seekins and Tironi (2016) see the BRT 
expansion as the embodiment of a 
redefinition of ‘publicness’ in transport and 
a consolidation of a set of institutions that 
although publicly managed, are put in 
place as the means to enhance and 
facilitate the engagement of the private 
sector. Therefore, this would not be a case 
of outright privatisation of the commons, 
but a move in a similar direction (also 
Willoughby 2013). The classic example is 
the emergence of restrictions on the use 
of public assets, such as pavements and 
roads, that although remain publicly-
owned can no longer be used by any 
private operator, but are exclusively at the 
disposal of transport suppliers operating 
within the BRT framework. 
 
Alternatively, BRT interventions can be 
interpreted as a displacement of small-
scale transport operators and an ensuing 
loss of jobs and opportunities in the 
paratransit sector. These debates could 
be brought to the fore and further 
problematised by conceptualising more 
rigorously the ambiguous role of the state 
in these developments. First, it might be 
incorrect to speak of outright privatisation. 
Second, a more nuanced approach to the 
politics and tensions between a range of 
old and new public transport investors, the 
state and workers in the process of 
transport formalisation is required. 
 
Such an approach would study processes 
of competition, concentration and 
centralisation among different segments 
of capital (e.g. paratransit bus-owners and 
the state enterprises that own BRT buses), 
and struggles between capital (including 
state capital) and different types of 
intermediaries, contractors and workers in 
the transport sector (e.g. firms that supply 
outsourced transport services on behalf of 
BRT managers, their workers, workers in 
the paratransit sector and other 
contractors and drivers in a position akin 
to that of share-croppers in agriculture). 
Transport formalisation and the 
paratransit operators: 
Resistance and co-option 
Another theme that has received attention 
in the BRT literature is the effect of BRT 
implementation on social, political and 
economic groups and on the power 
balances between stakeholders in urban 
transport. Of particular interest are the 
effects of BRT adoption for traditional 
paratransit operators including drivers, 
bus owners and route concessioners, and 
the extent to which these groups can 
either be integrated into the formalised 
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transport framework, or alternatively resist 
these interventions. As the cases 
addressed in this section will show, the 
effectiveness of the opposition by 
paratransit operators depends on the 
degree of coordination and the type of 
political backing and leverage that such 
groups command in different political 
settlements.  
 
BRT-proponents tend to demonise 
traditional, para-transit and non-bus 
operators as wedded to an inefficient and 
polluting organisation of mass transport. 
Paratransit operations are regularly 
characterised as vested interests, 
constituencies capable of wielding their 
political power and connections to oppose 
the positive transformation of BRT 
implementation (Weinstock et al. 2011; 
Wirasinghe et al. 2013) and largely 
responsible for the historical deterioration 
of the quality of urban mass transport 
(Salazar Ferro et al. 2013).8  
 
In contrast, a historically-grounded 
analysis of paratransit operators reveals a 
different picture. Namely, that the informal 
unregulated private transport accounts for 
a larger share of passengers carried 
precisely in those cities in which public 
transport policy-making followed closely 
                                                          
8 Gauthier and Weinstock go as far as to 
equate paratransit with lawless gangs with 
the recommendations of the World Bank 
and other prevailing policy actors. These 
advocated a move away from public 
provision of public transport and the 
dismounting of subsidies and price 
controls during the 1980s (Schalekamp 
and Behrens 2010; Salazar Ferro and 
Behrens 2015). As research on Bogotá 
(Echeverry et al. 2005) and Dar es Salaam 
(Rizzo 2013, 2014) shows, the many 
inefficiencies which characterised the 
operations of private, and largely 
unregulated, providers of public transport 
reflected the highly congested nature of 
the market in which they operated, and the 
cut-throat competition that prevailed in 
them.  
 
By the early 2000s, the chaotic state of 
unregulated transport systems led to the 
formulation of a new paradigm in mass 
urban transport (around the publication of 
Cities on the Move). This paradigm 
articulated an explanation of the public 
transport crisis couched in new 
institutional economics, appealing to 
concepts such as market failures, 
information asymmetries and principal-
agent problems (Gwilliam 2002; 
Echeverry et al. 2005; Kominek 2005).  
 
political, rather than business, interest in 
mind (2010). 
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The gist of this argument, most 
influentially developed by Gwilliam (2002), 
is that market failures arise in unregulated, 
privately-operated mass urban transport 
systems due to misalignment between the 
incentives of the agents and the interests 
of principals. To begin with, operators 
have no incentive to offer quality transport 
services because their compensation 
depends solely on the quantity of 
passengers carried. Furthermore, route 
managers have no incentive to regulate 
the number of buses operating a given 
route, because their income is derived 
from monthly affiliation quotas rather than 
from the number of passengers carried.9 
Route managers exert political pressure 
for higher fares to attract more affiliated 
buses and the price mechanism ceases to 
act to correct market failures. This leads to 
oversupply, on-the-road competition for 
clients, traffic congestion, exploitative 
labour practices, pollution and inefficiency. 
As more buses enter the system, both 
average passengers per bus and operator 
incomes fall, despite rising fares. Route 
managers start to operate as cartels to 
capture the regulatory institutions that 
                                                          
9 Whereas route managing enterprises 
typically act as intermediaries between 
bus owners and public administration in 
Latin America, unscheduled, unregistered 
minibuses in African cities may be 
predominantly organised through transport 
associations (Schalekamp and Behrens 
(2010: 373) for a comparison) 
allow them to control a rent they derive 
from transport fares that are generally 
above efficiency levels (Echeverry et al. 
2005).10 This has different implications.  
 
• Bus associations, route managers 
and other players in the private, 
unregulated transport sector tend 
to become key political players and 
to wield considerable influence 
over the direction of urban 
transport policy.  
 
• Reforming such systems entails 
transforming the structure of 
incentives and the regulatory 
framework.  
 
BRT was conceived to carry such reform 
forward by restricting the use of public 
roads and raising the entry barriers for 
operation within the new system. The 
separation of transport services and fare 
collection and contracting and payment 
based on pre-agreed indicators are also 
strategies designed for state authorities to 
10 A different account of ‘carteliation’ refers 
to the problematic effects of the rolling 
back of public investment and intervention 
in transport during this period. Cartels 
arise to protect exclusivity in key routes 
and to help coordinate collective action for 
investment and maintenance of the routes 
(Kominek 2005).  
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regain power in the transport sector. This 
leads some to argue that BRT is above all 
a strategy to reform informal transport 
(Schalekamp and Behrens 2010; Salazar 
Ferro et al. 2013; Paget-Seekins 2015). 
 
As the impact of BRT on unregulated 
private transit operators can be significant, 
their resistance to its implementation can 
be a major political economy barrier. BRT 
implementers have developed two main 
strategies for dealing with paratransit: the 
integration of traditional operators into the 
new systems, and the mechanism for 
economic compensation used as an 
incentive for discontinuing their operation. 
In the most recent literature on BRT 
paratransit operators, their capacity to 
resist BRT is taken so seriously that their 
acquiescence is deemed politically 
expedient and necessary for successful 
BRT implementation (Wright and Hook 
2007; Hidalgo and Carrigan 2010a, 2010b; 
Agyemang 2015). The political and 
financial negotiations with paratransit 
operators have been so problematic, 
prone to conflict and protracted that 
Schalekamp and Behrens (2013) claim 
that the biggest obstacle to BRT 
implementation at present is paratransit 
reform, not infrastructural or financial 
considerations.  
 
In most cases, the phasing out of 
paratransit operators involves both 
scrapping old buses and mini-buses and 
seeking mechanisms to integrate old 
operators into the new system (Willoughby 
2013). There is some debate as to 
whether vehicle scrapping should happen 
on a voluntary or mandatory basis. The 
valuation of the vehicle does not appear to 
be problematic, but estimating foregone 
incomes and the value of existing routes 
was far more difficult in the case of Cape 
Town. The starting point of the negotiation 
with old operators was the promise that 
through their acceptance of BRT they 
would under no circumstance end up 
being worse off and that no jobs would be 
lost. The costing of this plus that of the 
compensations is rarely included in the 
operational costs of BRT, especially when 
compared to the cost of alternative 
transport solutions. The import of these 
additional and rarely visible costs is such, 
that in the South African context it led to a 
transformation of the original spirit of 
pushing for BRT at all costs into 
understanding the actual costing of 
implementing a thoroughly formalised 
trunk and feeder system such as BRT. 
This came with the realisation, as 
described by a transport consultant that: 
‘South Africa had jumped straight into this 
BRT story without understanding its 
financial implications’ (Schalekamp and 
Behrens 2013: 189; Flores-Dewy and 
Zegras 2012; Goméz-Lobo 2012). 
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Even in contexts where there was a 
genuine political will to incorporate pre-
existing operators, municipal authorities 
experience many difficulties in conducting 
consultations and negotiations with 
paratransit operators. To begin with, this is 
a highly fragmented sector, in most cases 
lacking universal and legitimate 
representation. In South Africa, municipal 
authorities have debated whether to 
engage with operators individually, which 
increases transaction costs, or through 
transport associations, which at times are 
ripe with internal disputes and 
undemocratic. Furthermore, should 
administrations negotiate with all 
paratransit operators or only with those 
whose routes are directly affected by BRT? 
(Schalekamp and Behrens 2010, 2013). 
 
The integration of old operators into the 
new system presents its own alternatives 
and problems. In some BRT systems, 
there have been attempts to transform 
paratransit operators into the firms that are 
contracted to provide transport services in 
BRT (Cape Town, Bogotá), while in other 
cases it was the operation of feeder routes 
what was on offer (Santiago). Either way, 
the incorporation of old operators requires 
a profound transformation of their 
practices (such as shareholding in the 
company, remuneration by contract, 
labour formalisation), as well as their 
consolidation into viable contracting 
partners, which requires training and 
support from the system manager 
(Schalekamp and Behrens 2013; Salazar 
Ferro and Behrens 2015).  
 
Different models of integration have been 
tried, usually depending on the relative 
political power of the operators. Mexico 
City opted for the direct allocation of 
routes to old operators, while in Bogotá 
competitive bidding for routes gave 
incentives to existing operators (Paget-
Seekins and Tironi 2016). However, 
whereas paratransit integration is seen as 
necessary to guarantee the political 
stability of the BRT project, opting for old 
operators as opposed to competitively 
selected bidders has been linked to 
problems further down the line. In the case 
of Mexico City, these have included 
resistance to further route reallocation, 
high costs, political, rather than technical, 
decision-making and the use of public 
funds to implicitly subsidise old operators 
in order to co-opt them politically in favour 
of BRT (Flores-Dewey and Zegras 2012).  
 
The political viability of BRT-lite in 
locations such as Lagos may also be 
linked to the comfortable position awarded 
to paratransit operators in the BRT 
corridor: the operation of the system was 
wholly outsourced to NURTW (the 
National Union of Road Transport 
Workers). LAMATA (Lagos Metropolitan 
Area Transport Authority) provided 
67 
 
financial support to buy buses on behalf of 
NURTW and bought other buses that 
NURTW operates on lease (Mizuoka and 
Shimono 2013). 
 
Irrespective of the conditions awarded to 
paratransit operators, not all incumbents 
have participated in consultations or been 
finally integrated into the new system. 
Despite mitigation strategies, many see 
their access to transport routes and their 
livelihoods threatened by BRT and 
existing transport operators have 
organized protest, and in some cases, 
forms of violent resistance to the plans for 
urban transport reform.11 In South Africa, 
poorly conducted negotiations have 
contributed to a growing antagonism 
between authorities and paratransit 
operators and have inadvertently 
contributed to the creation of new 
associations with more coherent 
oppositional strategies and greater 
capacity to disrupt the BRT process 
(Schalekamp and Behrens 2010).  
 
Drawing from the Latin American and 
South African experiences, it is clear that 
the integration of paratransit operators into 
BRT has been limited and problematic 
                                                          
11 All South African cities developing BRT 
systems experienced violent protests by 
paratransit operators in 2008 and 2009. 
The operators decried the lack of 
whenever it did take place. This difficulty 
has serious implications for the possibility 
of reducing carbon emissions through 
BRT. This dispels the idea that paratransit 
integration will happen spontaneously and 
without difficulty (Gauthier and Weinstock 
2010). In the absence of contractual 
guarantees, considerable support and 
subsidies, the integration of paratransit 
operators would simply transfer the 
operational and financial costs and risks of 
a massive transport reform, whose 
success is unguaranteed, to precisely the 
groups that stand to lose their livelihoods 
from BRT adoption (Salazar Ferro and 
Behrens 2013). The complete eradication 
of paratransit operations advocated by the 
early BRT-proponents is unrealistic and, 
some argue, potentially harmful for the 
transport system as a whole.  
 
Two alternatives are discussed in the 
literature: a slow and progressive 
formalisation and upgrading of existent 
operators with the long-term objective of 
switching to BRT corridors (which is 
probably a better characterization of the 
process taking place in Lagos) or simply a 
more effectively regulated but liberalised 
transport market (Schalekamp and 
consultation and the prospective loss of 
employment in urban transport 
(Schalekamp and Behrens 2010). 
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Behrens 2010; Salazar Ferro and Behrens 
2013). 
 
In contrast to BRT narratives, paratransit 
operators account for the largest share of 
passengers transported in all cities without 
rail-based options – and even in some 
cities with metro and urban rail systems 
(e.g. Caracas) or in cities with large BRT 
operations (Mexico, Quito). In Bogotá, 
despite perceived accomplishments in the 
carrying capacity and utilisation of BRT, 
the system accounts for a mere 20 percent 
of modal split, with paratransit operators 
accounting for the remaining 80 percent 
(Salazar Ferro and Behrens 2013). 
 
It is worth pointing out that there are 
complementarities and advantages in 
paratransit operation that have been 
largely ignored by BRT-proponents. 
These include: greater flexibility, 
responsiveness to changes in patterns of 
demand, and their specialisation in door-
to-door type of services. It was estimated 
that before the introduction of 
Transantiago, 98 percent of the city’s 
inhabitants lived less than 800 meters 
away from any of the paratransit routes on 
offer and around 10 percent of the trips 
required a transfer. As a consequence of 
BRT introduction, with its rigid trunk and 
feeder organisation, now upwards of 60 
percent of the trips require transfers. 
Salazar and Behrens (2015) claim that 
cities developing BRT capacity need the 
complementary service of paratransit 
operators, as the complete formalisation 
of transport is probably not feasible. In fact, 
these cities should be understood as de 
facto hybrid systems in which both formal 
and informal systems operate.  
 
Decentralisation, BRT and local 
electoral politics 
BRT systems, proposed as a transit 
solution for urban centres of the 
developing world, are city-wide 
interventions that require large financial 
efforts, a reorganisation of urban space 
and tend to have implications for the day-
to-day urban experience of users and non-
users alike. But whereas the net benefits 
of the reorganisation of corridors in terms 
of travel-time and emissions have 
received ample attention, scholars are 
starting to propose an analytical approach 
that can account for the differentiated 
impact that the system has on different 
social groups. By avoiding generalisations 
and attending to the context-specific 
societal and economic forces shaping 
urban livelihoods, a more nuanced 
assessment of BRT-impacts emerges. In 
cities with strong socio-spatial fault-lines, 
BRT systems can reinforce and modulate 
class, race and gender cleavages. 
Emerging literature accounts for dynamics 
such as marginalisation and gentrification, 
as well as revealing problematic 
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assumptions and silences in the literature 
that advocates for BRT-type of 
interventions. 
 
BRT packages are part of a set of political 
technologies that impact considerably on 
political power and decision-making at the 
national and the local scale. Rizzo (2014) 
argues that a key reason behind the slow 
progress in the construction work 
associated with BRT in Dar es Salaam 
was the city council’s unwillingness to lose 
to the central government, which owned 
DART, as much as half of its direct 
revenue was previously earned through 
the council “ownership” of public transport.  
 
The controversy that developed between 
the central and local governments over the 
ownership of the project, and of the many 
phases of the infrastructural work 
(including land surveys, the expropriation 
of land, the compensation of expropriated 
owners/occupiers, and the carrying out of 
demolition work) was the main reason 
behind the remarkably slow pace at which 
the building of the BRT system proceeded. 
In Delhi, the political power of car owners, 
typically the richer segment of the 
population, led to their prolonged 
opposition to the ways in which both the 
infrastructural work associated with BRT 
and its planned use of urban infrastructure, 
negatively affected them. This opposition 
ultimately led to the costly demise of BRT 
there (Gallagher 2017). While the politics 
that underpin the construction of BRT 
systems are context-specific, the key point 
is that the building of BRT tends to be 
politically charged and controversial. 
 
By contrast, Mizuoka and Shimono (2013) 
argue that BRT has been a catalyser of 
global trends towards decentralisation and 
re-scaling whereby both the Fordist model 
of the central state bearing fiscal 
responsibility for public investment as well 
as the neoliberal model based on public 
transport ‘laissez faire’ are replaced with 
forms of hybrid ownership and regulated 
competition. 
 
Other authors have noted that the 
emergence of BRT systems demands the 
development of a new set of institutions 
and management capabilities from local 
level authorities. These institutions are 
necessary to secure the financial leverage, 
coordination and private sector 
involvement needed for BRT 
implementation and are unprecedented in 
urban policy making (Wilkinson 2010; Finn 
2013). Other authors register the tensions 
between the old national institutional 
framework and the newly empowered 
local administrations and regulatory 
systems - frequently supported directly by 
the World Bank. The failure to develop a 
local institutional framework is regularly 
blamed for limitations in BRT 
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implementation. For example, the lack of 
local urban planning capacity and urban 
land management institutions are blamed 
for the failure of BRT in Accra and India 
(Ponnaluri 2011; Agyemang 2015), while 
the reticence of national authorities to 
decentralise transport functions would 
explain the relatively late start of the BRT 
process in Senegal (Godard 2013).  
 
Two characteristics of BRT projects are 
relevant for the proposed relocation of 
decision making: 
 
• BRT projects are large-scale and 
politically visible, while at the same 
time they are discrete and 
manageable at the local level.  
 
• BRT projects are led by local 
executive authorities and 
attributed, when perceived as 
successful, to ‘strong political 
leadership’.  
 
This combination of feasibility and political 
prestige has been attractive to 
technocratic politicians in charge of rapidly 
growing cities in the developing world, 
where- despite remaining conducive in the 
national arena- patronage politics may not 
operate. The different preferences of 
urban electorates make demonstrational 
interventions such as BRT necessary to 
legitimise the power of ruling urban 
coalitions. Mizuoka and Shimono’s 
analysis of BRT-lite development by the 
Lagos Metropolitan Authority illustrates 
this point: “Politicians assume leadership, 
create rules and plan a more efficient 
transport service on the provincial scale. 
The citizens enjoying these efficiencies 
support the provincial government. This 
kind of positive ‘circle’ of democracy 
occurred in the governance exercised in 
this case” (2013: 70). 
 
Similarly, unlike more ambitious 
infrastructure interventions, BRT projects 
can be implemented without leadership 
from the national level and can be 
parcelled into manageable phases. The 
first modules of a BRT project can be 
operational within months and can be 
easily capitalised by local administrations 
and political incumbents (Lindau et al. 
2008; Deng and Nelson 2011). For 
instance, Changzhou is considered to 
have opted for BRT as a way bypassing 
the lengthy negotiations with the central 
Chinese state they would have had to 
engage with, had they insisted on a metro 
(Fjellstrom 2010). 
 
This effect should be more pronounced 
wherever national politics are not aligned 
with urban politics, as in the case of capital 
and mega cities ruled by opposition 
parties, as well as in cities where the 
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demographic most likely to benefit from 
BRT has considerable electoral 
representation. In many cases local 
political figures in opposition parties or 
technocratic coalitions find leverage in 
BRT projects to improve their options in 
the national arena: this was the case of 
Narendra Modi as Chief Minister of 
Gujarat; Governor Sutiyoso in Jakarta; 
Lopez Obrador, the former Mayor of 
Mexico and head of the opposition PRD; 
Enrique Peñalosa, two times Major of 
Bogotá and once presidential candidate; 
Hellen Zille, the DA Mayor of Cape Town, 
now Premier of the Western Cape 
Province; Mayor Zhang Guangning from 
Guangzhou (Matsumoto 2007; Weinstock 
et al. 2011).12 
 
 
                                                          
12 In fact, Weinstock et al. hypothesise that 
the slower introduction of BRT in North 
American cities is closely linked to the fact 
that these are highly motorised systems, 
where potential bus riders are less 
politically powerful than car owners, and 
where other type of urban intervention 
would have more political traction with 
voters. Cities in which car owners, and car 
manufacturers can articulate their 
opposition to BRT have had more 
difficulties of implementation (e.g. 
Bangkok and Delhi) (Weinstock et al. 
2011; Wu and Pojani 2016). 
However, a logical implication of this 
tendency is that in cases in which BRT 
fails to deliver on its promises or 
experiences resistance, the political costs 
similarly tend to revert to the political 
groups that backed it. Transantiago is the 
most prominent case of failed transport 
reform discrediting the ruling party 
(Gómez-Lobo 2012). In consequence, 
BRT-promoting authors argue that it is 
necessary to develop local institutional 
frameworks to manage BRT (Finn 2013), 
as well the legal framework for 
metropolitan entities to oversee BRT 
implementation when it straddles different 
municipalities (Lindau et al. 2008; 
Willoughby 2013).13 
BRT as prestige project: 
Branding, image and the 
‘world class cities’ 
13 For instance, the 1988 electoral reform 
in Brazil gave local authorities some of the 
functions formerly held by federal state, 
including relative autonomy for public 
transport investment and regulation. 
However, in terms of BRT development 
the reform was deemed insufficient as it 
empowered municipalities but failed to 
develop the legal framework for 
metropolitan authorities. BRT 
development in the greater Sao Paulo 
area required the administrative alignment 
of municipalities ruled by opposing political 
parties (Lindau et al. 2008). 
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Political economy analysis is important to 
understand potential allies of BRTs, as 
well as, barriers to their implementation. 
As has been discussed above, the 
implementation of BRT projects has rarely 
been driven solely by the need to address 
urban public transport challenges and 
there are a range of political agendas that 
municipal authorities frequently attempt to 
advance by embracing the 
implementation of a BRT system. 14 
Central among the BRT-related narratives 
are the concepts of the ‘smart city’ and the 
‘world class city’ (Bassett and Marpillero-
Colomina 2013). These terms 
encapsulate the idea that cities in the 
developing world are players in their own 
right in the global competition to attract 
foreign investment, and that by developing 
a portfolio of services and displaying the 
right type of political leadership and 
efficiency indicators, they can bypass the 
financial constraints of the central state or 
delink from the developmental shortfalls of 
the national economy at large (Shatkin 
2007; Gauthier and Weinstock 2010; 
Paget-Seekins 2015). Unsurprisingly, the 
development of BRT systems in cities in 
                                                          
14 A 2011 Economist Intelligence Unit 
survey of city mayors around the world 
found that 61 percent considered 
improving roads and public transport as 
the key investment that could make their 
cities more globally competitive, twice as 
many mayors as who instead would favour 
China, South Africa and Brazil has been 
closely linked to the hosting of major 
sporting events in these cities such as the 
World Cup and the Olympics (Ahmed et al. 
2008; Wilkinson 2010). 
 
Public transport projects feed into 
narratives of good local governance. BRT 
projects became a quintessential 
component of the aspiration of cities in the 
developing world to become ‘world class 
cities’. To this effect, BRT-advocates 
insisted on the importance of brand 
coherence and image management of the 
system, including that of the visual and 
architectural aesthetics and day to day 
upkeep of buses, stations, logos and other 
identity material. Curating the image of the 
BRT system contributes to customer 
satisfaction, to attracting users into BRT 
and more broadly to a perception of urban 
modernity and efficiency, which local 
authorities can leverage as part of their 
global marketing strategy (Cao et al. 2016). 
This has also been linked to state-
supported processes of inner city urban 
recovery and improvements in land 
value.15 Paget-Seekins and Tironi (2016) 
investment in education and schooling 
(cited in Cervero and Dai 2014).  
15 Linked to the 2008 Olympics, BRT 
development in Beijing involved the forced 
eviction of poor inhabitants from around 
the projected BRT corridors, and their 
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and Martínez et al. (2016) noted that 
‘publicness’ and environmental 
sustainability are now widely accepted as 
tenets of the global BRT brand, although 
in practice BRTs are rarely public-
provided systems and their linkages to 
sustainability oriented finance such as 
GEF is increasingly questioned.16  
Affordability, access, 
marginalisation 
Case studies debate the impact of BRT 
systems on ridership dynamics. This 
includes debates around the extent to 
which given population groups benefit 
from the implementation of the new 
system, as well as the different ways in 
which such changes can be measured. In 
general terms, BRT-proponents tend to 
focus on registering the evolution of 
ridership in the system, with less attention 
given to broader implications and 
differentiated impact. Among the aspects 
that receive less attention are, to cite 
some examples, the patterns of transport 
monopoly that corral users into the BRT 
                                                          
relocation away from the city centre 
(Ahmed et al. 2008). 
16 A paradoxical case of the branding of 
sustainability as a BRT component is that 
of Curitiba. According to Martinez et al. 
(2016), the narrative of Curitiba as an 
example of environmental friendly 
transport development is locked in place 
as a key example of continued reference 
system and undermine the claims around 
voluntary modal changes; the trade-offs 
created by improvements to transport time 
in the system that are coming at the 
expense of transport time for non-users 
(Echeverry et al. 2005) and route changes 
and fare spikes that result in the 
marginalisation of specific social groups, 
even in cases where ridership increases 
overall.  
 
A case in point is the outlook of BRT in Dar 
es Salaam, now in its second year. 
According to original plans, no paratransit 
operators would operate alongside BRT 
lanes. However, when the proposed BRT 
fares were released, amounting to more 
than a 50 percent price hike, the plan was 
modified. Paratransit operators are now 
allowed to operate on two overcrowded 
lanes which they share with private 
vehicles drivers, and charge 400 
Tanzanian shillings. BRT buses charge 
650 Tanzanian shillings and operate on 
segregated lanes.  
by the city’s many corporate and financial 
partners. The potency of this image is 
such that growing evidence of the looming 
environmental and economic crisis in the 
sustainability of the BRT system is 
regularly ignored, since it cannot be 
reconciled with the city’s carefully 
cultivated global reputation which has 
benefitted entrenched political groups.  
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The implications of this dual mode of 
transport provision are complex and 
reveal important aspects of the political 
economy barrier to BRT. First, the public 
transport ridership becomes stratified. 
BRT ridership can afford to pay 50 percent 
more than paratransit passengers to 
access a service which provides a much 
more rapid, reliable, and less polluting 
form of public transport. BRT fare levels 
acts as barriers to access for the poor, so 
that paratransit passengers pay less for a 
considerably slower, less reliable and 
more polluting form of public transport. 
From this angle, BRT therefore might 
appear as a regressive intervention for the 
poor, as scarce tax-payer money is 
channeled towards the construction of a 
public transport system that the poor 
cannot afford. The coexistence of these 
modes of transport provision also has 
negative implications for the sustainability 
of the new BRT systems. While BRT 
business plans assumed no competition 
from paratransit operators, a significant 
share of the market is now captured by the 
latter, with negative ramifications for BRT 
operators’ revenue. What remains to be 
see is whether BRT in Dar es Salaam will 
require public subsidy, and whether this 
will be politically feasible.  
Conclusions 
This analysis cautions against 
understanding BRT as a ‘win-win’ 
intervention. BRT is a mode of public 
transport that might deliver improvements 
in the quality of public transport. However, 
this is normally associated with: 
1) increases in fare levels, with 
negative implications for the poor’s 
access to BRT; 
2) difficulties in the incorporation of 
pre-existing paratransit operators; 
3) the need, against the narrative put 
forward by advocates of BRT, for 
public funding to make BRT 
systems sustainable; 
4) neglect of other forms of low 
carbon transport. 
In light of the above, the analysis 
concludes by suggesting two key areas for 
future research on BRT and public 
transport. 
BRT and ‘the public’ 
Independent research is required to 
genuinely explore the tension between 
urban mass transport, seen as a public 
entitlement, and as a commodified service, 
and how this debate has shaped the 
evolution of BRT systems in cities across 
the developing world. The adoption of a 
BRT system poses political questions 
about the role of the state in the creation 
of public goods and triggers debates about 
resource allocation, the creation of rights 
and rents, and requires authorities to 
perform a difficult balancing act between 
the interests of passengers and private 
operators. The way in which these 
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questions are framed, and by whom, is 
highly context specific. 
 
A sub-stream of research under this 
theme is the analysis of the financing of 
BRTs (whether through loans, and from 
which institution, or through public 
expenditure) and whether and how 
financial architecture affects the politics of 
BRT implementation and the 
public/private interface. 
 
Alternatives to BRT 
Very few BRT impact assessments extend 
their cost-benefit analysis to the possibility 
of reforming existing systems, as opposed 
to adopting BRTs (DeCorla-Souza 2005). 
Similarly, many of the indicators of 
success regularly used in BRT studies 
have contradictory effects on closer 
inspection. For example, the rise in land 
values - which is regularly praised for 
raising revenue potential for further BRT 
investment - has also led to instances of 
gentrification, displacement of 
marginalised urban dwellers away from 
transport hubs and a double increase in 
transport fees and housing rents for users 
(Ahmed et al. 2008; Delmelle and Casas 
2012; Basset and Marpillero-Colomina 
2013; Casas and Delmelle 2014; 
Stokenberga 2014; Bocarejo et al. 
2015). 17  Similarly, modal shift and 
transport intensification has not always 
resulted from users being persuaded of 
the virtues of the system. With BRTs as 
monopolistic transport providers, 
alternative modes are regularly crowded 
out or outright stamped out. Finally, the 
BRT literature is symptomatically thin 
when accounting for cases of failure in 
BRT, which have received little or no 
attention at all.18 
While empirical evidence may support 
some of the proposed effects of BRT 
systems, countervailing evidence has not 
been carefully examined, nor has it 
contributed to rethinking or reformulating 
BRT practice or scholarship. There are 
important methodological caveats to the 
blurry relationship between pro-BRT 
lobbies and BRT scholarship: BRTs have 
been in most cases only recently 
introduced, their effects are highly case-
specific and there is not enough rigorous 
independent research to substantiate 
claims about universal effects. 
                                                          
17 BRT-induced gentrification is 
euphemistically referred to as: ‘urban 
revitalisation of brownfields and 
abandoned properties’ (Wright and Hook 
2007). 
18 Accra, Pune and Delhi are cases in 
point. In the case of India, the literature is 
quiet about the costly dismantling of the 
south corridor in Delhi and the failure of 
the Ahmedabad BRT system to operate 
profitably (Times of India 2016). 
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Section 4: Engineering cultures: Knowledge and meaning in transport 
infrastructure 
For anthropologists, objects carry 
meaning. Objects, such as transport 
infrastructure, are more than material 
and technology; they interact with the 
social world and become part of the 
social world. Anthropologists can 
therefore study objects such as roads 
and other transport infrastructures 
without considering engineering or 
land acquisition law, peculiar as this 
may sound for those who build 
infrastructures. Infrastructures are not 
simply technologies, they also 
establish the invisible rules that 
govern people’s everyday lives.  
This section provides an overview of 
the kinds of things anthropologists 
have studied with regards to roads, 
engineers and infrastructure 
messaging and then outlines what an 
anthropological approach to transport 
knowledge and project 
implementation might look like, 
demonstrating how critical 
engagement between 
anthropologists and city-level 
engineers could create possibilities 
for developing new transport agendas. 
 
Roads, meaning and power  
Augé (1995) famously theorised the 
‘non-place’ of the motorway; however, 
the fame of this idea is rather at odds 
with the conventional wisdoms in 
anthropology where roads are seen 
as rather rich places, where a lot 
happens as part of the social lives of 
those who use them, live close by and 
for others who just know of or imagine 
them. Roads emerge in the literature 
as potent sites of meaning and culture 
in which ideas such as hope and 
desire, fear and danger, nationalism 
and hatred are brought into sharp 
relief (Trankell 1993; Masquelier 2002; 
Dalakoglou 2010; Lee 2012).  
New urban roads variously divide 
communities or may become 
boundaries along which ethnic, tribal 
or class distinctions are traced. In 
other contexts, new roads may 
represent the state, modernity or 
some form of urban renewal. Often 
new urban roads and other 
infrastructures can symbolise the end 
of traditional ways of doing things 
(Taussig 1980; Roseman 1996; 
Mostowlansky 2017). In other words, 
roads alter the shape of things and 
have qualities all of their own, which 
exist outside the materials of their 
construction. 
Roads are built to improve traffic flow, 
to temporarily reduce congestion, to 
bypass somewhere, to pass through 
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somewhere else and to reduce the 
unit cost of transport. Other people 
may build roads to bring civilisation to 
a rude country, to bring producers 
closer to a market, a port closer to a 
city, or an army closer to a site of 
potential conflict (‘closer’ here means 
in time and with oil, see Rosa 2013; 
Urry 2013). Some people believe that 
roads bring peace; others think roads 
bring trouble (Melly 2013). Roads 
may be part of an attempt to establish 
a democratic utopia, even if they often 
also deepen inequality. Many build 
roads for investment, seeing profits in 
tolls, kickbacks, land prices, 
corruption and allied construction 
opportunities. Roads have been 
analysed as symptoms of 
technological phases and financial 
fashions. Historical analysis of road 
finance, for example, reveals the 
coming and going of phases of public 
and private ownership, reflecting 
broader shifts in political mood (Guldi 
2012). At another level altogether, 
roads are part of the continued appeal 
of the story of individual freedom and 
movement, and the grand narratives 
of modernisation and progress (Urry 
2007; Cresswell and Merriman 2011).  
In Africanist anthropology, for 
example, roads are often seen as 
symbolic of the former colonial period, 
and as such are markers of time. The 
colonial state in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo was known as 
Bula Matari (breaker of rocks), in part 
because of its rapacious road building 
agenda. Bula Matari also came to 
mean an irresistible force that 
crushed all resistance (Young and 
Turner 1985). In a similar vein, Freed 
(2010) has described how the French 
colonial administration of Central 
Africa used roads as tools of 
governance, but also as a flexible 
form of technology which allowed 
them to utilise local materials and 
unskilled forced labour, with road 
building as one of the most contested 
of the colonial encounters. 
Building and maintaining roads 
through forced labour brought many 
Africans into contact with the colonial 
state (Masquelier 2002). Grand 
projects of road and rail construction 
facilitated population movements 
across empires, centralised authority, 
formed circuits of migrant labour, 
transformed social life and changed 
the face of a continent. In the 
Francophone colonies, road-building 
efforts were organised by the 
distinction between Africa utile and 
Africa inutile (‘useful’ and ‘useless’ 
Africa), resulting in a concentration of 
infrastructure focused on extractive 
industries and ports, while the 
hinterlands languished. Such ideas 
continue to shape regional political 
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economies in Africa today (Ferguson 
2006).  
Engineers have been studied as 
integral to these forms of colonial 
governance and processes of state 
formation. Historians have discussed 
ways in which transport and civil 
engineers became part of the 
‘infrastructural state’ in Britain in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(Guldi 2012). In the colonial world, 
particularly so in South Asia, the 
engineering of monumental civic 
buildings, grand trunk routes, canal 
systems, docks and telegraph 
networks helped Britain develop the 
collective capacity to dominate and, 
as such, infrastructure became a 
foundational and legitimating principle 
of power (Mukerji 2003: 656). 
The literature on colonial engineers 
and planners clearly demonstrates 
how their activities made concrete 
inequality and produced certain kinds 
of submissive subject, their work 
being often uneven, and conducted 
demonstrably in pursuit of colonial 
aims and ambitions. They contributed 
to making the self-serving ideas of 
colonial governments, inscribing 
hierarchies of race, gender and caste 
and tribe on populations. Understood 
in this way, infrastructure has the 
capacity to create and enforce 
meanings and messages far beyond 
its stated purpose. 
Historians have hindsight on their side; 
it is much harder to untangle with such 
certainty the motivations and hidden 
messages in transport infrastructure 
and planning in urban centres today. 
There are, however, lessons to be 
learned from the historian’s concern 
with power that alert us to some of the 
possible locations where ideology and 
state or private interest might orient 
particular kinds of decision-making 
(such as the rise and now fall of BRT, 
discussed below and in Section 3). It 
is also the case that in many cities the 
colonial legacy of land distribution and 
use, and the orientation of transport 
networks continue to play a significant 
role in the postcolonial construction of 
urban space. 
In the post-colonial period, roads 
became symbolic of failed statehood 
(Mbembe 2000; Mains 2012). In Zaire 
(now the DRC) the diminishing 
network of tarred roads was seen as 
indicative of Mobutu’s misrule more 
generally (Young and Turner 1985). 
Roitman (2006) reports how roads in 
the Chad Basin become central to 
new forms of extra-state regulation, 
carefully negotiated between urban 
merchants, state officials and bandits 
(known as les coupeurs de route or 
those who cut off the roads). 
In addition to colonialism, power, 
governance and informality, another 
strand of the anthropological literature 
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on infrastructure in Africa focuses on 
the relationship between transport, 
modernity and the occult (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1993; Geschiere 1997). 
In Ghana, for example, Klaeger (2009) 
associates roads with spiritual forces, 
bewitched vehicles and the curses of 
gods and ghosts. In Niger, Masquelier 
(1992, 2002) links deadly road spirits 
to the perils and possibilities of 
modern life. The road ghosts bear a 
striking resemblance to the seductive 
creatures of Western advertisements. 
Chilson’s (1999) evocative account of 
road culture in Niger looks at, among 
other things, the sociality of humans 
and spirits on the road. Saunders 
(2008) examines the relationship 
between the privatisation of transport 
in Tanzania and the appearance of 
devils on the road. Morris (2010) 
argues that auto-mobility in South 
Africa is the condition of the rich, with 
symbolic and imaginative possibilities 
for the poor, which involve a mixture 
of fear, desire, speed, sexuality and 
sovereignty against a backdrop of a 
history of roads, cars and violent 
carjacking. 
Other literature referring explicitly to 
roads in Africa examines (the 
following are representative rather 
than exhaustive) the semiotics of road 
signs and monuments (Oha 2000; 
Quayson 2010), the costs of 
maintenance (Gwilliam et al. 2008), 
the high casualty rates on the ‘world’s 
deadliest’ roads (Peden et al. 2013), 
and the spread of HIV (Djemai 2009) 
and more recently Ebola (Leach et al 
2010). Lamont (2012, 2013) has 
provocatively theorised mobility and 
the ‘accidental’ against the backdrop 
of development and ‘infrastructural 
governance’ and road safety 
campaigns in Kenya. 
More generally, there is a useful body 
of work on the relationship between 
the state, citizenship and other forms 
of infrastructure, which makes a 
similar point about the relationship of 
the material to ‘magical’ or ‘political’ 
power: Wafer (2012) on municipal 
services in post-Apartheid Soweto; 
Schnitzler (2013) on electric meters 
and social contestation in South 
Africa; Chalfin (2014) on toilets and 
sanitation in Ghana; and Beck (2013) 
on the culture of highway stops.  
The various bodies of work discussed 
above demonstrate the relationships 
between road building, power and 
control. However, we can also see 
how roads become the sites through 
which history is (re)made, notions of 
citizenship are forged, and where 
capitalism operates in its most 
extreme and enchanting forms 
(Dalakoglou 2012). Roads cease to 
be anodyne or the neutral means to a 
destination and instead become 
artefacts of culture and politics, 
88 
 
mediums of change and hope, and 
vehicles of state-building, liberation 
and oppression. Roads tie 
construction to notions of religion, 
time and agency (Verrips and Meyer 
2001). 
The claim of this section is that 
because transport infrastructures, 
such as roads, are potent and 
meaningful places, that there is 
mileage in connecting the 
engineering and planning aspects of 
infrastructure with anthropological 
approaches. From the perspective of 
anthropology, this engagement is 
twofold: first with the knowledge and 
practice of engineers themselves and, 
then, secondly, to theorise what 
happens in the gap between the two 
perspectives. Ultimately, this is to ask 
questions about the relationship 
between infrastructure as a technical 
object and its use and imagination as 
a social object. In this largely 
unfamiliar and un-theorised space, lie 
some of the most significant barriers 
and possible solutions to the 
reduction of carbon emissions in 
urban transport. 
 
 
 
Messaging: Selling 
infrastructure and other 
ideas  
Engineers, governments and 
politicians present and promote 
infrastructure to recipient and affected 
populations. This may take the form of 
outright hype or more subtle forms, in 
which infrastructure is associated with 
healthy and productive citizens. A 
better understanding of good and bad 
practices (intentional and unforeseen) 
seems essential given that urban 
infrastructure has once again reached 
the top of the development agenda 
(this time in the name of sustainability) 
and is presented as a key tool in 
resilience, mitigation and adaptation 
policies. The ways in which 
infrastructure is presented to people 
and tied to ideas about sustainability, 
carbon futures or citizenship can, we 
hypothesise, play a significant role in 
the ‘take up’ or abandonment of 
projects, i.e. the barriers to 
implementation. Importantly, such 
‘messaging’ can also be used to 
promote other kinds of behaviour, 
such as those which reduce carbon 
consumption and therefore contribute 
to development goals. We suggest 
that successful infrastructure is more 
than ‘building stuff’ and ‘engineering’, 
it can also include the engineering of 
minds to create the conditions in 
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which change and sacrifice are 
acceptable and even desirable. 
In this, we are not saying that adverts 
can be put on the side of buses. We 
are pointing to the invisible and 
unspoken powers of infrastructures to 
fashion subjectivities and to engage 
with the world in very particular ways, 
ways that are open to change – if 
understood in the way that 
anthropology treats these registers of 
knowledge and human engagement. 
Transport infrastructures traverse the 
ground between the people and the 
state, through domains of private and 
entrepreneurial activity, offer visions 
or blueprints for the future, and are 
used as root metaphors in many 
social science understandings of the 
world today. To treat infrastructure 
solely as an engineering or logistical 
challenge is misguided, which, not 
only itself produces the possibility that 
the project will fail, but also neglects 
the opportunity to change ideas, ways 
of thinking, and the nature of urban 
space itself. The ‘cultural work’ of 
infrastructure is tied to powerful 
notions of modernity and progress, 
and can therefore also be harnessed 
to influence other ideas which may, 
for example, directly hinder the 
implementation of low 
carbon/collective transport. 
The cities of the Global South are 
crowded and the deconstruction of 
urban certainties, heritage and 
communities required to make way 
for infrastructure often brings 
understandable discontent, protest 
and posturing. The technology itself 
may be rejected or underutilised (as 
in the case of the metro in Jaipur and 
BRT in Delhi where there was 
organised non-compliance). There is 
work to be done in understanding the 
history, reception and execution of 
each project. The influence and 
methods of local lobbyists, media and 
financial brokers play roles in the way 
infrastructure is communicated. What 
claims and judgements are presented 
and at what intervals? How and why 
do the claims made for infrastructure 
vary at different levels of government? 
Many modern urban infrastructure 
projects are branded, employ teams 
of publicists and may even have their 
own promotional materials such as 
films, songs, posters and T-shirts. At 
stake here are questions of inequality, 
rights, mobility and collective and 
individualised modes of transport. 
Who is the infrastructure for? Whose 
sustainability is being planned for? 
And, to what end? Infrastructural 
messages are conveyed in speeches, 
passed to journalists and advertisers, 
and presented in rituals, 
nomenclature and imagery to 
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recipient and affected populations. 
These materials, produced by 
financiers, political backers, planners 
and engineers, are revealing of the 
ways in which they knowingly and 
unwittingly present infrastructure 
solutions. 
Some projects fail because of poor 
engineering and planning, but others 
may fail because there is insufficient 
buy-in from affected populations, a 
mismatch between expectations and 
actual use, or, perhaps more 
commonly and influentially, there is a 
cultural reluctance to engage in a 
particular form of urban transport 
infrastructure. In contrast, other 
projects are tremendously successful, 
bringing about social justice, 
prosperity and pride and might 
become models of good practice (this 
was true of projects undertaken in 
Ahmedabad such as BRT). What can 
we learn for the future from the 
successes (and failings) of 
communication around infrastructure? 
We suggest and explore further below 
that there is a great deal of research 
to be done in this field. The structure 
of a research agenda has to be inter-
disciplinary, reflexive and designed to 
understand the gap between the 
infrastructure of the engineer and the 
infrastructure of the anthropologist. 
 
Transport engineering as 
cultural practice: Knowledge 
networks and everyday 
politics  
This section will briefly outline what it is that 
anthropologists do, before considering 
what critical engagement between 
anthropologists, urban engineers and 
planners might illuminate, particularly with 
regards to the production of knowledge and 
the micro political processes through which 
transport infrastructure is brought into 
being.  
To really understand the thinking and 
operational logic of another profession or 
discipline is to embark on a training in that 
discipline. Many anthropologists would see 
this as fieldwork, learning to see the world 
how the ‘natives’ see it (in this case, the 
‘natives’ are engineers and planners). 
There is considerable effort involved in this 
process and it takes the time 
anthropologists think of as fieldwork. 
Fieldwork allows anthropologists to 
participate and observe in the daily lives of 
the ‘natives’, learning what is a joke and 
what is serious. Effort will be made to learn 
the vernacular language and to understand 
the idioms of expression. At a higher level, 
the aim is to learn about the culture of the 
‘natives’ and how they see the world and 
understand those around them. However, 
this is only the first step.  
The second move is to think beyond this 
culture – a process made easier by having 
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had to learn it, gradually, often painfully, 
through fieldwork – and to critically engage 
with its premises, assumptions, aims and 
objectives. This is what much qualitative 
social science research aims to do. In 
trying to explain what anthropologists do, 
Hastrup (2004) suggests anthropology is a 
kind of explanation beyond the truth of 
events themselves. Anthropology is not 
simply knowledge about particular events, 
practices and ideas, but about the 
processes by which these come to appear 
meaningful, inevitable or mandatory, 
contestable or ridiculous.  
It is important to stress that anthropology is 
not just about elucidating and exposing 
what constitutes common sense. Rather, 
anthropology does the work to understand 
the logic of that common sense and then, 
significantly, makes an additional move to 
understand the values and meta-ideas 
which exist in order to allow something to 
appear as natural and proper – to appear 
as common sense. To take this a step 
further, common sense itself is a highly 
political and cultural value that has 
implications for the ways in which 
engineers engineer and planners plan. 
These observations also have 
consequences for those who interact with 
their work, whether as passengers, 
customers, protesters and saboteurs, or as 
those who wish to understand the barriers 
to the implementation of low carbon 
transport technologies. 
 
The production of knowledge and 
its effects: The case of BRT  
The knowledge of the engineer or planner 
might be seen as technical, applied and 
positivist. However, in the social science 
world there is a large body of literature that 
explores the fallacy of popular notions 
about the certainty and truthfulness of 
science. This literature points to the fact 
that many scientific innovations are based 
on serendipity, chance and funding 
regimes (Latour 1987). Anthropologists 
thus see engineering or transport theory 
not as a pristine terrain of logic and reason, 
but as a field of power, influence and 
competition in which different paradigms 
are promoted or decried as a reflection of 
the interests of powerful groups. In other 
words, engineering and planning 
knowledge is not value neutral, but part of 
the broader world in which knowledge is 
constructed and presented in particular 
ways.  
BRT offers a useful starting point for 
thinking through how knowledge about 
infrastructure is produced, and the political 
consequences of the messages this 
technology communicates. This example 
shows how stories developed and 
packaged in terms of transport innovation 
can have particular effects. In the case of 
BRT, these messages are about success 
and have been aimed primarily at urban 
planners, city-level governments and 
engineers, rather than at urban populations. 
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In this instance, the story of BRT has been 
so successful that it has distorted decision-
making and has itself become a barrier to 
the implementation of other low carbon 
transport solutions, such as walking or 
bicycles. 
The evidence base on BRT is strongly 
political and built from the interplay 
between the economic and political 
interests that promote such schemes. 
There is a trend in BRT studies for scholars, 
researchers and consultants assessing 
BRT to work under commission for one or 
several of the organizations set up to 
promote this technology. This has 
contributed to creating a consensus around 
BRT practice – a standard narrative that 
posits BRT as a good thing – that is difficult 
to critically interrogate, without appearing 
contrary.  
Furthermore, and significantly, it is difficult 
to understand the barriers to the 
implementation of BRT – protests, 
demonstrations and strikes – if the 
narrative only suggests that BRT is a ‘win-
win’ intervention. Those who raise 
dissenting voices are evidently able to see 
other forms of truth and consequences. 
The idea of BRT as a straightforward 
technical fix can be questioned only when 
we understand something of the broader 
environment in which BRT knowledge has 
been created, distributed and sustained. 
                                                          
19  See: http://www.brt.cl/about-
us/members  
Behind much of the research on BRT, and 
supporting the narrative that portrays it as 
the solution to urban transport problems in 
developing countries, lies a tightly knit web 
of institutions with interests in the 
promotion of BRT. The World Bank is the 
key player, for it provides not only the loans 
to make BRTs happen in many instances, 
but also funding for some of the most 
supportive research.  
 
Another important actor is Volvo, which 
supplies buses to many BRT systems. The 
Volvo Education Research Foundation also 
supports the ‘Across Latitudes and 
Cultures – Bus Rapid Transit’, which is the 
BRT Centre of Excellence, whose 
members include four academic institutions 
and EMBARQ.19 EMBARQ (set up by Shell) 
is now the WRI Ross Centre for 
Sustainable Cities. It credits itself with 
having played a major role in expanding the 
BRT concept to cities throughout the world. 
It is also one of the organizations behind 
‘Global BRT data’, the most up to date 
dataset on BRTs.20  
 
The Institute for Transportation and 
Development Policy (ITDP), a Washington-
based NGO, has been actively involved 
wherever BRTs are implemented. ITDP’s 
growth, from a small advocacy NGO to an 
organization with over 60 staff members in 
20  On the current figure see Global BRT 
Data <http://brtdata.org/#/location>. 
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offices across Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, has been associated with access 
to BRT funding. ITDP has played different 
roles in this capacity. It produced a BRT 
planning guide, carried out pre-feasibility 
studies in various cities, signposted 
potential new sources of funding for BRTs, 
and has been at the forefront of studies on 
BRT impacts (Matsumoto 2007).  
 
In 2011, the ITDP Board of Directors, a 
proxy to whom the NGO is accountable, 
included the managing director of the 
Goldman Sachs Urban Investment Group, 
a representative from the global investment 
firm Carlyle Group, and two 
representatives of the World Bank, 
including a retired former Vice-President. 
These are all examples of institutions that 
present Bogotá’s TransMilenio – and BRT 
more broadly – as a success. 
 
Second, and related to the economic 
interests of the main actors promoting BRT, 
much of the literature on BRTs suffers from 
what might be thought of as apolitical 
technicalism. The strong focus on the 
technical features of BRTs, such as 
ridership numbers, speed of travel, 
distance between bus stops and CO2 
emissions, fails to pay adequate attention 
to the politics and distributional impacts 
that the adoption of BRT systems, and the 
                                                          
21 See Hall (2015) on the failings of public-
private partnerships. 
move away from previous systems of 
public transport, present. 
 
In sum, a key feature of the evidence base 
on BRTs is that it is largely produced by 
organizations and corporations with 
interests in promoting the BRT model, not 
least because this type of transport 
development fits with their commercial 
and/or political agendas. Funding from 
such sources may compromise or 
undermine the academic independence of 
much of the existing knowledge base on 
BRT and helps to explain its silence on the 
social and economic tensions generated by 
the adoption of BRTs, as well as the lack of 
attention towards those who stand to lose 
from their introduction. 
 
That there are key institutions promoting a 
particular technology in a key transport 
sector is not in itself particularly surprising. 
Some sectors of international finance have 
taken interest in opening up urban public 
transport markets – and more broadly 
public utilities markets – in developing 
countries, and in the funding of the 
infrastructural work they require. 21 
However, the degree and spread of such 
influence is perhaps hard to see for those 
inside this world, who view these 
connections as common-sensical, 
mundane and hardly worthy of comment. 
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For the anthropologist, interested in where 
ideas come from and how they develop and 
maintain legitimacy, such webs of 
connections are deeply important. A 
standard narrative has emerged in which 
the BRT is a ‘win-win’ intervention in urban 
transport design. One of the consequences 
has been to prioritise BRT in many urban 
settings over and above other forms of low 
carbon transport. Despite the success of 
the BRT message and the unquestionable 
influence of its supporters, there are those 
who still manage to see around the hype, 
viewing BRT as little more than a Trojan 
horse for further urban highway 
development and for the continued 
expansion of bus and petrol-based 
transport solutions (Ross 2016). 
 
As the BRT example usefully illustrates, 
those making decisions about transport are 
compelled to engage with various and 
intersecting networks of knowledge. In 
other words, sets or chains of expertise 
come together in particular configurations 
around urban transport projects. An 
attempt to understand the ways in which 
such distributed cognition effects the 
creation of networks of mobility is an 
understudied topic. How do the forms of 
knowledge that exist in the extensive range 
of institutions that come together in a 
particular transport project understand and 
relate to one another? What are the 
interfaces like between finance, marketing, 
political offices, construction firms and 
indeed engineers and planners? Such 
relationships are not only under-
researched they are also often unwritten 
and tacit forms of knowledge that are 
difficult to articulate and codify. 
Anthropologists might call this knowledge 
‘embodied’ as it is largely unspoken and 
becomes part of people’s everyday activity. 
Understanding the embodied knowledge of 
engineers – and the ways in which a 
transport project may bring together a 
range of such knowledge – is, we argue, 
key to unpacking the ways in which 
transport projects come into being.  
Engineers and planners, among others, 
have become part of globalised networks of 
decision makers. Many engineers are 
themselves part of global consultancy firms 
and networks of knowledge. These people 
might feel part of international discourse 
and see the possibilities for global agendas. 
However, there are many others, perhaps 
more influential at the local level, who work 
in vernacular ways and continue the 
traditions of their offices and institutions. 
There appears to be a disconnect between 
the two which also acts as a break in 
communication between local and global 
ideas and priorities. Careful ethnographic 
study of the ways in which knowledge – 
whether it be about BRT or climate change 
– is understood in any particular location, 
and how these situated understandings link 
to broader national and global discourses, 
would not only illuminate how transport 
knowledge is differentiated according to 
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context, but generate insights into how 
closer alignment between the multitude of 
different actors may be forged.  
 
Engineers as political brokers: 
Unpacking the gap between 
policy and practice in transport 
infrastructure 
Engineering is often casually thought of 
and represented as a technocratic process. 
As any practitioner can readily narrate, 
however, transport engineering is better 
defined by competing techniques and 
routines, varying regimes of fashion and 
theory, the manipulation of unruly materials 
(Harvey and Knox 2015), as much as local 
political pressures and events. Engineers, 
in other words, play various roles as 
brokers between policy and urban life, and 
are thus uniquely positioned to shed light 
on the gap between the two. 
Anthropologists have long been concerned 
with illuminating discrepancies between 
what people say and what they do; indeed, 
much of the fieldwork endeavour could be 
conceptualised as exploring how this 
distinction emerges. This is often done 
through careful contextualisation, exploring 
the multiple and competing logics that 
structure people’s everyday lives and 
decision-making processes.  
Anthropological attention to processual 
details of this kind could lead to productive 
collaborations with engineers and urban 
planners. The work of planners and 
engineers, although different, are bound up 
in the spheres of activity and interaction to 
which standard rules and theories cannot 
apply; furthermore, the aims of their 
practice are often multiple and intended to 
fulfil many requirements simultaneously, 
even more so with the formalisation of a 
‘co-benefits’ agenda. Engineers have 
clients, such as urban municipalities, but 
they also have publics and finances, as 
well as contracts and contractors to 
encourage and discipline. Therefore, there 
is a lot to be learned from them as to how a 
low carbon transport agenda can be built 
into the fabric of cities and what would need 
to be engineered in order for that 
transformation to become socially and 
politically possible. 
Engineering, as these comments suggest, 
is not above politics. Scholars such as 
Barry (2001, 2013) have shown how 
technical calculations in decision-making 
resonate with broader political 
considerations. By looking at engineering 
and planning reflexively and in partnership 
with anthropologists it is possible to 
deconstruct, analyse and interrogate many 
of the everyday assumptions and 
processes that go into engineering and 
decision-making in transport practice in 
urban areas.  
• How does government power work?  
• What form does it take?  
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• How is government or private 
power understood in any particular 
context?  
• Is it welcomed, feared or met with 
cynicism?  
• What kinds of power and influence 
are well received? Why? 
• Which institutions are influential in 
national planning and engineering 
contexts?  
• What kind of curricula do they use?  
• What are the major influences?  
• What are the relationships between 
these national standards and 
international pressures and ways of 
doing things?  
• How might coalitions with national 
partners work with such curricula to 
advance sustainability goals? 
By looking at the ways in which engineers 
and planners understand and manage 
protest and contestation, as well as uptake, 
relating to urban transport we can untangle 
deeper logics about aspiration, rights and 
privileges. Significantly, by closing the gap 
between ground and practice, the focus on 
engineering also allows us to see the ways 
in which ‘co-benefits’ might be embedded 
in daily urban life. By turning up the 
resolution we can see in fine detail how 
global policy is interpreted by states, in 
cities, by engineers and on the ground in 
practice. There is unquestionably slippage 
and transformation between these levels, 
so understanding how, why and to what 
effect may lead to more thought being 
invested in the relationship between policy 
and practice. 
Picon (2004) observes that infrastructure is 
an object and infrastructure is also a set of 
social and behavioural patterns. He 
suggests that quite a lot is known about 
both qualities but much less is understood 
about the relationship between the two. 
This is perhaps the key contribution that 
anthropologists working with engineers and 
planners could make to the field. This is the 
field in which both the success and failure 
of low carbon transport initiatives is to be 
best understood.  
Of course, if we see infrastructure as a 
work of imagination as well as practice, 
then we have to contend with the materials 
and intent of infrastructure just as we do the 
ideological, visionary and revolutionary 
potential of such technologies. This goes 
beyond seeing engineers and planners as 
decision-makers, intermediaries and 
conduits for particular ideas, and places 
them at the forefront of being able to 
generate new ideas about what the future 
should hold. 
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Section 5: Mobility and auto-mobility 
Throughout this review we have 
identified disconnects between global 
climate change, national 
development and transport policies, 
and divergences between what 
people on the ground think and how 
they act in relation to the resources, 
networks and navigational tools they 
have at their disposal. We have 
described how stratospheric politics 
entered popular consciousness in the 
late twentieth century. From initial 
anxieties about aerosols, fridges and 
sun-burnt Australians, a global 
discourse on planetary warming and 
then climate change emerged. The 
politics of oil suddenly became more 
than a worry about the date on which 
the maximum rate of extraction had 
been reached (‘peak oil’) or, more 
drastically, what would happen when 
the wells ran dry. The utilisation of 
carbon for movement, power and 
plastic became indicative of a 
‘runaway world’ (Leach 1968, then 
Giddens 2003).  
In some countries, movements 
emerged promoting the reduced 
consumption of carbon. Elsewhere, 
however, incomes in poorer parts of 
the world began to rise, along with the 
capacity to consume. The production 
of cars increased and prices fell as 
manufacturers competed for shares 
in new markets. Accompanying new 
wealth came (and is coming) in the 
form of suburbanised lives, gated 
communities and auto-dependency. 
Increasing incomes saw a retreat 
from communal and shared living 
spaces, to isolation and insulation. 
A new paradigm of thinking about the 
world emerged: the Anthropocene. 
The Anthropocene is the era in which 
humanity emerged as a geological 
agent, i.e. a species with the capacity 
to transform or destroy its own 
conditions of existence (Chakrabarty 
2009). The term has overcome initial 
faddishness and gained traction, 
powerfully highlighting the agency of 
humanity to significantly affect 
prevailing conditions on the planet 
(Hann 2017). 
 
Earlier, sceptics attempted to discredit 
the science of climate change. 
Gradually, however, the language of 
climate change entered a peculiarly 
bureaucratic layer of international 
diplomacy. Initiatives were 
established to understand and then 
plan to act against climate change. 
The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was 
opened for signature at the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro (popularly and evocatively 
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known as the ‘Earth Summit’). More 
than 150 countries signed that 
convention to reduce ‘greenhouse 
gases’ in the belief that ‘anthropogenic 
activity’ was interfering with climatic 
conditions. 
 
Agenda 21 emerged as a plan for 
sustainable global development. 
Chapter 9 of the Agenda document 
suggests measures to protect the 
atmosphere. The claim that 
transport placed ‘harmful 
emissions into the atmosphere and 
had other adverse environmental 
effects’ was at the heart of the 
proposals. Agenda 21 demanded 
that organizations at all levels: 
 
Develop and promote, as 
appropriate, cost-effective, 
more efficient, less 
polluting and safer 
transport systems, 
particularly integrated rural 
and urban mass transit, as 
well as environmentally 
sound road networks, 
taking into account the 
needs for sustainable 
social, economic and 
development priorities, 
particularly in developing 
countries.22 
                                                          
22 Agenda 21. Rio de Janerio: 
United Nations Conference on 
 
There was enthusiasm for 
reducing emissions, delegates 
jetted home from Rio with a new 
knowledge of sustainable 
development, the fragility of 
indigenous livelihoods and the 
dangers of carbon. In the following 
years, the ideas of Agenda 21 
found their way into national and 
local government policy, albeit in a 
very piecemeal and unequal 
fashion. The document and its 
legacies helped establish the 
atmosphere in which reports such 
as Gwilliam’s (2002) land-mark 
Cities on the Move was produced 
by the World Bank. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) formed a 
few years before the Rio 
conference, in 1988, to establish 
an ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ view 
of climate change and its 
consequences (Bolin 2008). In 
many ways, the IPCC has set the 
terms of debate on carbon 
reduction. Subsequent summits 
(‘COP’ or Conference of Parties) in 
Kyoto and Durban, in particular, 
encouraged alternative ways of 
thinking about transport and 
carbon. In Paris in 2015 pledges 
Environment and 
Development, p. 79. 
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were again made to reduce 
emissions to limit global 
temperature increase to 2°C.23 
 
The IPCC’s most recent report 
(2014) stated: ‘Warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, and 
since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are 
unprecedented over decades to 
millennia’ (IPPC 2014a: 1). Other 
key observations included: 
‘Increasing magnitudes of [global] 
warming increase the likelihood of 
severe, pervasive, and irreversible 
impacts’ (IPPC 2014: 14), and ‘A 
first step towards adaptation to 
future climate change is reducing 
vulnerability and exposure to 
present climate variability’. 
 
The message from the IPPC is clear; 
however, the seemingly pressing 
implications of these claims are far 
removed from the direction of travel in 
many parts of the world. Most 
estimates suggest that transport 
accounts for around a quarter of 
current global carbon emissions and 
an even higher percentage of oil 
consumption. Urban transport 
infrastructures are therefore central to 
both traditional developmental 
                                                          
23 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate 
Change: CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. 
agendas and progressive low-carbon 
sustainability initiatives and 
development goals, as well as for the 
improved quality of life in cities. 
Transport infrastructure has become 
an ‘asset class’ (promoted by 
development banks and stock 
exchanges) and presented as 
something of a panacea for the 
problems of congestion and pollution. 
These sometimes-contradictory 
forces have led to an infrastructural 
construction boom in much of the 
urban Global South. 
The background to the IPPC and 
global climate change debate is well 
known, by laying the story out at some 
length we can make two moves away 
from this received knowledge. The 
first is to look at climate change 
inaction as described in western 
sociological literature. The second is 
to suggest that while climate change 
discourse represents a reality of high-
level international diplomacy, and 
perhaps national diplomacy, it is not 
embedded in the day-to-day running 
of poorer countries, and crucially 
plays little to no role in the relationship 
between politicians and those who 
elect them, quite the contrary in fact. 
Therefore, we see the barrier to the 
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implementation of low carbon 
transport as the absence of political 
and moral will.  
Social science thinking on climate 
change 
Many social scientists writing on 
climate change have recently begun 
to think through the knowledge 
politics behind public and individual 
opinion. They have attempted to 
address why the question of climate 
change has provoked such 
disagreement, befuddlement and 
faltering action. These investigations 
lead them into big philosophical, 
sociological and moral questions, 
akin to asking why some people and 
not others believe in god or gods and 
why some are left wing and others 
right. Such questions cannot be 
explained by applying sociologically-
adhesive labels such as ‘socialisation’, 
‘genes’ or ‘class’; nor can quantitative 
approaches provide adequate 
explanatory power for either 
understanding or creating conditions 
for change. 
Giddens (2009; also Urry 2011) 
argues that because the dangers 
of global warming are intangible in 
everyday life, many will sit on their 
hands and do nothing. According 
to him, such inaction is 
accentuated by ‘future 
discounting’, a condition in which 
people find it hard to give the same 
level of reality to the future as they 
do to the present. For others, the 
dynamics of globalisation and 
accumulation inherent in capitalist 
society, and the competitive nature 
of the interstate system, have 
combined to produce a form of 
global development which is 
centered on systems of production 
and mobility (Paterson 2007). In 
this view, methods of production 
have inertia and momentum of 
their own. They cannot simply 
change or be stopped because too 
much is dependent on these things 
continuing. 
 
Global warming has been 
‘marketised’, both as a business 
opportunity and as a way of 
dealing with the problem through 
carbon markets and trading. Stern 
goes as far as to suggest that a low 
carbon economy could be a ‘new-
energy industrial revolution’ (Stern 
2015: 33). In essence, and if Stern 
has his way, the free market has 
been left to negotiate our future. 
The result, according to critics 
such as Parr (2013), is that 
decisions that should be collective 
have been splintered into a 
disparate and confusing array of 
choices. The crisis has been 
restructured and privatised. The 
free market is not the political 
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response to climate change that it 
pretends to be; rather it is ‘a 
political ghost emptied of its 
collective aspirations’ (Parr 2013: 
5-6). Beck (2016) usefully shows 
how the discourse and debate on 
climate change have themselves 
been agents of metamorphosis. 
Climate change debate and the 
spirit of Agenda 21, for one 
example of many, have produced 
new realties and possibilities.  
 
Climate change thinking on 
the ground  
The second move we wish to make 
away from the IPPC framing of 
climate change is to look at the 
way climate change is a ‘non-
issue’ in much of the world – and 
this we suggest is perhaps the 
single biggest barrier to the 
implementation of low carbon 
transport technologies. Positions 
might vary, from ‘climate is not a 
concern because there are more 
pressing priorities’ to ‘there is no 
climate change’ or ‘changes to the 
climate are a result of the actions 
of already-wealthy countries’. This 
is not simply the same debate 
about ‘climate change skepticism’ 
that we are more familiar with in 
the UK. These views are often 
framed in terms of historical 
inequality, global equity, justice 
and neo-colonialism. 
 
In an excellent study of the micro 
politics of climate change in 
Norway, Norgaard (2011) 
describes the socially-organised 
denial of climate change, 
suggesting that the norms of 
emotion, conversation and 
attention keep the issue out of 
everyday life – the problem is just 
too big to be there. For her, this is 
not a matter of ‘information’ or 
‘science’, but rather a matter of 
sociality. 
 
Fieldwork undertaken in South 
Asia suggests that there is a 
pervasive disconnect between 
global climate change politics and 
domestic political agendas, in 
which climate change features 
rarely. India’s national policy 
frameworks, for example, do not 
mention transport. Instead, 
transport is a question of 
development, rather than climate; 
it is a form of development which is 
receiving tremendous investment 
and growth and therefore is an 
area in which carbon emissions 
will continue to rise, off-setting 
improvements in technology, 
efficiency and other forms of 
engineering. 
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Further, there is a more specific 
disconnect between road and car 
transport, and climate change. In the 
DFID-funded BBC Climate Asia 
project, one of the questions was 
about aspirations and car ownership. 
However, those running the survey 
made no attempt to link projected 
increases in car ownership to climate 
change or personal transport to 
carbon emissions – it possibly did not 
occur to them. The survey, 
nonetheless, took as a starting point 
the fact that climate change was part 
of the daily lives of people.24  
Likewise, the influential Cities on the 
Move (Gwilliam 2002) report from the 
World Bank presents car ownership 
as a ‘natural’, or at least a rational, 
function of increasing wealth, as if 
there were no vested interests in the 
promotion of the automobile as a way 
of organising social, economic and 
political life. The report assumes that 
the redesign of cities to accommodate 
the car (and thus to become 
dependent on the car) is an inevitable, 
rather than a socio-economic and 
political process. 
 
Implications for transport 
agendas  
                                                          
24 
http://dataportal.bbcmediaaction.org/site/ 
The threat, responsibility and frames 
of reference within which climate 
change is understood vary around the 
world. Climate change might appear 
as a natural and self-evident fact to 
many – but the way in which the idea 
is received and understood is a 
product of local contexts, histories 
and cultures, as well as notions of 
equality and rights, which often 
exceed national boundaries and have 
roots in colonial and anti-colonial 
movements. The important role 
climate change negotiations have 
played in international diplomacy has 
not filtered down to domestic policy 
and party-political concerns in many 
countries. Therefore, arguably one of 
the most significant barriers to the 
implementation of low carbon 
transport solutions is the lack of local 
appetite, whether political or popular. 
Agarwal and Narain (1991) argued 
that climate change discourse, which 
at that time emanated from 
Washington, was a form of 
‘environmental colonialism’. They 
reasoned that the focus on current 
flows over the historic accumulation 
of carbon emissions, calculating 
responsibility by gross emissions per 
nation rather than normalising them to 
a per capita measure, and equating 
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luxury consumption of the rich with 
the survival emissions of the poor was 
to act in favour of western and 
industrialised nations over developing 
nations, such as India and China. 
This line of reasoning found a ready 
home in India where climate change 
remains a ‘non-issue’ in electoral 
politics (Dubash 2012). Internationally, 
India has consistently argued that the 
North and South have different 
responsibilities and obligations. In line 
with the international stance, the 
domestic focus has been on 
economic growth as a developmental 
ethos. Development in India is often 
shorthand for people becoming 
wealthier and leading increasingly 
resource-consumption intensive life-
styles (often labelled as ‘western’). 
Key to this, and the language of 
development deployed by the last few 
governments, has been the 
promotion of mobility through road 
infrastructure. At the same time, the 
market for cars has expanded rapidly. 
There is a ‘disconnect’ between the 
automobile and the ‘problem’ of 
climate change. In India, as 
elsewhere in the world, various other 
powerful ideas about progress, the 
right to consume, and equalities of 
privilege seem to render the 
automobile immune to critical scrutiny. 
In India, roads and cars have been 
promoted as two of the key planks of 
development policy and as clear 
evidence of ‘progress’ being made. 
Roads are commonly and powerfully 
associated with efficient and strong 
governance and the arrival of 
modernity. Given this, coupled with 
the brute fact of persistent and 
widespread poverty, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that transport in India is 
not connected to national climate 
change policy. As already mentioned, 
there is no mention whatsoever of 
transport or vehicle emissions in any 
of the national policy statements, 
including the National Climate Action 
Plan. The brief discussion of transport 
in Dubash’s Handbook of Climate 
Change and India states ‘the 
developmental priorities of this sector 
- to facilitate mobility while enabling 
access for the poor, improve energy 
security, and reduce cost and 
pollution - are well aligned with the 
global objective of climate mitigation’ 
(2012: 299). This sentiment seems to 
contradict India’s current policy of 
hyper promoting road infrastructure, 
almost as if it were a liberation 
technology. 
Numerous studies have shown that 
vehicle emissions in India are already 
rising quickly and look set to rise at 
even faster rates in coming years. 
The current government has turned 
road infrastructure into front page and 
feel-good news. The responsible 
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minister has become a celebrity and 
found himself a place in the national 
imagination; his pronouncements on 
other political issues also carry a 
great deal of weight. The agency 
responsible for highway construction 
(NHAI) has set ambitious targets for 
the length of four-lane highways to be 
constructed each day. By 2040, the 
government claims it will have the 
capacity to build 50 km per day. 
Roads have multiplier effects and the 
quantity of traffic these arrangements 
will generate will far exceed carbon 
targets, particulate emissions and 
congestion. Although the global urban 
population is growing, there is a 
parallel trend of decreasing urban 
density, as cities are redesigned to 
accommodate the automobile. As 
cities grow to make room for the car, 
they tend to develop low-density 
suburban areas on their outskirts. 
Consequently, cities get larger and 
travel times and distances the 
population travel also tend to increase.  
It is also the case that cities are 
increasingly congested and average 
traffic speeds have continued to fall. 
Planning for the car encourages low-
density development in suburban 
areas, which in turn has to be low-
density to allow for parking and the 
movement of vehicles. As cities 
become wealthier, there is a rise in 
car ownership which makes it 
increasingly difficult to sustain 
profitable urban public transport in 
suburbs. In most parts of the world, 
despite significant roadbuilding 
programmes, average travel speeds 
continue to decline, as the rate of car 
ownership continues to rise faster 
than the ability to create meaningful 
road networks.  
Urban planning is so dominated by 
the car that there is surprisingly little 
accommodation of the poor, who, for 
the most part, remain pedestrians. 
The car increases both public and 
private costs of infrastructure per 
residence. In many areas, free 
parking on roads amounts to a state 
subsidy for the car. Walking and other 
forms of non-motorised transport play 
second fiddle to the motorcar in the 
eyes of planners and those at large on 
city streets. Congestion and 
particulate pollution does not only 
affect car drivers, but all road users, 
as the poor frequently have to walk or 
travel in slow-moving and 
overcrowded buses. 
 
Questioning auto-mobility  
Social science literature on roads 
demonstrates how such 
infrastructures become far more than 
engineering and materiality, but the 
very sites through which history is 
(re)made, notions of citizenship 
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forged, and where capitalism 
operates in its most extreme and 
enchanting forms. Much of the power 
and significance of roads stems from 
their coupling with the idea of mobility; 
an idea and practice promoted and 
capitalised like no other over the 
course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
  
The literature on roads is vibrant, 
including the ethnography of life on 
the road (Dalakoglou 2017), at the 
side of the road (Stewart 1996) and 
among those building roads (Harvey 
and Knox 2015). Augé (1995) 
theorised the ‘non-place’ of the 
motorway; others productively see 
roads as potent sites of meaning and 
culture where ideas such as hope and 
desire, fear and danger, nationalism 
and hatred are brought into sharp 
relief (Masquelier 2002). In this sense, 
roads variously divide or shape 
communities; represent either the 
state, modernity or the most 
aggressive forms of private service 
provision; reflect the end of traditional 
ways of doing things through 
commodification and are imbued with 
notions of domination by the city or 
the West or something else. Roads 
alter the shape of things and have 
qualities all of their own, which exist 
outside the materials of their 
construction. Roads carry with them, 
and can be made to represent, ideas, 
power and knowledge. Consequently, 
roads are often key to the 
development of territorial projects 
such as that of the national socialists 
in Germany in the early-twentieth 
century (Zeller 2006), and the 
‘infrastructural Europeanism’ of the 
European Union (Schipper 2008). 
Weston (2012) argues that Fordism’s 
most iconic product, the automobile, 
is a pedagogical device, schooling an 
affectively sensual and toxicity-
infused relationship to the 
environment. In this sense, a car is 
not just a symbol of freedom or open 
roads or class mobility and 
modernisation; rather, it is one of the 
technologies most intimately and 
corporeally implicated in the creation 
of new ecologies. The car organises 
the idea that we can poison the world 
without limit by extending 
contemporary relations of production 
and mobility into the future. At the 
same time, we recognise that a limit 
must be out there somewhere, but it 
remains an abstraction and a distant 
intellectual realisation, rather than a 
practical or material one. 
In much of Europe, the car was the 
post-war vehicle of modernization. 
Cars became the commodity form. 
Workers made the product they most 
wished to buy. Many needed their 
produce in order to reach the place of 
their labours, i.e. they drove cars to 
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work. In her account of the 
Americanisation of France, Ross 
elegantly argues that the car is so 
central to the story of the twentieth 
century that it is often consigned to 
the edges of historical discourse. 
Such marginalisation is not spun from 
banality or ubiquity but because the 
historicity of the car is ‘emptied out’ 
during production, transformation into 
discourse (advertising) and 
consumption. In her words, ‘For the 
car is not only implicated in a certain 
type of mobilisation by capital, it is 
also an active though partial agent in 
the reproduction of that structure – 
thus its embeddedness’ (1998: 19). 
 
Following the liberalisation of the 
Indian economy in the 1990s and the 
‘opening up’ of the car market for 
foreign manufacturers, automobility 
has become central to the lives, 
consumption habits and aspirational 
goals of many. Investment in the car 
industry stimulated other industries 
notably those of oil, steel and 
construction. Following this line of 
reasoning, Paterson (2007) outlines 
the complexes through which support 
for the car has helped to promote and 
reproduce the state power. This 
happens through the combination of 
(a) road building and the neglect of 
public transport (b) fiscal measures 
which effectively subsidise car use 
and (c) collusion between states and 
car manufacturers. National and 
international road lobbies emerged as 
a coalition of car, oil and construction 
companies, allied with highway and 
municipal engineers. Cars and roads 
became central to everything, but at 
the same time, echoing Ross’s 
characterisation of the car as 
naturalised and self-evident, the car 
has not met with critical discussion in 
South Asia. 
  
The Ford Foundation is one of the 
major funding agencies to have 
supported climate change research in 
India. Vehicle testing agencies in 
India are often supported by car 
manufacturers. As in other parts of 
the world, the government, in 
partnership with the automobile 
industry, has launched a new think-
offensive in favor of new cars, ‘green’ 
cars, electric cars or even flying cars, 
but not no cars. Might it be a bad bet 
to rely on car manufactures to save us 
from climate change? 
 
Focusing on the car as a source of 
emissions obscures the fact that the 
mobility complex requires roads and 
is carbon intensive. Cars are part of 
systems of production, consumption 
and mobility that must be seen as a 
whole. A holistic vision of what puts 
the car in such a role is required. 
Efforts that focus on the reduction of 
carbon produced by cars through 
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engine design, aerodynamic 
technologies or other engineering 
solutions rather miss the point. With 
countries across Asia gearing up for 
tremendous growth in car markets, 
reducing the carbon emissions of 
each vehicle becomes a tokenistic 
gesture, given that the overall 
quantity of vehicles on the road is set 
to expand to much greater carbon 
effect.  
The automobile, and range of 
associated industries that produce it, 
refuses to be upstaged, even by the 
climatic threat to the planet. 
Questioning the centrality of the car in 
ideas about the development of 
anywhere is not to adopt a stance 
against technology but to ask two sets 
of rhetorical and inter-related 
questions. First, what is the point of 
mass auto-mobility? Who is it for and 
whom does it serve? How has it come 
to appear as a fundamental right? 
Secondly, how is it that the object 
associated with Fordism and 
Taylorism, and carbon emissions has 
become fetishised to such a degree 
that its manufacturers now also 
promise to deliver the world from the 
very evils it appears to have brought 
upon us? 
Is there salvation in the ‘green’ and 
‘electric’ cars of the automobile 
industry? The same manufacturers 
have put their own expansion over 
and above human welfare. It is an 
irony mediated by various sensual 
bonds and visual paradigms: smell, 
design, style and speed. To ask why 
the car should have emerged as a 
leading protagonist in quest 
narratives on the route to a 
perpetually inhabitable planet is to 
ask about the relationship of 
sensation to prosthetic embodiment 
of the sort that the automobile 
teaches. This is, the kind of 
embodiment in which industrial 
products, however toxic, return to 
people as extensions of their own 
physicality (Weston 2012: 439-440). 
Continuous sensory engagement with 
industrially-sourced experiences of 
consumption discourages any 
meaningful reorganization of a 
system that represents immense 
short-term profitability for some and 
political office for others.
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Appendix 1 
Global Overview: Major Trends in Transport within Global Climate Policy 
This section traces the development of climate instruments and the changing role and 
position of the transport sector within them. The analysis is funnel-shaped, starting broad 
and moving to a specific point in the policy landscape in which ‘coalition’ and ‘co-benefit’ are 
the organising principles of the present and lead to the organisation of the author-institutions 
behind the Global Mobility Report (2017). 
Environmental assessment and the leadership framework 
The link between transport and climate change was first highlighted through the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the context of global environmental 
assessment. Although climate change had been signalled in the nineteenth century, it was 
only in 1979 that the issue was discussed at the global level, at the first World Climate 
Conference. In the 1980s, discussion led by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development placed climate change in the context of other global environmental and 
development problems (Gupta 2010).  
The IPCC was established as a scientific advisory body in 1988 by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). In 
1990, IPPC published its First Assessment Report, identifying options for mitigation in 
energy, industry, agriculture, and forestry sectors. Transport’s relevance to the climate 
debate was then understood through the categorisation of transport as one of the main fossil 
fuel end-users within the energy sector. The report recommended public education and 
information, technological development and transfer, and economic, financial, legal and 
institutional mechanisms as policy instruments. This policy framework remains largely 
relevant today, although emphasis has changed over time. 
By the time the IPCC First Assessment Report was published, there was already political 
recognition that climate change was a serious problem. However, the strong North-South 
divide on global environmental issues led to fundamental and protracted debates on how 
responsibilities with respect to the problem of climate change should be defined and 
addressed. This too remains a central and challenging issue in both international negotiation 
and within the scientific literature.  
Early political declarations on climate change emphasised the differential roles of developed 
and developing countries in causing the problem. Such differentiated roles called for 
differentiated responsibilities and targets. This was articulated in the idea of leadership in the 
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Noordwijk Declaration, in the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Conference 
statement, and in the Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference (para 5). 
Leadership as a political concept implied that developed countries would lead in reducing 
their own emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) while also assisting developing countries, 
to both adopt technologies that would reduce their rate of emissions growth and adapt to 
climate change. 
In 1990, the end of the cold war brought with it a general sense of political optimism and 
expectations of a ‘peace dividend’. Resources previously devoted to military use could now 
be made available for environmental and development issues. In 1992, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC1992) were adopted. The treaty was 
rapidly ratified and entered into force in 1994. However, the targets in the Convention were 
ambiguously worded as a result of pressure from the United States. The principles of 
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) established under the treaty - all countries 
have common responsibilities; these responsibilities are differentiated on the basis of their 
contribution to causing the problem and their capabilities to address the problem – later 
become an excuse for delayed measures at a national level and presented considerable 
challenge to the scientific community in addressing the ‘equity’ issue in modelling (Kartha et 
al. 2017). 
Beck and Forsyth (2015) describe the coproduction of science and social orders to explain 
how the IPCC had contributed to the signing of the UNFCCC, by translating the observed 
‘regional’ change of climate patterns into a ‘global’ environmental crisis, and by inventing 
procedural rules to present itself as the ‘unified voice of science’. They also documented the 
IPCC’s rocky relationship with developing countries. The IPCC consisted mainly of scientists 
from the US, EU and Japan. Their representation of the ‘world’ was highly contested to the 
extent that the IPCC had struggled to win support from the developing country leaders to 
maintain its advisory role under the UNFCCC. 
Apart from the vital issue of ‘inclusiveness’, the IPCC’s methodology – particularly in relation 
to future forecasting and the allocation of responsibility – has also been challenged. From 
the beginning, data has been contested and deeply politicised. Although structural and 
procedural changes made within the IPCC have succeeded in establishing the panel as a 
main advisory body under the UNFCCC (IPCC 2000, Beck and Forsyth 2015, Vardy et al. 
2017), debates over the soundness of the IPCC GHG emission scenarios, the accuracy of 
emissions calculations (Parikh 1992), and later, debates on the relevance of calculations 
with respect to the costs of the effect of climate change (for instance, the monetary value of 
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human life in developing countries) have continued to cloud the authority of the IPCC’s 
reports (Gupta 2010).  
The Kaya identity played a central role in the development of the IPCC emission scenarios 
(IPCC 2000). It formed the conceptual framework underlying today’s understanding of the 
transport sector’s climate change mitigation options (see diagram 1 below) (Urban 2016). 
The Kaya identity was developed by Japanese energy economist Yoichi Kaya in 1989 as a 
formula for computing the total anthropogenic CO2 emissions generated by energy 
consumption. It was modified from the I=PAT equation (Impact=Population x Affluence x 
Technology) that was previously widely used to calculate human impact on the environment. 
The Kaya Identity states that the total emission level of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide 
can be expressed as the product of four factors: human population, GDP per capita, energy 
intensity (per unit of GDP), and carbon intensity (emissions per unit of energy consumed) 
(Kaya 1989).  
The Kaya Identity identified energy intensity and carbon intensity as the two key factors 
affecting the level of GHG emissions other than population and GDP growth. Since upward 
population trends and GDP growth are unlikely to be halted, the climate change policy 
recommendations developed based on this mathematical notion have centred on the 
available options with the potential to “de-couple” the lineal relationship between 
population/GDP growth and increasing energy and carbon intensity.  
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Diagram 1 shows the transport sector’s emission mitigation options based on Kaya Identity 
principles.  
 
(Source Urban 2016) 
Issues:  
Technology-fix 
The I=PAT identity was developed at a time when environmental politics in the US were 
centred on the role of production technologies, both positive and negative. Therefore, the 
importance of technology is overly emphasised in this equation. As a result, policy 
recommendations based on this equation have been criticised for being intrinsically biased 
towards a “technology-fix” approach (Alcott 2010).  
Significant reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions are technically possible 
and can be economically feasible. These reductions can be achieved by utilizing 
an extensive array of technologies and policy measures that accelerate 
technology development, diffusion and transfer (IPCC 1995). 
The integrated assessment models (IAMs) that dominate IPCC’s assessment focus on fuel 
and technological efficiency gains as transport mitigation solutions (Creutzig 2016). 
Carbon leakage/rebound effect 
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The I=PAT equation has been criticized for being too simplistic by assuming that factors of 
population (P), affluence (A), and technology (T) are independent of each other. In reality, 
there are at least seven interdependencies between P, A, and T that could exist, indicating 
that it is more accurate to rewrite the equation as I = f(P,A,T) (Alcott 2010). For example, a 
doubling of technological efficiency, or equivalently a reduction of the T-factor by 50 percent, 
does not necessarily reduce the environmental impact (I) by 50 percent if efficiency induced 
price reductions stimulate additional consumption of the resource that was supposed to be 
conserved. This phenomenon is called the ‘rebound effect’ (conservation), or the Jevons 
Paradox. Despite significant improvements since 1980 in the carbon intensity of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP, i.e., the efficiency in carbon use), world fossil energy consumption 
has increased in line with economic and population growth (see Alcott, 2010: Fig. 5). 
Similarly, an extensive historical analysis of technological efficiency improvements has 
conclusively shown that improvements in the efficiency of energy and material use were 
almost always outpaced by economic growth, resulting in a net increase in resource use and 
associated pollution (Huesemann and Huesemann 2011). 
By 2001, literature in transport studies had established that the main challenges in the 
transport sector were (a) the ever-increasing demand for transport/mobility as GDP per 
capita increases and (b) economic development policies that further encouraged car use. 
This was reflected in both the IPCC third assessment (IPCC 2001) and the World Bank 
Transport Strategy Review (Gwilliam 2002). 
Recent reports from the European Environmental Agency (EEA) on transport and climate 
change also discuss the problem of ‘rebound effects’: 
Many past technological advances in the transport sector have historically been 
offset by the ever-increasing demand for transport (EEA 2016a: 8). 
New passenger cars have been put on a trajectory towards emissions of 95 g 
CO2/km by 2020 — almost a 50 per cent cut compared to 1990. Unfortunately, 
traffic levels are growing at around the same rate as average emissions are 
projected to fall, meaning that the net effect may still be far from what we need 
(EEA 2016b). 
Initiatives exist to include vans and, with a longer time perspective, trucks into 
the emissions target. But without complementary measures there is still a risk 
that most improvements will be offset by the growth in traffic. Indeed, more 
efficient vehicles may lower transport costs in the long run, thereby increasing 
the demand for transport. This process is already apparent in the airline 
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industry. Half a century ago few could afford a vacation in Thailand but now it 
is available to a broad segment of society (EEA 2016b).  
If vehicles become more fuel efficient, they become cheaper to drive meaning 
we may drive more often. This might give a significant rebound effect, causing 
more mobility and thus lowering environmental pressures to a lesser degree 
than previously expected (EEA 2016a: 61). 
Funds for improving accessibility are often reserved for investments in 
transport networks which reduce travel time by increasing travel speed. 
However, travelling at higher speeds encourages longer trips and therefore 
increases energy use and environmental pressures (EEA 2016a: 57). 
Economic measures, transport-centred research, and the equity 
framework 
By 1996, the post-cold war optimism had faded, and it had become clear that it would not be 
easy to decouple economic growth from GHG emissions. Against this general pessimism, 
hope was building that perhaps an agreement could be reached at COP-3 in Kyoto in 1997. 
However, prior to Kyoto, the Byrd–Hagel Resolution was adopted in the United States in 
1997. This resolution called on the United States not to accept any future binding 
quantitative targets until and unless the key developing countries also participated 
meaningfully, especially in light of the increased costs associated with taking action for the 
United States. Despite pessimism in the United States, in December 1997, the Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted against all odds. However, it proved much more difficult to actually 
ensure ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The United States withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol 
in 2001 and the European Union invested heavily in collaborative leadership to ensure that 
Russia and Japan ratified the Protocol leading to it coming into force in 2005 (Gupta 2010). 
Barriers identified: 
This period witnessed growing contributions from economists to IAM and more discussions 
on economic measures, as well as increases in transport sector specific modelling. The key 
policy debates centred on whether and how cost-benefit analysis could be applied to climate 
change, and how ‘equity’ should be defined with respect to developing countries rights to 
economic growth. 
A recent review of the IAM models revealed that economically-focused studies concentrated 
on undesired welfare loss (Creutzig 2016: 345), with the decarbonisation of the transport 
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sector understood to be comparatively challenging. This is because low-carbon transport 
technologies are costly and require technological change for billions of end-users, compared 
to technological change for a limited number of agents in the power sector. Low carbon 
transport raises costly questions about how energy is stored. The structural change of 
economies from industrial societies toward service economies also predicts a greater 
proportional increase in the size of the transport sector. As a result of an inelastic demand 
with respect to the oil price, strong behavioural effects, and assumed high costs in 
technology deployment, a global carbon price is assumed to be less effective in 
decarbonizing transport, compared to other sectors (Creutzig 2016: 345). Within such a 
scenario, oil remained the main source of primary energy that powers transportation, 
rendering the transport sector the main emitter of CO2 emissions at the end of the twenty-
first century (Creutzig 2016: 345). 
In 2000, the IPCC published a special report on Technology Transfer, focusing on the kinds 
of technologies and mechanisms that accelerate or hinder technology transfer. In the Third 
Assessment Report of IPCC, technological risks to car manufacturers were identified as a 
key barrier in transport mitigation: 
(i) Risk to manufacturers of transportation equipment is an important barrier to 
more rapid adoption of energy efficient technologies in transport. Achieving 
significant energy efficiency improvements generally requires a “clean sheet” 
redesign of vehicles, along with multibillion dollar investments in new production 
facilities; (ii) on the other hand, the value of greater efficiency to customers is the 
difference between the pre- sent value of fuel savings and increased purchase 
price, which net can often be a small quantity. Although markets for transport 
vehicles are dominated by a very small number of companies in the technical 
sense, they are nonetheless highly competitive in the sense that strategic errors 
can be very costly; (iii) finally, many of the benefits of increased energy efficiency 
accrue in the form of social rather than private benefits. For all these reasons, the 
risk to manufacturers of sweeping technological change to improve energy 
efficiency is generally perceived to outweigh the direct market benefits. 
Enormous public and private investments in transportation infrastructure and a 
built environment adapted to motor vehicle travel pose significant barriers to 
changing the modal structure of transportation in many countries (IPCC 2001). 
The Stern Review of 2006 is the largest economic analysis on climate change to date. 
Through extensive economic modelling, Stern suggests that the GDP costs of climate 
change would be much worse than previously predicted: ‘without further action, costs and 
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risks would be ‘equivalent to losing 5 percent of global GDP each year, now and forever’ and 
possibly higher if other risks were accounted for. He called for strong and immediate 
government response with much higher GDP investment and his review addresses the 
importance of economic measures, in particular carbon pricing and carbon trading 
mechanism.  
Stern (2006) pointed out that economic modelling is particularly challenging for the transport 
sector because various stakeholders’ behaviour over long time spans is very difficult to 
predict. IPCC (2007) also mentioned that the limited number and scope of available studies 
of mitigation potential and cost is a problem for a credible assessment and for extending 
funding opportunities. The issue of a lack of local data was addressed in the Paris 
Agreement with increasing reporting responsibilities to the parties. GIZ (2016) also 
addressed the same issue: ‘Comprehensive and reliable databases are essential in order to 
identify effective strategies for reducing emissions. However, in most cases existing data is 
inadequate: detailed inventories and information on trends in transport demand are not yet 
available’ (GIZ 2016, Advancing Transport Climate Strategies (project) 2016-2019).  
The EEA has made the following comments on carbon pricing and the carbon trading 
potential of the transport sector:  
Transport is generally not exposed to international competition, meaning that a 
trip from Paris to Poznan cannot be replaced by one from Singapore to Sidney. 
There is therefore no real risk of ‘carbon leakage’ with emissions that are 
regulated in Europe simply moving abroad. This, in principle, makes transport a 
good candidate for emission trading as a means to regulate emissions (EEA 
2016b). 
Two other criteria should also be met before embarking on a trading scheme. 
First, the number of operators in the market must be limited in order to make the 
allocation of allowances manageable. Aviation meets this criterion and emission 
trading will start in coming years. Maritime transport could also meet this criterion, 
but verification is more difficult because ships can carry fuel for longer periods of 
time than planes. Rail is already covered by emission trading as the electricity 
used is bought from a sector under emission trading. Road transport, however, 
cannot meet the ‘limited number of operators’ criterion as each driver is 
essentially an operator (EEA 2016b). 
123 
 
Second, the carbon price should be high enough to induce a change in 
behaviour. The current carbon prices would add less than 1 ¢ per kilometre to the 
cost of driving a car (less than 4 ¢ per litre of fuel). Compared to present fuel 
taxes it is insignificant and therefore unlikely to have any impact on behaviour 
(EEA 2016b). 
The Paris Process on Mobility and Climate (PPMC) reported the following: 
Deep reforms of transport pricing are required to ensure that users pay a price 
which reflects the full marginal social costs of transport (e.g. noise, infrastructure, 
accidents, delays, as well as GHG emissions and air pollution etc.). This will 
ensure fair modal competition, stimulate innovation by allowing market forces to 
drive the transformation of transport (PPMC 2017: 17). 
Gwilliam (2013) also advocates full-cost pricing. 
One of the key outcomes of COP21 has been the strengthened resolve to adopt 
carbon pricing to promote action on climate change. In Paris it was argued that 
pricing CO2 at around 50 $/ton could give a strong push to alternative energies 
and that pricing it at around 100 $/ ton would make certain technologies like 
carbon capture and sequestration become economically viable. Discussions 
continue both on price levels/trajectories and ways to foster a level playing field. 
Putting a value on carbon --be it in the form of carbon tax or emissions trading 
e.g. by making transport part of carbon markets -- is a major lever to inform 
player decisions towards low carbon solutions (PPMC 2017:17). 
Until now carbon pricing in the Transport sector has been poorly developed in 
comparison to other sectors, and additional efforts will have to be made to catch 
up. It is encouraging that a number of transport related companies have started 
to introduce an internal or shadow carbon price (PPMC 2017:18). 
This new economic instrument, if implemented at scale, will provide much 
needed market signals and help generate income to be pumped back into the 
economy, preferably through sustainable transport related infrastructural 
investment (PPMC 2017:18). 
Characterisation: Extensive linkages between transport and other 
factors  
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In the Technical Annex on transport, Stern (2006) comments:  
Transport is one of the more expensive sectors to cut emissions from because 
the low carbon technologies tend to be expensive and the welfare costs of 
reducing demand for travel are high. Transport is also expected to be one of the 
fastest growing sectors in the future. For these two reasons, studies tend to find 
that transport will be among the last sectors to bring its emissions down below 
current levels (Technical Annex: Transport, Stern 2006: 3). 
Stern (2006) explained the issue of welfare costs for reduced mobility: ‘The demand for 
transport is a derived demand: it is not demanded for its own sake, but rather for the things it 
enables people to do (such as get to work, take leisure trips, and move goods from one 
place to another)’ (Stern 2006: 13).  
Transport scholars, as well as the World Bank, have long observed the growing constraints 
and demands that the global trade pattern has imposed on urban transport (IPCC 2001, 
Gwilliam 2002). Energy and development scholar Urban (2016) further commented on this 
aspect and pointed out that like the energy sector, transport is a derived demand. However, 
a crucial difference of the transport sector lies in the extent of end-user engagement. 
Urban (2016) pointed out that end-user engagement is associated with the extensive 
linkages between transport and other factors, such as linkages between: 
• transport technologies and wider infrastructural and institutional systems;  
• the transport sector and wider spatial, infrastructural, social and economic planning;  
• the transport sector and settlement; 
• the transport sector and environmental and social issues.  
The EEA also addressed this issue from a different but similar angle in its latest report, 
highlighting the close and complex linkages between transport and other societal functions, 
such as trade, food and tourism (EEA 2016a: 58). 
These linkages have profound policy implications, including:  
(i) Stern path-dependency and technology lock-in 
These close linkages mean that there is a very high degree of path dependency and ‘lock-in’ 
to current transport systems, both from the mobility system and other systems, due to private 
and public investment in infrastructure, equipment and other forms of capital associated with 
or dependent upon particular forms of transport. For example, the transport system is closely 
connected to the energy system and replacing conventional vehicles with electrical vehicles 
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(EVs) can help reduce emissions, although this is dependent upon the source of the 
electricity used. Historical investments in carbon intensive electricity generation, therefore, 
may form a lock-in for a transition towards electrical mobility, as these plants have long life-
spans and obstruct low-emission mobility (EEA 2016a: 58). These are particularly 
challenging aspects for developed countries (Urban 2016).  
The EEA (2016a) suggests that a key challenge for the current EU emission mitigation 
efforts in the transport sector is the extensive and incumbent interests of various 
stakeholders. These range from transport operators, state confined systems and car 
manufacturers, to private companies, biomass farmers and food retailers and their 
consumers, to name but a few.  
(ii) Policy implementation outcomes hinge upon external factors 
The European Environment Agency emphasised the policy implication of such linkages: 
Because of these links, actions designed to improve the environmental 
performance of transport can become more complex, as the outcomes also 
depend on factors that are external to the mobility system (EEA 2016a:9). 
(iii) Cost implications of new modes of transport 
Development of infrastructure for new modes of transport may also be very costly due to the 
number of stakeholders involved. For example, the development of new railway tracks in 
urban areas not only incurs the construction costs of the new track but also high costs in 
avoiding, or compensating damage to existing and expensive infrastructure such as roads, 
buildings and factories (Urban 2016). 
These features make transport policy highly political, with different stakeholder groups 
making uneven gains and losses from various transport improvement options. This can hold 
back or drive forward mitigation options. Nevertheless, Urban (2016) has argued that such 
features also offer opportunities for integrated solutions that address the environmental 
performance of transport via other societal systems. For example, Hallegatte et al. (2016) 
show the significance of transport in the context of climate change through its entanglement 
with the food security and physical safety of the urban poor, as well as in terms of the rural 
poor’s access to market and the right to work. 
Taking this crucial feature of the transport sector into account, the PPMC has remarked:  
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The transport sector alone cannot realize such ambitious action and so will need 
to gain the full cooperation of other sectors that interact with it, especially the 
energy sector and urban development (PPMC 2017: 6). 
 
Transport demand models 
In contrast to the IPCC’s energy/economy/environment models which limit themselves to the 
transport sector, transport demand models, such as those developed by the IEA, also 
address transport-specific issues like accidents and congestion alongside climate mitigation. 
Hence, the fuel shift in the electricity/power sector is taken as a boundary consideration; 
optimal mitigation strategies across sectors are included in the investigation. Infrastructure 
and modal shift options are well represented, highlighting the contribution of climate change 
mitigation on the demand side (Creutzig 2016: 346).  
In its 2009 report, Transport, Energy and CO2: Moving Towards Sustainability, the IEA 
identifies ‘how [by 2050] the introduction and widespread adoption of new vehicle 
technologies and fuels, along with some shifting in passenger and freight transport to more 
efficient modes, can result in a 40 percent reduction in CO2 emissions below 2005 levels’. 
The language suggests the prioritisation of technological options, such as fuel economy, 
followed by the identification of modal shift options (Creutzig 2016:346). Nevertheless, the 
report also shows a clear trend, as transport demand models converged with place-based 
studies in the late 2000s. This will be discussed further below. 
 
Place-based research and the emergence of the ‘co-benefit’ framework 
In the first decade of this century, there was a growing trend to increasingly link climate 
change to development issues. Commitment and resources for climate assistance during 
this period were low, and a new discussion emerged about the need for main-streaming 
climate change into development and development cooperation.  
A key element in this period was the changing nature of the leadership discourse. The idea 
that the developed countries should lead by reducing their emissions was shattered by the 
US Byrd–Hagel Resolution and the subsequent withdrawal of the United States from the 
Kyoto negotiations. This was justified by the White House’s argument that the world 
economy would collapse if the United States were to take on strong stabilization or reduction 
targets. Developing countries experienced this lack of leadership as a failure in the 
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implementation of the Convention. Concurrently, there was growing pressure on newly 
developing countries to take appropriate action at a national level. 
Efforts to address climate issues through alternative political spaces have led to increasing 
engagement with sub-national actors. There is growing interest in the potential of policies 
that can be taken at local government level. The International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) had already been engaging local governments across the 
developed and developing world to participate in climate policy. National governments that 
were reluctant to sign up the Kyoto Protocol in this period found that their own sub-national 
government authorities were more active. Research into state policy also revealed that 
through past processes of decentralization and federalism, power to take decisions in some 
fields had been transferred to sub-national government levels (Gupta 2010).  
There have been at least two major waves of activity in municipal action on climate change 
since the 1990s. The first involved individual cities and transnational municipal networks, 
such as ICLEI's Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), Climate Alliance, and Energy Cities, 
which started to mobilize action for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. For the most 
part, national governments and the emerging international regimes for governing climate 
change showed little interest in these activities (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013). It was dominated 
by a few pioneer cities, predominantly in North America and Europe and focused on 
mitigation (Bulkeley and Betsill 2013). The second, and more-recent wave, saw transnational 
municipal networks grow and multiply as a more geographically diverse range of actors 
emerged. The emergence of the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and the Rockefeller 
Foundation Climate Change Initiative, together with the continued work of ICLEI, has led to 
an increasing involvement of global and megacities in the urban climate change agenda. At 
the same time, the predominant focus on mitigation is giving way to the emergence of 
municipal climate policy in which both mitigation and adaptation are considered significant. 
With regard to this shift, the World Bank has been particularly influential. 
This trend gave rise to increasing place-based research in the low carbon transport 
literature, specifying idiosyncratic behavioural and infrastructural mitigation options that are 
likely to be beneficial in realizing local co-benefits. These specific local approaches could 
mitigate urban transport emissions by 20-50 percent, a figure higher than that revealed in 
aggregate global models (Creutzig 2016: 342). 
Place-specific models limit themselves to one or a small number of locations, often cities. 
They comprise a variety of methodological approaches, such as those based on 
econometrics, or on agent-based modelling, and investigate infrastructure effects, demand-
side responses to policies, and urban development. Location-specific analysis is highly 
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relevant as urban transport emissions constitute 40 percent of all transport emissions. 
Activity reduction opportunities, largely, but not exclusively, in private urban transport have 
been best studied. Public health and environmentally-minded models tend to be more 
optimistic, focussing more on welfare benefits. In contrast, more economically focused 
studies tend to be more conservative, and emphasize undesired economic welfare losses.  
Urban modelling studies mostly consider multiple objectives besides climate change 
mitigation, specify local co-objectives such as congestion, physical activity benefits, air 
quality and accessibility. In this, they are closer to transport demand modelling 
methodologies. 
 
World Bank and climate change financing 
Another approach has been climate financing, which calls for the mainstreaming of climate 
change in development cooperation. This has led to new opportunities and actors in low 
carbon transport. Considerable progress has been made since Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) first became operational in 2001. 
CDM was established under the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Protocol explicitly includes five 
mechanisms—joint fulfilment (JF), joint implementation (JI), the clean development 
mechanism (CDM), emissions trading (ET), and the financial mechanism to promote the 
implementation of the agreement. Joint fulfilment allows countries to adopt a joint target for 
implementation. The CDM allows investors to invest in developing countries in return for 
emission credits, named certified emission reductions (CERs). CDM has proved to be a 
useful mechanism for soliciting interest from the private sector. The possibility of CDM 
together with other climate funds also facilitated development banks’ investment in 
sustainable transport. However, the actual financial support from CDM for transport projects 
were far less than expected and political and procedural factors such the withdrawal of the 
United States and carbon accounting led to the collapse of the CER market. 
According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), currently the largest sources of 
international public finance for climate mitigation in developing countries are the World Bank 
administered Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
while the EU’s Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) and the 
World Bank’s Scaling up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) provide mitigation financing 
on a smaller scale (ODI CFF 2016). 
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The key influences of the World Bank include: (a) its approach to combining knowledge and 
development solutions from transport, poverty reduction, environmental protection and urban 
planning and (b) its success in promoting Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) as a flagship intervention 
in low carbon urban transport solutions. 
 
The World Bank and the GEF: Priority setting 
In 1989, France proposed that the World Bank be provided with additional resources to fund 
environmental projects, offering to support it with a contribution of 900 million French francs 
over a three-year period. Its proposal, to the Bank's Development Committee, was quickly 
seconded by Germany. In November 1990, after the Bank had developed the proposal 
through extensive consultations and negotiations, 27 countries, including nine developing 
ones, agreed to set up a pilot Global Environment Facility (GEF). The first three years 
funding amounted to approximately $1 billion25. 
The GEF was jointly supported by the World Bank, the UNEP and the UNDP and was 
envisioned at the outset as independent. 
However, by 1994 the initial attempt at 
developing the GEF into an independent 
organisation had failed. Since the French 
government had clearly stated its preference 
for the World Bank, the World Bank won the 
political fight amongst the three agencies and 
ended up running the GEF. 
The World Bank had viewed the GEF as an 
opportunity not only to improve its reputation in 
environmental protection but also to extend its influence and resources in the new, 
environmental field. Since the World Bank became the trustee and the administrator of the 
GEF, the power relations between the World Bank, the UNEP and the UNDP changed from 
cooperation and pooling of expertise, to competition for project funding. In the past decade, 
funding from GEF went mostly to the World Bank’s projects, whilst the second largest share 
went to UNDP projects. Only a relatively small amount of money was allocated to UNEP 
work. 
                                                          
25 https://www.thegef.org/news/gef-how-it-all-began 
130 
 
The GEF was established around the time when the Climate Change Convention and the 
Biodiversity Convention were both signed. GEF has a committed fund larger than the total 
fund available for the UNEP. Subsequently, it has become the official financing mechanism 
for both Conventions. Upon taking over the GEF in 1994, the World Bank quickly directed 
resources and efforts to the field of climate change. By 1999, it was reported that around 45 
percent of the GEF total budget was allocated to climate change projects.  
In 1995 the World Bank launched the Global Overlays Program under the GEF, with major 
support from the Government of Denmark. The program is designed to help countries 
analyse policy options so as to integrate global climate change considerations into their 
national economic planning. By 1999, development and testing of energy sector 
methodologies was essentially completed and comprehensive guidance was issued. Efforts 
then refocused on the transport sector. In 2002, the World Bank’s Urban Transport 
Strategies (UTS) were developed through the Gwilliam 2002 report, which brought the 
bank’s previous reviewed strategies on transport and on urban development together with a 
clear emphasis on the relationship between urban transport and poverty alleviation, the 
critical role of non-motorised transport, and the effects of the external environment on the 
transport sector. 
The central concerns with transport and climate change identified by the World Bank UTS 
were similar to those outlined in the IPCC2001, but also addressed the problem of urban 
settlement patterns. These included the relationship between the high growth rate in per-
capita vehicle ownership and local government transport policies which encourage sprawling 
settlement patterns, thus leading to a further increase in reliance on private motor vehicles. 
Another two challenging trends that were addressed in the World Bank UTS were: (a) the 
growing and pivotal role that cities play in global trade, which underlines the need for 
efficient transport systems; and (b) the deterioration in urban transport systems that was 
partly linked to drastic cutbacks in funding for public transport systems. 
The UTS notes the difficulty of convincing urban transport policymakers in the developing 
world to prioritise climate change-related interventions. It recommended options linking GHG 
mitigation to near-term benefits, such as reducing local air pollution. The World Bank’s UTS 
proposes that in the short-term emphasis should be placed on policy reforms, such as fuel 
pricing and taxation. In the long term, greater attention should be paid to technological 
changes including non-motorised transport (NMT) and increased reliance on public transport 
systems with the aim of breaking the link between economic growth and increasing demand 
for individual transportation (Gwilliam et al. 2002; World Bank 2003). In sharp contrast to 
developed countries’ interest in investing in new vehicle and fuel technologies, additional 
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capital and operational costs were seen to be major constraints upon the introduction of new 
technologies or fuels in developing countries. The World Bank commented openly on its 
funding priorities, stating that its main funding source, the GEF, was unlikely to continue to 
cover the incremental cost of new technologies or fuel, as it had in its early days. It also drew 
on research to repeatedly address the practical point that transporting people via efficient 
modes of public transport, regardless of the technology, can have a large impact on reducing 
energy consumption and GHG emissions. 
Below is a table detailing the World Bank’s UTS priorities and cautions, in response to key 
issues- 
Main responses Preferences and priorities Cautions  
Structural Changes to Land 
Use 
• Removal of fiscal 
and public 
expenditure 
distortions that 
encourage the 
growth of megacities 
• The need for 
coordinated and 
integrated 
planning of land use 
and for development 
of urban transport 
infrastructure 
• A good road 
infrastructure does 
not necessarily result 
in auto dependency 
• Question the 
feasibility of trying to 
solve traffic 
congestion by 
shifting activity away 
from megacities. 
Improved Operational 
Efficiency 
• Better road system 
management: 
technical assistance 
and investment in 
this field can yield 
high returns 
• Efforts to reverse 
urban road decay: 
• Less enthusiastic 
about the viability of 
non-exclusive bus 
lanes combined with 
automated priority at 
intersections: 
enforcement proven 
to be very difficult 
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(improving clarity in 
responsibility and 
source of funding) 
• NMT infrastructure 
investment 
addressed through 
transport policy, road 
fund statutes and 
procedures: it serves 
people in all income 
groups, not only the 
poor 
• Support to the 
bicycle sector 
• Exclusive busways: 
low cost and can 
deliver performance 
levels only slightly 
lower than much 
costlier rail-based 
mass transit system 
• Cautious about 
urban rail systems: 
high capital and 
operational cost. 
Experience 
demonstrated that 
poorly planned urban 
rail systems can 
harm the interests of 
poor bus users and 
impose a large 
financial burden on 
cities. 
Better Focusing of 
Interventions to Assist the 
Poor 
• Improving access to 
slum areas 
• Improving public 
transport to 
peripheral locations 
• NMT and bus 
systems: more 
directly serve the 
poor 
• Safety and security 
measures such as 
street lighting 
• Investments in 
primary roads and 
high-cost transit 
systems can change 
the value of land and 
eventually drive the 
poor out of the area 
Policy, Institution, and Fiscal 
Reforms 
• Integrated package 
of strategies for 
infrastructure and 
Technical measure alone 
are unlikely to adequately 
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service pricing and 
for system financing. 
• Greater integration 
of the disparate 
authorities and 
agencies that 
currently oversee the 
urban transport 
subsector. 
• Involvement of the 
information sector 
address the challenges due 
to structural characteristics: 
1) The separation of 
infrastructure from 
operations. 
2) The separation of 
interactive modes of 
transport. 
3) The separation of 
infrastructure financing from 
infrastructure pricing. 
(Source: World Bank 2003: 5-13) 
Around the same time, the GEF’s limited funding scope was criticised by the GEF Council 
for being ‘too technical’. In response, funding structures were reviewed with the aim of 
broadening their scope so as to fulfil the initial mandate of promoting modal shift and non-
motorised transport. Four new priorities were recommended for OP11 in 2002 which were 
more in line with the World Bank’s UTS: 
(i) Public rapid transit, including BRT, light rail transit, and trolley electric buses. 
(ii) Transport-and traffic-demand management, including parking measures, traffic cells, area 
licensing (restricted zones), and congestion pricing. 
(iii) NMT and maintaining physically separate NMT networks, traffic calming, strengthening 
NMT manufacturing and maintenance enterprises, and improving NMT vehicle design. 
(iv) Land use planning through regulatory measures (zoning laws) and placing new public 
facilities such as schools, hospitals, police stations, and playgrounds in transit-friendly 
locations. 
The scope of OP11 has continued to broaden with increasing ‘non-technical’ priorities. In its 
2013 report on sustainable urban transport, the GEF described the key issues of urban 
transport in the developing countries as symptomatic of lacking institutional and 
legal/regulatory capacities, reporting:  
 
Most of the GEF transport and urban projects can be grouped into three general 
categories: (i) technology solutions; (ii) improvements in urban transport systems; 
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and (iii) integrated urban systems. While early GEF’s investments focused on 
technology solutions, the recent emphasis has shifted to comprehensive and 
integrated strategy options at the urban level (STAP GEF 2013:12).  
 
In 2003, the World Bank made an effort to compare its UTS with GEF OP11 priorities in 
order to identify interventions that are consistent with both strategies, and to help its 
transport staff explore funding opportunities from the GEF. Four overlapping areas were 
identified as promising: modal shifts to public transport, NMT, combined transport and urban 
planning and transport demand management (TDM). BRT was considered to be a good 
cost-effective example, with potentially large benefits on local air quality as well as global 
climate change. In addition, significant scope for the GEF to support the development of 
BRT was recognised in this review (World Bank 2003: 21-22).  
As of 2009, 29% of the GEF transport projects involved BRT systems or some form of transit 
system priority or spatial restructuring. Another 29% focused on some form of NMT 
infrastructure, normally cycling lanes, but also some pedestrian facilities. Another 8% were 
for some form of TDM measures. 6% of the projects dealt with alternative vehicles such as 
electric, hydrogen or hybrid vehicles. Another 28% was spent on ‘other’ activities; including 
capacity building, land use programmes, awareness raising, policy making, freight and 
bicycle manufacturing (STAP GEF 2013).  
GEF support for transport has been concentrated in cities with higher mitigation potential in 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Mexico (with China receiving most funding, 
followed by India coming second). In these counties GEF support for transport is 
implemented in conjunction with a range of other international and domestic efforts aimed at 
sustainable transport (STAP GEF 2013).  
By 2013, Asia was home to 22 projects which were either completed or in the process of 
implementation, in a total of 46 cities with a combined number of inhabitants of 180 million. 
Furthermore, it is notable that GEF’s partner, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), also 
launched a transport programme called the ‘Asian Sustainable Transport and Urban 
Development Program (ASTUD)’ in 2011 (STAP GEF 2013: 13).  
In Africa, eight projects have been developed and/or implemented, covering 18 cities with a 
combined number of inhabitants of 40 million. 
CDM demonstration projects 
The key impact of the World Bank on developing countries’ transport mitigation options was 
its investment in, and promotion of BRT. In 2002, the World Bank coordinated funding from 
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CDM, GEF and other funds to its BRT project in Bogota. It later rolled out funding to several 
major BRT projects, typically co-funding work with other agencies. 
 
Clean Development Mechanism 
The CDM was proposed during the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol by the US government 
as a means of reducing the shock of mitigation targets for developed countries’ national 
economies and a source of investment for developing countries.  
Developing countries and NGOs’ initial responses to this mechanism varied. Some criticised 
and protested against its inclusion, seeing it as an unethical practice which justified bringing 
environmentally unfriendly ‘big (dirty) projects’, such as the construction of hydropower 
plants, to developing countries. However, some, especially emerging countries, saw it as a 
chance to increase infrastructure investment for national energy security, as well providing 
potential opportunities for technology transfer which could improve their countries’ global 
competitiveness in the technology based knowledge economy. 
Stern (2006), Gwilliam (2002) and Grütter (2007) addressed CDM as an important funding 
resource. However up to 2012, amongst the 8,000 registered CDM projects only 30 were in 
the transport sector. Gwilliam (2013) points out that the World Bank had great expectations 
for the CDM, but that the Clean Development Mechanism had not worked for the urban 
transport sector in the ways it had initially been hoped it would. Stern (2006) cautioned that 
the stringent requirement to prove ‘additionality’ and the project-based methodology of the 
CDM would make the application process too complex and expensive for the least 
developed countries and thus favour emerging countries. Calculating and comparing CO2 
emissions of different mitigation options would be challenging for sectors like transport. Stern 
also echoed the already common criticism of CDM, that its limited impact is due to its 
project-based nature and methodology.  
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Further studies suggest that the two issues outlined by Stern (2006) as short-comings of 
CDM are also responsible for the under-representation of the transport sector in the 
programme (Wittneben et al 2009; Millard-Ball and Ortolano 2010). Grütter comments that 
there are three problematic areas under the CDM, which are methodologies, validators and 
the additionality procedure. There was high complexity in methodologies and far more is 
demanded in the transport sector than in other sectors. According to Hone (2017), the CDM 
failed due to the collapse of the CER market. He also reported that the discussions of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement in May this year had not come to agreement on any 
arrangement as to the future of CDM. 
In an interview on BRT, Grütter commented that because the infrastructure costs are high, 
carbon financing’s impact is limited, even in the context of the higher CER prices of the past. 
However, carbon financing’s potential impact lies in the possibility of reducing the financial 
risk of operational deficits (quoted in Yu 2014: 36). Yu (2014) analysed a BRT project Grütter 
highlighted to illustrate the impact of the failing CDM: 
The Chongqing BRT was managed and operated by a public company, 
Chongqing Bus Rapid Transit Development Co. Ltd. According to Grütter, the 
BRT Chongqing recently ceased operation, returning to the city's former bus 
transit system run by private companies affiliated with the government. This 
outcome is a result of the operating deficit unable to be covered by the CER 
income related to the low CER price as well as the lack of a credit buyer in the 
second contract period (Yu 2014: 39). 
Purdon (2017) suggests that CDM survived the 2012 UN climate change negotiation during 
a period where a much less ambitious second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol was 
agreed. However, the idea of exchange of carbon credits between developed and 
developing world is arguably losing political support. According to Purdon: 
Disappointed with the approach of the Kyoto Protocol and CDM, some have 
called for climate funds as an alternative strategy. Such funds have arisen rapidly 
following a commitment in Copenhagen towards $30 billion in 'fast-start' finance 
for 2010-2012. The UNFCCC is also establishing a Green Climate Fund [GCF] 
that is intended to 'play a key role in channelling new, additional, adequate and 
predictable financial resources to developing countries and will catalyse climate 
finance, both public and private, and at the international and national levels 
(Purdon 2015: 3). 
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Cost-effective, equality or needs? 
The ODI has reported that prior to the operationalization of the GCF in 2015, multilateral 
climate financing has been efficiently spent in countries with relatively high GHG emissions 
(ODI CFF 2016). During the negotiation of the GCF, questions were raised as to whether 
such a ‘cost-effective’ approach is appropriate. The majority of the funding went to large 
middle income countries such as China, India and Mexico. Others argued that ‘equality’ 
between the countries should be the organising principle, while others suggested that 
actually funding support ‘needs’ should be the priority. As an example, according to the 
‘needs’ strategy, whilst China may have the highest levels of emissions it is probably less 
likely that China is unable to raise funds for its transport projects.  
The GCF's current 50:50 mitigation/adaptation allocation framework reflects something of a 
political victory for non-Annex I countries that have fought to position adaptation as a priority 
in UNFCCC negotiations (Ciplet et al. 2013). After years of fruitless negotiations for a 
mitigation regime, and in the face of rising numbers of natural disasters (Khan and Roberts 
2013), many developing countries have organized to push for action that supports 
adaptation (Brechin and Espinoza 2017: 313).  
Mitigation provides a global public good with its benefits dispersed globally and experienced 
over long-time scales, while adaptation provides local benefits over a shorter time span 
(Watkiss et al. 2015). It is thus not surprising that mitigation—a strategy that reduces fossil 
fuel-based growth—is perceived as having higher political opportunity costs, making 
adaptation more attractive to developing and emerging economies (Kane and Shogren 
2000).  
Most importantly, the GCF marks a new direction in climate financing mechanisms by 
allowing direct access for recipient countries and including the private sector. The GCF can 
attract the private sector by reducing the costs and risks of climate investments that may not 
be considered commercially viable without its intervention (e.g., buying-down upfront costs 
of projects that are considered excessively risky). 
In terms of geographical distribution of funds, unlike CDM, where Africa had little access, 
within GCF, 20 percent of funding went to Africa. The general distribution to priority countries 
is as follows: 19 percent to African states, 13 percent to least developed countries (LDCs) 
and 8 percent to small-island developing states (SIDS), totalling 40 percent of available 
funds. Judging from the information that is available on the GCF website, the only current 
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project under the GCF that has a clear theme on transport is a project co-funded by the KfW 
Development Bank to build 80km of storm-proof roads. 
 
‘Co-benefit’ and coalition 
Very recent scholarship of the ‘big picture’ shows how the underlying domestic politics of 
major rising powers (China, India, Brazil and South Africa) influence their global positioning 
in climate negotiations. Schmitz (2016) puts it strongly:  
The key actors behind climate-relevant policies are not primarily concerned with 
environmental or climate issues. Their prime concerns are securing energy for 
the nation or particular regions, fostering new green industries and making them 
competitive, creating jobs and incomes in these industries, or laying the 
foundation for increasing public revenue. Reducing the risk of climate change is 
at best seen as a ‘co-benefit’ (Schmitz 2016: 5). 
With the growing success of the security framework in formulating national climate strategies 
for the energy sector, the search for synergies between low carbon transport and 
development goals is further complicated by potential conflict between national interests and 
local needs. For example, the World Bank and the PPMC have both suggested to start by 
looking for areas with synergies in goals, such as reduction in air pollution. However, even in 
terms of air pollution, there are conflicting solutions. The sustainable transport instruments 
with perhaps the most mixed response to pollutant and GHG reductions are those relating to 
cleaner or alternative fuels, where GHG emissions can actually increase (Dalkmann and 
Brannigan 2007: 37). Examples include improving fuel quality (e.g. lower sulphur), adding 
oxidation or 3-way catalyst, switching to compressed natural gas (CNG) or blending ethanol 
(Dalkmann and Brannigan 2007:36). Myanmar’s role in supplying cheap CNG as a means of 
ensuring national and regional energy security has had a crucial influence on its transport 
fuel policy. In spite of the growing controversy over CNG’s environmental impact, the product 
has remained a key element in Myanmar’s low carbon measures. 
The idea of ‘co-benefits’ (sometimes called ‘sustainable development benefits’; GIZ Report) 
offers the potential to address multi-policy objectives simultaneously and to support the 
creation of coalitions. 
The notion of co-benefits is useful in so much as it points to potential synergies with other 
policy objectives; efforts can be combined to be greater than the sum of their parts; and once 
areas of overlap are identified it is theoretically easier to build further coalitions and to 
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overcome barriers. The idea can be sensibly split between developed and developing 
countries and might be further refined into primary and secondary benefits (Huizenga and 
Bakker 2009) or direct and indirect benefits. 
The turn towards ‘policy holism’ at the intersection of climate and transport thinking opens 
the door to a social science contribution. Holism has traditionally been at the core of the 
social science approach to understanding society. For social scientists the idea that different 
domains of life, such as religion and politics, might be separated from one another 
categorically is problematic. A social scientific approach would see these various ideas as 
intertwined to the degree that one cannot be understood without the other. So too in the 
realm of everyday transport thinking, where people make decisions about how to move 
around cities that are deeply rooted in their cultural lives. Many of these decisions have 
nothing to do with transport but are motivated by the compulsions of social life, a domain 
which is the established realm of the social sciences. 
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